AFTER ACTION REPORT

WITH A COURSE OF ACTION PLAN FOR FOLLOWUP ACTIVITIES

OPERATION PATHFINDER

A Riverine Flood and Terrorism Functional Exercise
On January 12, 2005 for the
Sacramento Operational Area

FINAL REPORT
March 24, 2005

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Numerous individuals contributed to the planning of this event. Some of the names of these individuals are listed below.

The following individuals provided support as the Exercise Design Team:

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

I. Executive Summary

The Sacramento County Sheriff's Department Office of Emergency Services took the lead to produce and implement an interactive emergency operations center functional exercise for a large-scale riverine flood event combined with a terrorist attack incident. The exercise was held on January 12, 2005, from 9:15 A.M. until 3:00 P.M. It was dubbed **Operation Pathfinder**. Some 250 people were involved in this exercise activity. The exercise was the culmination of months of preparation with the cooperation of an Exercise Planning Committee comprised of volunteers from the City and County of Sacramento as members of the Sacramento Operational Area. This was further supported by years of work within the Operational Area to strengthen their own flood response capabilities, as well as actions to effectively address terrorism attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**).

The exercise content focused on building response planning and resource deployment relationships between many of the public sector organizations in the Operational area during a scenario involving a series of levee breaches during flood threats, including one caused by a terrorist act. The exercise was specifically designed to provide the kinds of challenges and pressures that occur in actual breaking events without time compression. Those with experiences in such events, like 9/1l, are painfully aware that the first eight hours of unexpected, challenging events are difficult to manage, if not survive. The stage was set to put the participants in an environment of realistic tension that would require close, flexible responses to quickly changing threat environments.

Besides participants from the City of Sacramento and Sacramento County, there were representatives from non-profit organizations involved in the exercise (the American Red Cross and Salvation Army) as mass care and shelter, which would always be a major response activity during such an event. There were also observers from state and federal agencies. The FBI also participated in the exercise as part of the Law Enforcement Branch. The Controller/Evaluator staff was comprised of emergency management officials and leaders from Sacramento, Amador, Yolo, San Joaquin, Placer, and El Dorado Counties, as well as the University of California, Davis.

The scenario started with an oncoming flood threat caused by an April heat wave melting a base of Sierra Snow that was still at 228% of normal. This threat was soon impacted by a suicide terrorist attack involving a commercial transport plane from Mather Field. The plane missed its intended target in the Sacramento fog and then crashed into the levee near the Tower Bridge along the swollen Sacramento River. This eventually led to a major breach into the downtown area, which was later impacted by other breaches on the American River. The plane crash caused structural damage to high rises in Sacramento, caused a major mass casualty incident on I-5 (including the release of serious levels of a hazardous material into the fog) and caused the derailment and roll over of a full Amtrak commuter train.

This exercise included some unique aspects, including the use of simultaneous flood impacts that restricted timely evacuation routes and restricted care and shelter capacities within the County. This was a groundbreaking activity, which proved highly productive for all participants. The overall ratings from the participants at the exercise were very high, as both highly satisfactory and satisfactory. The overall impression of participants was that the tabletop was successful in achieving its intent and was highly valued. This was verified by the exercise evaluation team, which found that the participants met most of the exercise objectives.

The exercise activity was followed by an exercise critique. This allowed representatives from the various participant components and jurisdictions to present their positions on the exercise, including both successes and unmet needs. Comments and working documents were captured and compiled for this After Action Report. It is important to note that any exercise of this scope and function must by its very nature find areas to improve, or the exercise is a failure. Specific areas that need further attention are noted in this report. A Course of Action Plan (CAP) is included with recommendations for future actions to address the gaps noted by the participants.

Participants noted many times that exercises regarding flooding impacts need to be scheduled and implemented on a regular basis. There needs to be more time to spend in the details of the operations of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) so that better understanding of inter-EOC communications can be achieved as well as better mastery of documentation and planning systems. Improvements in inter-jurisdictional and inter-disciplinary coordination are a critical aspect of this continued level of practice involving all members of the Sacramento Operational Area.

II. Scenario Purpose and Summary

A. Basis for Exercising: Challenge Statement

There was a recognized need to assess and evaluate the current levels of skills and capabilities of Sacramento County and City personnel to respond in a coordinated fashion to a large flood event. This included the need for practicing resource management, including resource support from state and federal government sources. There had not been an activation of a joint operation for a flooding emergency since the El Niño flooding of 1997. A terrorism response element was added to ensure considerations could also be addressed under the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program guidelines within the exercise structure.

B. Goal

The expectation, or overall goal for this exercise, was to increase the readiness of the Joint EOC personnel in order to perform their disaster response duties in the event there is a flood and/or a terrorist event in the County and/or City of Sacramento.

C. Objectives

The objectives of the tabletop were designed not to test an individual's knowledge or skills, but rather to exercise their roles using their current checklists and procedures to evaluate their effectiveness. It was designed as a method for evaluating command and control, decision-making, coordination and communications skills for flood and terrorism operations. No one was being specifically tested or evaluated to meet a national or state standard for certification of any participant's programs.

All objectives were evaluated as being ***met, unmet, or unobserved*** based on the findings and observations of the Evaluators. The summaries of all evaluator/controller comments are found at the very end of this report in Attachment 8. **Although some objectives were not met, and some were met only conditionally, the overall consensus of the evaluation team was that the EOC passed the exercise.**

1. Demonstrate the ability to implement SEMS. (Participants will initially identifying their roles, identify to whom they report, go to their assigned workplace and utilize the correct position checklists for the Joint EOC.)

Met

2. Perform timely initial threat assessments. (Participants will be expected to recognize growing and existing threats, evaluate the actual or potential threat impacts, prioritize the order of managing the threats, and identifying the actions needed to address each threat.)

Met with conditions.

Comment: Threat assessments are not effective if they are not completely shared and explained to other components of the organization. In addition, long-term, advanced planning must be considered in the assessment process. When advanced planning is incomplete or missing the threat assessment may be faulty in its scope.

3. Define evacuation areas and routes quickly to reduce loss of life. (Participants will assess population vulnerabilities, physical barriers, low lying and flood prone areas, traffic capacities, and special conditions, e.g., time of day, seasonality, weather, special events, etc.)

Met with conditions.

Comment: A more robust, integrated and automated system is needed to assist in this process that is now bulky and time intensive.

4. Identify and procure needed resources in a timely manner. (Participants will process requests from Sacramento County and City of Sacramento Department Operation Centers ((DOCs)), from the EOCs of other cities in the operational area, and with the Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC).

Met

OBJECTIVES: (Continued)

5. Evaluate the need for a local emergency declaration and a request for a Governor's Proclamation of a State of Emergency. (Participants will work with decision makers to ensure that a local emergency declaration is prepared and processed in a timely manner, including in it the request for a Governor's Proclamation of a State of Emergency.)

Met

6. Evaluate mutual aid needs (for all appropriate functions) and the processes, per function, used to acquire resources through the mutual aid system. (Participants will analyze and identify likely needs based on past experience and lessons learned, and process actual requests in a timely manner through the mutual aid system. This will include immediate identification of shortfalls when mutual aid cannot be provided.)

Met with conditions.

Comment: Some key mutual aid coordination participants were missing at the beginning of the exercise. In addition, Logistics support was underutilized in assessing resource needs availability as part of lessons learned from previous events. Closer coordination is needed for mutual aid coordination between Logistics and Operations.

7. Provide timely communications within the Joint EOC between SEMS functions, between disciplines, and between jurisdictions. (Participants will use the SEMS structure and protocols for all internal and external communications including forms, face-to-face, phone, and e-mail contacts.)

Unmet

Comment: There were substantial information gaps and lack of information sharing between sections during the event, including Management. There is a need for stronger integration of information sharing, including regular full-EOC briefings by Management so that all participants have a sense of the true status of the response. The implementation of liaisons between sections, with the recognition of their importance, needs further development. It is clear an inter-EOC status board system easily accessed by all is also critical, whether on a fixed surface and/or electronically situated. Internal electronic information sharing needs to be implemented for future activations of the EOC and training provided on the use of the system.

8. Prepare timely media news releases and media briefings, including rumor management, through a Joint Information Center (JIC) concept. (Participants will prepare materials adequate to inform the public and to hold at least one press briefing during the time of the exercise.)

Met with conditions.

Comment: The performance of the PIO participants was exemplary but there was no media participation or mock briefing to evaluate the capability of

OBJECTIVES: (Continued)

Management to appropriately meet and address media demands for public information. EAS messages were not actually delivered by the media, so there was no way to address how effective the request for EAS broadcasts would be in an actual event.

9. Prepare an Initial Damage Estimate (IDE) when requested by State OES. (Participants will prepare an IDE within two hours of the initial request from State OES.)

Unmet

Comment: Although data was being compiled and efforts were made to brief Management about the findings, an IDE was not completed in a two-hour timeframe. Much of the difficulty came with integrating GIS information into actual loss estimates. This process needs further development and practice across the various disciplines involved in providing information and statistics. It should be noted that a loss estimate was provided by the end of the exercise.

10. Establish requests for federal asset support as needed to support medical, health and morgue operation. (Participants will identify when Operational Area resources and resources from the mutual aid system are not adequate and more assistance is needed from federal agencies than has historically been provided during large-scale disaster operations.)

Met

11. Develop an Action Plan for whatever operational period is covered in the scenario. (Participants will hold an Operational Period Incident Action Plan meeting within the first two hours of the exercise to establish the goals and objectives of the participants based on existing and expected conditions.)

Unmet

Comment: The Action Planning process currently used in the Joint EOC is in non-compliance with current ICS/SEMS protocols and standards. The process of holding an Action Planning meeting and the proceeding development of the Action Plan document are well established and standardized nationally through the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS). The Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has noted in its guidance that it expects all government agencies to adhere to NIMS or face repercussions such as deobligation of funding. That makes this finding of particular merit for being addressed in a corrective action in a timely manner.

D. Exercise Design Process

The County and City of Sacramento's Emergency Managers met with TAO Emergency Management for an initial Kick-Off Oversight meeting on August 6, 2004. The full Exercise Design Committee met initially on August 31, 2004 to establish the parameters of the exercise and to approach the development process.

The exercise process timelines and milestones were developed, and a process for approval of all exercise products was approved. From August through the end of October, this Committee, lead by Exercise Director, Teresa Stahl, of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department Office of Emergency Services, worked with TAO Emergency Management Consulting to develop a complete and effective exercise package (available electronically from the Exercise Director). TAO also provided an Exercise Administration Manual to assist the Exercise Director. The other products included the Exercise Plan (EXPLAN) with the Master Scenario Events List (MSEL), the Controllers Instruction package (COSIN Plan) combined with the Evaluators Instruction Package (EVAL Plan) and the message and Simulation Cell (SIM Cell) guidance, including training and briefing materials. In addition, TAO was tasked to perform a 3-hour Incident Action Planning workshop for key members of the Operational Area EOC staff, in order to have a turnover document ready for the Exercise shift change on the following day, since the EOC was assumed to have been open for three days prior to the actual exercise date.

E. Master Scenario Events List (MSEL)

In order to ensure the approved exercise objectives would be met, a general overview of the flow of the exercise events was constructed. This description is called the Master Scenario Events List, or (**MSEL**). The MSEL for Operation Pathfinder is provided as Attachment 1.

Narrative Summary

The following narrative was used to introduce the flood threat situation to EOC staff the day before the exercise in order for them to prepare an EOC Action Plan for a shift turnover presentation.

It is an early Monday morning in mid-April. Northern California just experienced one of the most destructive and dangerous El Niño periods in its modern history. Heavy, intense rainstorms caused localized flash flooding and landslides through the Sierras and through the lower foothills. Losses along the California coastline were in the hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage. Twelve people lost their lives due to the storms in January and February. There were landslides on Highway 50 near Whitehall.

Extreme, record-breaking cold held the Sierra snow packs at their highest recorded levels: almost 225% of normal. The cold streak broke in late March, which was followed in early April by record heat. Redding hit 100 degrees in the first week of April: another record. These unusual extremes have caused losses of many crops in California, as well as the death of livestock. Sudden Oak Death virus has depleted almost one quarter of the Sierra live oaks in the last two weeks. These losses are unprecedented. NOAA is tracking a major cell coming from another Pineapple Express that could strike the area with significant rainfall in three to four days, but that depends on whether a high-pressure ridge descends from Alaska.

The sudden, continuous heat has filled the Sierra Rivers. Folsom Dam warned Sacramento County and the State last week that they expect Folsom Dam reserves to be challenged sometime on Monday afternoon. There will need to be releases that could exceed 145,000 cubic feet per second if the melt continues at its current pace. The levees

are already running near capacity in the Sacramento area from both the American and Sacramento Rivers. Releases are also expected later from Oroville and Shasta that also exceed 145,000 cfs. The County and City have had the Joint EOC open since Friday in anticipation of possible flooding. Fog has become another challenge. The temperatures in the valley at night are also unseasonably low, allowing the area to be locked in with fog until midday.

Sand bags are in place and messages have been prepared to warn city residents to take immediate evacuation measures, based on pre-designated evacuation routes and plans. These evacuation routes and news releases for warning the public have already been prepared for areas known to be vulnerable in past flooding events (Players have already been handed evacuation route plans, news releases for evacuation notices to this area, and sand bag information.) The media has been covering this new flood threat since the national focus of attention during the Winter Storms.

Site Locations for Activities

The following were sites of major activities that were driven by the scenario:

- An airplane crash at the Tower Bridge in Sacramento
- An MCI with hazmat release on I-5 near Old Sacramento
- High-rise damage to office buildings and hotels in the Downtown area
- An Amtrak commuter train is reported turned over
- A train carrying chloroform is damaged and then releases chemicals
- A breech occurs at the levee near the Tower Bridge
- The dams in the area warn of record releases due to heavy run off
- Levees begin to fail on the American River near Campus Commons

F. Message Summary

Some 164 formal messages were developed to direct the actions forward in the exercise. These were delivered to participants by having the section controller read them first and then hand a copy to the recipient. Some of the messages were injected by phone from a Simulation Cell located at the County Sheriff's Headquarters. Many other messages occurred ad hoc to the Simulation Cell since it acted as all external agencies and contacts as needed by the EOC.

Some of the messages were provided as news announcements in the EOC. The Lead Controller acted as the announcer and emphasized the messages with manipulated photographs that simulated the events in the news briefings.

The message control was carefully designed to ensure timing, delivery, and performance measures were completed to meet the exercise design objectives. An example of the details in the message design is provided as Attachment 2.

DISASTER SCENE MAP

G. Controllers/Evaluators and Their Function

TAO provided a controller training class and guidance materials for the controller team in order to ensure the efficient delivery of message traffic, ensure continuity of the exercise play, and to evaluate performance related to the objectives when observable. Teresa Stahl acted as the Exercise Director to evaluate continuity and thoroughness of the process. Rick Tobin, of TAO, served as the Lead Controller. Other control team members served as lead or support for the Management/Command, Operations, Logistics, and Planning and Intelligence functions. A separate controller provided oversight for the Simulation Cell. Rick Tobin later facilitated the after exercise critique, and produced this After Action Report in coordination with Sacramento County Emergency Operations Office and the exercise participants who provided review comments.

H. Exercise Day Schedule

A schedule was developed for the day of the exercise to ensure that all administrative and safety elements were covered, as well as ensuring that the initial briefing would set the stage for play. The primary exercise activity was to start at 9:15 A.M., with closure at 3:00 P.M. The exercise closed earlier than expected due to the extent of play and the effort demonstrated by the EOC participants. A copy of the exercise day schedule is provided as Attachment 3.

I. Outcome of the Exercise Implementation

The day started with the distribution of an EOC Action Plan that was developed the day before in an intensive 3-hour workshop. The Action Plan covered specific areas of concern based on the current threat of flooding including flood fight operations, evacuation considerations, public warning and care and shelter. This process was completed to reinforce the need for and techniques used in action planning meetings. It was clear from the outset that the EOC Management and supporting Sections did not have a clear understanding of the use and value of the Action Plan or the need for continued, timely updates during the operational period. In that regard, part of the ICS/SEMS functionality of the EOC did not meet current standards and best practices.

After a briefing by the City Manager, acting as the EOC Director, the EOC began planning for its next activities based loosely on the current threat briefing and then on a scenario update provided by the Lead Controller, Rick Tobin. That update is provided directly after this section (H). Shortly after that update, the EOC was alerted to a simulation of a major shaking in the EOC facility, with an electrical spike on phones and pagers. This caused an unexpected evacuation of one of the work groups in the EOC, without the same response from other EOC participants. It is believed that they were people with experiences with earthquakes and they believed incorrectly that this was a major quake, or the predecessor to one. This reaction, with a lack of reaction from the other members of the EOC (including Management) should be the topic of further discussion in training sessions for the Operational Area.

The exercise MSEL was then followed closely, with messages being delivered very closely to the timeline. This caused tremendous pressure on several operational functions, especially law enforcement and fire. It also put an early

and continuous pressure on the PIO function, due to the nature of the public and media concerns. Jurisdictional decisions were made not to activate and practice a Rumor Control function for this exercise as part of set up. This decision caused strain on the PIO function, but gave members in that group a realistic experience of fast breaking, large events when a Rumor Control function was not at the ready.

Part of the early confusion also occurred when Management moved their briefing meetings and planning sessions to another building distant from the EOC. The building did not have access to meeting rooms attached directly to the main work area. This separation of the chain of command from the EOC initially left a vacuum of leadership and line of authority in the EOC. Deputies were often not designated to perform the duty of Chiefs or the EOC Director during the initial briefings. This was corrected to some degree as the exercise progressed, but the initial break in command complicated the communications and decision-making process as major events occurred during the external leadership meetings. Communications to the external briefing area was also poor to non-existent, which caused further delays in response decisions. In a breaking event, that lack of communication and chain of command to and from the EOC could have done serious damage to public safety and support of field elements looking for support from the EOC.

Sharing of communications between and within Sections became a major issue and was only slightly alleviated by the termination of the exercise. Several things contributed to this challenge, including:

- Poor telephone protocols, experience, and use as well as function
- Lack of recognized liaisons between groups
- The physical design of the EOC, which blocked easy access between Sections
- The noise level and confusion during verbal communications
- The lack of use or understanding of the internal e-mail system
- The lack of use or understanding of the forms located on the web-based site
- The lack of ability to share technical data through a single server between the City and County, and between GIS and other functions
- The failure of the LAN and the server to support the internal communications needs
- The infrequent total EOC briefings from Management to all Sections, and the infrequent Section Chief briefings to their own sections after external planning and briefing sections
- The lack of established, verified information of large status boards
- The visual limitation of screens to portray critical GIS graphics
- The limited use of RIMS and understanding of its use

Probably the most embattled function was the Planning and Intelligence Section, which was behind the power curve of information all day, based on many of the factors listed above and some other basic operational difficulties. It was clear that the other Sections, including Management, did not truly understand the role and responsibilities of the Planning and Intelligence Section. This caused further problems for that Section as they were not accorded appropriate and timely information, or appropriate direction based on ICS/SEMS to support their designated function. This was particularly true in the areas of preparation of Situation Status Reports on a regular basis, leadership for coordinating and

preparing an EOC Action Plan, and tracking the use and effectiveness of resources including the development of Advanced Planning. It should be noted that the Planning and Intelligence function battles with time factors in every large event, and commonly struggles for recognition for information sharing (especially from the Operations Section). This is a challenge noted universally in EOC environments. However, some protocols for the Sections operation and role in the Sacramento County Operational Area must be revised and redesigned to ensure the staff in that Section are allocated the support and respect required for them to achieve their mission. One of the key precepts of ICS/SEMS is that resources be utilized to their maximum effect for the public safety. Without a solid, effective Planning and Intelligence Section, resources may be directed ineffectively and without regard for impacts that Operations may not consider in their allocation.

As the exercise progressed there were occasional lulls in activity from the heavy strain of numerous compounding events. This was designed specifically to provide some psychological and physical relief for the participants, while still maintaining a sense of drama based on the potential threats still pending.

A number of the technical support groups noted the need for more data they felt would be available during breaking events. This, of course, is not usually the case, and the desire for more detail and critical data is always at the forefront of emergency response in practically catastrophic situations. The information available in the first six hours after the explosion at Oklahoma City, or the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center, are classic examples of the void of critical technical data in the first shift of emergency response operations. The desire for more data, however, did drive personnel to note consistently that more pre-existing flood map information and related supporting documents should be available by computer or hardcopy at all times in the EOC. It was clear that even with forewarning that a flood exercise would be held, many documents were simply not available in a timely manner. The exercise pointed out this shortcoming as an action item designated as needing accomplishment in the short term.

Equipment issues plague the participants in the current EOC. It is true that the new EOC proposed for McClellan will solve many of these challenges, but until that time, some of these shortfalls must be addressed prior to the next real activation. These shortfalls include issues with phones, faxes, copiers, printers (of all kinds), Internet access, LAN and server usage, information sharing software, and graphics capabilities. One of the most clarion calls was for a situation status board visible to all participants so everyone had the latest news.

The play was vigorous and challenging; however, noise control was an initial factor that was somewhat disruptive. All groups noted that they would have liked much more time to discuss the issues that were raised but the scenario kept changing faster than some groups could respond. Some also noted that there was not enough time to find substantial solutions. This, however, fit into the design of the exercise, which was intended to uncover areas of concern, assumptions, and protocols that needed to be resolved and then included in the next revision of the Operational Area Plan, in training, and in the construction of the new EOC. That overall goal was definitely achieved, although some objectives were unmet due to the intensity of the events. Participants were very motivated and engaged throughout the exercise. The exercise was terminated early as play declined.

OPENING SCENARIO BRIEFING

Please note that this exercise only activates and evaluates the Joint EOC, and not the DOCs and field operations. Those are all part of the Operational Area emergency process and it is important to keep that in mind when evaluating today's activities. In real events this facility cannot act without them. The DOCs provide the information from the field. Direct field contacts do not generally occur from the EOC.

You will be using the flood fight, evacuation plans, care and shelter plans, media releases and public warning messages, and sand bagging information that was developed yesterday based on the flooding threats discussed below.

It is an early Monday morning in mid-April. Northern California just experienced one of the most destructive and dangerous El Niño periods in its modern history. Heavy, intense rainstorms caused localized flash flooding and landslides through the Sierras and through the lower foothills. Losses along the California coastline were in the hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage. Twelve people lost their lives due to the storms in January and February. There were landslides on Highway 50 near Whitehall.

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The sudden, continuous heat has filled the Sierra Rivers. Folsom Dam warned Sacramento County and the State last week that they expect Folsom Dam reserves to be challenged sometime on Monday afternoon. There will need to be releases that could exceed 145,000 cubic feet per second if the melt continues at its current pace. The levees are already running near capacity in the Sacramento area from both the American and Sacramento Rivers. Releases are also expected later from Oroville and Shasta that also exceed 145,000 cfs. The County and City have had the Joint EOC open since Friday in anticipation of possible flooding. Fog has become another challenge. The temperatures in the valley at night are also unseasonably low, allowing the area to be locked in with fog until midday.

Sand bags are in place and messages have been prepared to warn city residents to take immediate evacuation measures, based on pre-designated evacuation routes and plans. These evacuation routes and news releases for warning the public have already been prepared for areas known to be vulnerable in past flooding events (Players have already been handed evacuation route plans, news releases for evacuation notices to this area, and

OPENING SCENARIO BRIEFING (CONTINUED)

sand bag information.) The media has been covering this new flood threat since the national focus of attention during the Winter Storms.

Traffic is very heavy this morning as workers return from the weekend. Students are returning to schools after Spring Break. Only a few traffic accidents have occurred, including a big rig carrying corn oil syrup on I-5 near the Sacramento International Airport. A hazmat team was called out early in the morning, and was then released after the contents were identified from the trucker's manifest.

The current terrorism threat level is Yellow and is not expected to reduce the early spring tourist season. There have been no major terrorism threats to California or the U.S. since the presidential elections in November. There was a large rally for peace held over the weekend in protest to the President's appearance with the Governor on Sunday night at the Convention Center. The President is scheduled to fly out this morning to return to Washington, as soon as the fog clears. He and his staff are staying at a large hotel near the Convention Center.

Sacramento had a major regional horseshow at Cal Expo over the weekend. This coincided with a Grape Symposium held downtown and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The President took a moment to speak to the grape growers of California. He also appeared at the Asia Fair that was held partially in Downtown Plaza and in Old Sacramento, including a parade.

There are no major flu outbreaks in the area. The influenza season is almost over with just sporadic cases being reported.

The winds are still, with a heavy fog limiting visibility to a hundred feet. Temperatures are expected to reach 90 degrees by midday after the fog clears.

There were no power outages or other related utility problems in the County overnight, although there were brown outs in Southern California in the last two days due to the record heat in Los Angeles.

There were no major fires during the last twenty-four hours in the region, although large fires have been burning in much of Northern Florida.

III. Participants and Observers

There were 250 participants in various roles during the exercise. There was representation from various Operational Area jurisdictions and California State agencies, some federal agencies, and emergency management professionals throughout the exercise. The full list of all participants and observers is found in Attachment 4 of this report.

IV. Critique Process and Comments

A. The Critique

A critique of the exercise was held shortly after the conclusion of the exercise. Rick Tobin later worked with the various Section Chiefs to elicit first supportive and then constructive comments regarding the exercise. The Critique comments from the Hot Wash are provided in Attachment 5. EOC participant written comments are also summarized as Attachment 7. Many of the comments stressed the absolute importance of having regularly scheduled exercises in order to refresh and hone the skills of those assigned to respond. Team building was described by most of the participants as the most important outcome of the day's efforts. Regular face-to-face coordination with City and County players is crucial.

B. The Participant Evaluation

All participants and observers were allowed the opportunity to complete a written survey to evaluate the exercise design and performance. There were a total of 100 surveys completed by the EOC participants. The survey form and the summary of those surveys are provided as Attachments 6 and 7. Controller/Evaluator comments and findings are provided in Attachment 8.

V. Lessons Learned and Correction Action Plan

A. Primary Lessons Learned

Although there were many lessons learned by the participants and the Exercise Management Team, there were 3 primary lessons learned to direct further action:

1. The chain of command, and the command and control function, must be improved in the EOC operations from Management through the other Section Chiefs, including the regular briefing of the EOC as a whole and preparing EOC Action Plans.
2. Communications barriers, especially the sharing of critical and vital information, must be improved throughout the EOC through further training, practice, and the removal of physical, procedural and technological barriers.
3. The Operational Area, including all of its cities and involved special districts, and its Department Operations Centers, must participate completely and more often in large-scale exercises, including field exercises. Initial and refresher training must support this by preparing anyone who has an assigned role, or potential, to perform in the EOC environment.

B. Course of Action Plan (CAP)

Comments provided by exercise participants, including observers, were captured and categorized by programmatic elements. The following table notes the

suggestions for improvement and the performance measures necessary to achieve the improvements. Target dates for completing the improvements are also provided. Many of the projects would need to be designed, developed and implemented by multiple jurisdictions within the Sacramento Operational Area, with State and federal assistance for personnel support, resources, and in some cases installation or modifications to existing facilities.

TABLE 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN MATRIX

NOTE: SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS AND MILESTONE DATES FOR COMPLETION ARE ONLY SUGGESTIONS
SHORT TERM: TO BE COMPLETED BY MAY 1, 2005
MID-TERM: TO BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER 1, 2005
LONG-TERM: TO BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 30, 2006

CATEGORY	COMMENT	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PROPOSED MILESTONE FOR COMPLETION
PLAN AND PROCEDURES MODIFICATIONS	The County, Cities and supporting special districts of the Sacramento County Operational Area need to meet and revise their operating procedures, checklists and supporting forms and documents for the operation of the Joint Emergency Operations Center. The processes of resource allocation, information distribution, purchasing, resource tracking, and action planning are just some of the areas that need to be handled seamlessly between jurisdictions and functional sections. This may call for revision of policy, directions, specific assignments, information flow processing, and specific compliance to ICS/SEMS/NIMS standards.	The revised policies and documents should be in compliance with: • ICS/SEMS as directed by State OES and regulation • NIMS and the NRP, as directed by federal DHS and through guidance from State OES • Relevant NFPA 1600 and EMAP standards • Agreement between jurisdictional functions, e.g., finance and accounting policies for purchasing that vary between entities. • Best practices and standards used in Emergency Operations Centers in California	September 1, 2005
PERSONNEL TRAINING	The Operational Area jurisdictions should schedule several layers of training for personnel assigned to the EOC. The training should be in agreement with changes and modifications made to existing procedures and documents as directed in the previous finding.	The training should be focused on clearly defined outcomes addressing: • EOC operations and communications/data access • Functional operations • Command and Control with Unified Command • Technology applications and use	September 1 2005 through June 30, 2006 (In phased workshop and seminar schedules.)

CATEGORY	COMMENT	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PROPOSED MILESTONE FOR COMPLETION
EMERGENCY INFORMATION AND DATA SOURCE	The Operational Area needs to develop an integrated, computer-based, information and data collection and tracking system established in the EOC, which allows access to all participants. This will require software and hardware selection, utilization planning and design, operational testing, training on debugged systems, and then testing using the information systems.	The Operational system must be flexible enough to meet the needs of various stakeholders and require minimum maintenance outside of baseline data entry and regular updates. The system must have a track record in other California communities and be compatible with other external data systems such as EDIS, CDEC, HAN, ERIS, JRIES, CAMEO and RIMS to name just a few, as well as databases and GIS operations used in jurisdictions within the Operational Area. The system should also be compatible with internal and external e-mail systems. The system should also meet the standards and requirements set by the Department of Homeland Security.	June 1, 2006
GIS INFORMATION SHARING	The Operational Area needs to develop a central clearinghouse for Operational Area jurisdiction's GIS databases. This ensures that critical facilities, resources, support locations, care and shelter sites, and EOCs can be evaluated on a continuous basis during a disaster or threat of a disaster. The coordinated clearinghouse should also automatically accept regular updates to ensure verification and validation of data.	This process should be coordinated and constructed through an Operational Area GIS working group who are in charge of GIS assets and policy. This will ensure jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction consistency, including data file swapping, formats, and access. State OES should also play a role in helping develop this process.	September 1, 2005

CATEGORY	COMMENT	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PROPOSED MILESTONE FOR COMPLETION
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT	Operational Area needs to develop a punch list that addresses the facility and equipment concerns raised by the participants in this exercise. Some of the activities may be delayed until the move is complete to the McClellan site. However, most of the concerns need to be addressed in the La Sierra Community Center in order to be better prepared for activations and response that occur before a move of the Joint EOC can be accomplished.	This process should be coordinated and tracked using the ICS/SEMS system. A Director of the project should work with a Section Chief from Operations, Logistics, Planning and Finance to readily address the immediate resolutions, and to schedule and capture long-term issues that are best resolved in a new facility (e.g., the facility at La Sierra cannot be made bigger, that is a constraint that cannot be addressed at that site.)	May 1, 2005 for immediate mitigation items. June 30, 2006 for long-term resolutions (based on a relocation to McClellan.)
DRILLS AND EXERCISES	The Operational Area should coordinate all planned and funded drills and exercises so that the most benefit will result for the entire Operational Area. This can include combining activities in drills, expanding tabletop participation, holding functional exercises that activate more than the Joint EOC, and field exercises that encompass every jurisdiction and response function within the County boundaries. These should be scheduled in phases so that the next functional or field exercise occurs no later than June 30, 2006, preferably involving the new facilities at McClellan.	State OES, FEMA, the federal DHS and DHHS have all pressed for better consolidation and coordination of local grant funds so that efforts are not reproduced and communities focus more on the best outcomes for public safety, than for building program budgets. The Operational Area will be under severe pressure in the coming years to demonstrate that this consolidation was accomplished, especially in the area of drills and exercises.	September 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006. This will be dependent on the revision of the existing plans and procedures, training of personnel, and the movement of the Joint EOC to McClellan.

CATEGORY	COMMENT	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PROPOSED MILESTONE FOR COMPLETION
PUBLIC INFORMATION	The Public Information function needs several significant changes in order to ensure that the Operational Area can indeed manage concerns of the multiple stakeholders (public, media, employees, other elected officials, private sector interests). A Public Information Council should be established that meets every quarter with representatives from every jurisdiction participating in the Operational Area. In addition, the Joint EOC should be more properly supported with technology, equipment, and appropriate space for this function (including a separate media briefing area that is pre-identified and appropriate). Any and all training involving communications within the Joint EOC must include at least one representative from the PIO function. The Public Information Council should also consider releasing regular "Disaster Insights" as a fact sheet to all currently assigned Section Chiefs in the Joint EOC. These fact sheets would be developed through approval of the OA Council and would provide fresh and relevant insights into disaster response information happening in the community, statewide, or nationally that would be of interest or relevant to response in Sacramento County.	State OES Public Information has developed a similar statewide council with all State agency PIOs. The value of an integrated, scheduled council has proven valuable in communities that implemented such a structure. It also allows for a base of connectivity with active local media so that there is an awareness built and fostered between government and the private sector. When local emergency response officials receive regular updates from an organization they become more comfortable and familiar with how to work with the PIO function during disasters. This is enhanced by bringing something to the EOC leadership on a regular basis.	May 1, 2005

VI. Photos of the Exercise Activities

The Operation Pathfinder participants worked diligently to complete their tasks during the exercise. Here are a few of the photographic memories for participants to remember the team building of that day.

VI. Photos of the Exercise Activities (Continued)

VI. Photos of the Exercise Activities (Continued)

VII. Photos of the Exercise Activities (Continued)

VI. Photos of the Exercise Activities (Continued)

VII. Access to a Copy of the Tabletop Exercise Manual

An electronic copy of the Exercise Manual for Operation Pathfinder can be requested through the Sacramento County Emergency Operations Office. Send the requests to Teresa Stahl at:

stahlt@sacsheriff.com

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ATTACHMENTS

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ATTACHMENT 1

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

The exercise was scheduled for January 12, 2005, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The scenario was based on simulated events. Exercise information shown below is primarily for driving events, but not all message traffic to support the exercise is shown in detail here.

Exercise Time

Key evacuation planning was done the day before the exercise.

0845 hrs. All exercise participants are briefed about the rules of the exercise. The date is a Monday morning in mid-April. All play is to be considered real time. All participants and observers in the EOC are given an initial opening briefing by the Lead Controller. The opening scenario brings them up to date with information about the threats of flooding from the fast melt of the deep snow pack. In addition, all players are told that the Folsom, Oroville and Shasta Dams may have large releases sometime in the next 12 hours, based on melt projections. The Cosumnes River may flood the Michigan Bar area late on Monday or early Tuesday, which may then later impact Wilton and Elk Grove areas.

0915 hrs. Complaints come into the 911 about a low flying cargo plane in the El Dorado Hills and Folsom area. Complaints have been increasing ever since the flight path was changed two years ago. At least six callers are irate that the plane is far too low, and is causing animals to be upset and shaking windows and glassware. There is no fog above Folsom, but it is still almost zero visibility in the Sacramento City area.

0918 hrs. The Bureau of Reclamation calls for assistance to quell rumors of a low-flying large jet aircraft that may be a threat to the Folsom Dam.

0920 hrs. A loud series of rumbles are felt inside the EOC, followed by a shaking on the ground. Pagers and cell phones go off all over the EOC. There are no immediate reports as to the cause. It is unclear whether there has been a large explosion or an earthquake.

0925 hrs. Reports come in from Sacramento City Police about several explosions in the Downtown Plaza and Old Sacramento areas along the river, followed by a huge explosion somewhere north of the Tower Bridge. It is very hard to tell what is going on as the fog has limited visibility to less than 100 feet in the area, especially along I-5. Early reports from officers at the scene describe damage to levee walls at the crash scene. The Wells Fargo Building and the Holiday Inn Hotel have impact damage on several top floors from a plane impact or flying debris. A Watch Commander for the Sacramento City Police reports that I-5 has several big rigs tipped over. Hazardous materials are leaking out and forming gas clouds in the fog. Dozens of passenger vehicles are piled up in the fog. There are many casualties. There appears to be numerous glows and small explosions coming from the crash site, but the fog is too dense for the officers on scene to make out exact details.

0930 hrs. Arriving officers report pandemonium in the Downtown area. The buildings were full of people just starting the workweek. Traffic was heavy on all freeways as late arrivals struggled with the fog. No law enforcement or life flight helicopters can assist in the response, and no television copters or planes can cover the scene. Ground reports are still sketchy with conflicting reports about the size and scope of the damage. A report arrives at Sacramento County 911 from a silent alarm at the Mather Air Field. Hundreds of calls are coming into the Dispatch Center requesting assistance for injured people, fire suppression, damaged buildings, and missing persons. The 911 system is overwhelmed and unusable.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

Exercise Time

0945 hrs. Sacramento Fire takes charge of the Incident Command Post near the crash scene. Winds are still. There is difficulty getting response vehicles into the area as many people are trying to exit the area in their cars. Numerous new car accidents are reported on the freeways, as the fog is still thick and dangerous for travel. A choking cloud of gas is reported to be drifting through old Sacramento and the Downtown Plaza Area. West Sacramento requests assistance to put out fires on the west side of the Sacramento River. Falling, burning debris and explosive concussions have caused considerable damage in a large residential area. A number of elderly people are reported to have died, probably from inhalation of gases from the hazmat releases. FBI arrive and began to attempt coordination of crisis management including gathering forensic information, but the hazardous materials clouds in the area prevent spending much time at the scene.

1000 hrs. New reports from fire service and law enforcement personnel on scene state that there are many casualties from flying glass and debris falling from high-rise buildings, and from exposure to toxic fumes. At least 1,000 people may be injured with 53 confirmed dead on I-5 near the crash scenes. Airplane debris is recovered throughout the area indicating that some type of large aircraft clipped a number of Downtown buildings before piling into a levee north of the Tower Bridge. Calls come in for more law enforcement, EMS, and public works to help close streets to general traffic so ambulances can proceed directly to the Downtown medical center. The first photos come from news helicopters flying over the fog level. They show a huge plume of black and white smoke billowing up and layering onto the fog at the crash scene. Occasional flames burst through the fog bank. The Bureau of Reclamation and the National Weather Service cancel their briefing due to the breaking events. The CHP Academy is being evacuated according to one radio station. The Sacramento County Administration Building also is damaged from debris. Calls from families of county employees to ascertain the welfare of family members begin to overwhelm county 911 and Dispatch services.

1015 hrs. Reports from rescue teams near the Tower Bridge indicate that water from the levee wall is beginning to seep through in muddy boils near the crash site. Requests are made for assistance from City, County, and State engineers to assist with an immediate risk assessment. The engineers may need to enter the area in Level-A suits because of the hazmat gases in the area. It appears that part of the plane struck a train loaded with chemicals that was moving just west of I-5. Hazardous material liquids are escaping from the derailed train near the Delta King Riverboat in Old Sacramento. Other reports note that the Holiday Inn at Capitol Plaza has been hit on the top floors by plane debris as it descended. Many of the upper floors are damaged. There may be many casualties as the Hotel was full of visitors from weekend festivities. An Amtrak passenger train also tipped on its side at the passenger station. Calls come to law enforcement from the media who want to find out the status of the President. Communications are not working in some areas. Cellular sites are saturated with calls. There is major concern that the President and his staff have been hurt as they were staying near the Convention Center.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

Exercise Time

1030 hrs. Flood engineers and hazmat crews enter the crash scene after donning protective equipment. They are sent in with photo and video equipment and air sampling devices. They find that the levee is threatening to fail in several places. Muddy water is percolating heavily throughout at least a two hundred foot span of levee north of the Bridge, on the Sacramento side. Engineers on the West Sacramento side have found no breach or failures. Engineers at the EOC recommend planning an evacuation of the area formed inside a box formed by I-5, I-80 and Business 80, and the American River levees. Failure is not imminent, but likely in hours. This includes the Downtown medical centers, which are now managing the care of hundreds of seriously injured patients. Media coverage from local stations shows the devastation on the ground and the establishment of temporary morgues nearby. A map is now available of the buildings that are severely damaged in the Downtown area.

1100 hrs. The Sacramento County Executive should by this time have declared a Local Emergency. The Governor appears in a media briefing. He reports that a cargo plane was stolen from Mather Air Field and that it appears to have been filled with high explosives. It is believed that the plane was headed for either the State Capitol building, or perhaps the President's hotel. There is speculation that the unexpected, heavy fog disoriented the pilots, causing them to crash off course of their target. This was obviously a terrorist attack. The Governor stresses that the government is doing everything possible to support the victims in Sacramento.

1110 hrs. Phones and electrical power fail in the central section of Sacramento. Radio transmission towers are temporarily interrupted. Engineers report there is a threat that a gas main along I-5 may have been damaged during the explosion. The utility companies shut off natural gas flows through the area until an assessment can be made and repairs completed.

1115 hrs. The Govemor states to the press that he will immediately declare a State of Emergency and then will request federal assistance as soon as possible. He states to the press that he plans to activate the California National Guard to seal off both sides of the Tower Bridge and secure the Downtown area. He then turns the podium over to the Mayor of Sacramento to discuss current actions being taken, including a large-scale evacuation of the Downtown area due to the threat of the levees failing.

1130 hrs. The Governor proclaims a State of Emergency. The President declares a Major Disaster and calls upon FEMA and all other Homeland Security agencies to support the response and recovery efforts. Law enforcement reports that all highways in the Sacramento area are gridlocked with spontaneous evacuations. West Sacramento reports a wholesale evacuation of the City. This is causing further delays on major routes as access is impeded. This hampers incoming emergency response support from other communities for fire, hazmat, law, EMS, and heavy rescue. The Weather Service reports that the fog should begin to burn off a little after noon. Skies should be open for flying by 1:00, but remain unsafe at this time for helicopter traffic.

1200 hrs. Emergency crews report they are leaving the areas around the levees north of the Tower Bridge. The ICP is being moved outside the Downtown area. The levee begins showing many boils. Search and Rescue Teams, and CERT, are leaving the areas except as volunteers who are trying to get out the last trapped victims. Many victims may still be trapped in the buildings in the area. One of the major problems was an Amtrak train that was tipped over. There are still many inside the train that have not been extracted. Low-lying areas of I-5 are still packed with drivers who have not been able to move through the gridlock. The fog is beginning to lift. Hazmat, fire, EMS and heavy rescue crews have been arriving in the County, but cannot get timely access to the Downtown staging area. A DMAT is being called to activate at McClellan Park to support evacuated patients from the Downtown medical facilities. Many patients are delayed in route due to the gridlock.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

Exercise Time

1200 hrs. (Continued)

The Bureau of Reclamation informs the emergency personnel in the Joint EOC, as well as the Governor and the President, that at 2:00 p.m. Folsom will have to begin releases of as much as 145,000 cfs. There needs to be some strategy to deal with the disaster site and levee failure north of the Tower Bridge on the Sacramento River, while high stresses may occur along the American River levees. Oroville Dam and Shasta Dam report similar releases will occur shortly after 6:00 p.m. due to the massive run off in today's high temperatures. It has already reached 95^0 in Redding. Water levels are registering high at Michigan Bar on the Cosumnes River.

1215 hrs. The lunch announcement will be made to the Joint EOC. All Section Chiefs are to ensure that they release people in such a manner that their Section continues to function, just as in a real disaster. People should be released as available to lunch.

1250 hrs. Many calls come in from public and media regarding the safety of Folsom Dam, including concerns about dam integrity and future terrorist attacks.

Boils have also appeared on the Sacramento side of the levees in the Pocket Road area along the Sacramento River. The water coming from the boils is currently clear, but there are dozens of sites reported. Levee patrols are closely monitoring the condition. Sacramento River is at flood warning stage but is not expected to increase due to the Sacramento weir and the Sacramento bypass. (Response should be monitoring, not evacuation)

1315 hrs. City non-profit agencies report huge amounts of unsolicited donations being dumped at fire stations throughout the County. This is tying up fire fighters, and in some cases blocking exits from stations. Rumors begin to appear in the media and from phone calls that the explosion was a dirty bomb with nuclear materials. A terrorist organization has claimed credit for the crash into Sacramento and claims it is the first of many strikes to come against the evil United States. There is some concern that a secondary terrorist action may be enacted against response personnel The Bureau of Reclamation announces that Folsom has started its release of 145,000 cfs. There is a concern there will a need to increase releases if snowmelt continues at current rates. The new release does not threaten to overtop the dam. The levee near H-Street Bridge on the Campus Commons side of the river is showing signs of failure. The levee north of the Tower Bridge begins to fail.

1330 hrs. People in the area can see that water is quickly filling in the area near the Sacramento Museum of History and stretching towards the Amtrak station. The media is now in the air over the scene, showing the devastation and the water moving towards the trapped train. The media reports dozens of civilians in boats trying to retrieve people from buildings and the Amtrak train.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

Exercise Time

1330 hrs.
(Continued)

There are now reported to be over 1,000 casualties being treated in the three-county area, with hundreds being routed to the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) being set up at McClellan Park. There are not enough ventilators to treat all the victims with crushed chests from the crash areas, or for damaged lungs from hazmat exposures. A general call is made by State EMSA and DHS for all nurses and doctors in the area to report to McClellan Park. The Coroner has released the confirmed number of dead at 355 at this point, but that number is expected to increase, as more information is available from the Downtown area. Among the dead are 4 firefighters and 3 police officers lost in the explosion, fires, and sudden flooding. Three ambulances are missing from the evacuation area. A DMORT team will be necessary to deal with the expected high volume of corpses, and with identification, including the pilots of the plane.

Shelters that have been set up are receiving many complaints from those who are medically fragile who need special care and equipment. The media is also on scene reporting these shortfalls. The phone lines are also being overwhelmed with calls about school children in the evacuation, about patients moved from hospitals, and about loved ones that were caught in traffic who have not reported. Cellular coverage in the area is saturated so many people cannot be reached in their cars.

Volunteers are calling in, tying up phone lines. The number of volunteers is overwhelming the efforts to coordinate them. Hundreds of dogs and cats are now reported to be swimming in the Downtown area, and the media show one horse swimming desperately down the streets of Old Sacramento. It may be from one of the carriage vendors.

1350 hrs.

The Governor announces that all state agencies are to immediately active their continuity of government (COG) and continuity of operations (COOP) plans. The Governor is moving his operations to an undisclosed location in the foothills.

The ARC begins calls for blood donations.

Chemicals from the many hazardous materials spills are now mixed in with the floodwaters. A map is now available of the spread of the floodwaters and their depth throughout the Downtown area. Warnings come from the Corp of Engineers that the backwater going up against the inside of the north levee of the American River could cause it to weaken. The levee wall breech is now 200 yards wide north of the Tower Bridge.

MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST

Exercise Time

1410 hrs. Floodwaters in the Downtown area have now cut off all street access to I-5, I-80 and State Route 50. Rescue helicopters are working hard in the area, as are DART teams. The California National Guard and Coast Guard are providing services including boats to rescue trapped citizens. The floodwaters are so rapid now that any rescue attempts in the northern parts of Downtown are prohibited.

There is high-level media attention about purported evidence that it is a terrorist attack. This will be national media attention to be handled by the PIO.

The media is interviewing survivors from the Downtown incident. They are telling their stories of survival. The media are also visiting the DMAT to show the actions to support the victims. Latest figures indicate 1,500 casualties, 372 dead, and at least 3,000 still missing or unaccounted for in the area. Efforts to repair and hold back the American River levee are beginning to fail, and there has been no success in stopping the erosion on the Sacramento River levee at the breech.

1430 hrs. An initial breech of the American River levee occurs at Campus Commons. Floodwaters begin to spill into the Campus Commons area. Civilian boats are appearing in mass in the area to assist evacuees. Transformers in the area are blowing due to the water

1500 hrs. Evacuations continue as hundreds of thousands spontaneously evacuate the area. Sacramento is now under flood attack from two major rivers. The Folsom Dam is still releasing over 145,000 cfs, but that is not keeping up with the melt from the Sierras. The Corps of Engineers reports that in the next five hours the rate of release will have to increase from Folsom Dam, and that Oroville Dam has started releasing earlier than expected at over 145,000 cfs. Shasta is still maintaining and should be able to hold off on any major releases until 9:00 p.m.

The breech along the American River levee at Campus Commons widens and continues to grow. The waters are threatening high power lines. The release has not taken much pressure off the Tower Bridge levee failure. Floodwater has now gone deep into east Sacramento.

Latest figures indicate 1,900 casualties, 392 dead, and at least 5,000 still missing or unaccounted for in the area. All the roads leading to the Sierras are gridlocked. Numerous reports of road rage have been reported, including some shootings of motorists who blocked lanes or who tried to push around traffic in the emergency lanes. Foothill counties are requesting emergency assistance from the State after declaring Local Emergencies.

Other counties want figures on how many evacuees are coming, how medical transfers are expected, and what resources are being sent with the evacuating populations.

1515 hrs. Reports come in from levee patrols in the Pocket Road area that there new series of boils forming on the Sacramento River levee on the Sacramento side in Garcia Bend Park.

1525 hrs. Closure of the exercise

1530 hrs. Critique is held

1600 hrs. Critique is concluded

ATTACHMENT 2

MASTER MESSAGE TABLE (SAMPLE ONLY)

Time	Message Event	Recipient	Information Source and AV	Message/Event	Major Anticipated Responses	Objectives
EXERCISE BEGINS						
0845	**MAJOR 1**	**ALL PLAYERS** FROM EOC MANAGER AND LEAD CONTROLLER	Pass out exercise package with evacuation guides and other materials developed the day before. Go over the initial exercise briefing and provide a copy of any opening graphics used. Provide copies of the prepared Incident Action Plan. Materials may include: Tables of existing river flow data, weather reports, previous labor and material costs, and costs from the flash floods in early winter.	**LEAD CONTROLLER IN EOC AND SIM CENTER LEAD** give initial opening briefing with information about rules of the exercise. The date is a Monday morning in late April. All play is to be considered real time. The County Exec then provides a shift turnover briefing using the opening scenario sheets to discuss the flooding threats from the fast melt of the deep snow pack. In addition, Folsom, Oroville and Shasta Dams may have large releases sometime in the next 12 hours based on melt projections. He will also have the Incident Action Plan developed the day before in the workshop. The Joint EOC has been operating since Friday. Preparations have been completed for sand bagging, evacuating the public in the most likely weak spots for flooding, and for notifying the public to evacuate.	All participants should pay attention to the briefing, and just afterward: All Section Chiefs should brief their staff. EOC Management and Section Chiefs may hold a meeting to discuss an Action Plan. Operations may evaluate current resources. Planning and Intelligence should evaluate release rates, weather, and work on status reports. If Action Planning Meeting is held, they should facilitate. Logistics should evaluate sources for sand bagging and look at staffing for week ahead. Finance and Admin should continue tracking personnel costs.	**1, 2,11**

ATTACHMENT 3

EXERCISE DAY AGENDA

1. INTRODUCTIONS (EXERCISE DIRECTOR) 8:45

- Identify where rest rooms and food/water are located. Note that any releases of personnel for food or water must come by permission from Section Chiefs so the EOC continuity of operations is maintained.

- Ask all players in the room to identify themselves by name and their disaster role, as they are located at their assigned positions.

2. **SAFETY NOTE (LEAD CONTROLLER) 8:55**

- Stress the issue of safety.

- If anyone is hurt or ill during the exercise, play will stop immediately until that person has been cared for properly.

- All participants are to report immediately if there is any safety hazard observed during the exercise.

- If there is a real emergency, such as a fire alarm, play stops immediately and personnel respond to the real event.

3. RULES OF PLAY (LEAD CONTROLLER) 8:57

- Ensure all players have the phone directory they are to use to call the Simulation Center, depending on what they need. No outside calls are to be made unless authorized by the Exercise Director. All messages by phone or fax or e-mail are to indicate, "This is a Drill."

- Play will stop at exactly at 3:25 p.m., no matter where the scenario is at the time.

- A critique will be held at 3:30 p.m. in the Joint EOC. Participants should be prepared to make remarks and suggestions for improvement. A spokesperson will represent each function.

4. INITIAL BRIEFING BACKROUND (LEAD CONTROLLER) 9:00

- Ensure printed materials have been handed out earlier.

- Read briefing.

- Show any relevant maps using projector screens.

ATTACHMENT 3

EXERCISE DAY AGENDA

5. County Executive Gives Shift Turnover and EOC Briefing (9:07)

6. START MESSAGE PLAY (ALL) 0915

Controller(s) deliver messages and group discussion proceeds. Explain to participants that they should:

- Use the messages as a basis of response, without questioning the validity of messages
- Follow their training to respond to the information as received
- Use any materials normally available to them in the disaster operation
- Make decisions and assignments based on the messages and their current resources, but resources may be taken away or given at the discretion of the Controller

7. STOP PLAY 3:25 (This may happen sooner if all objectives have been met.)

8. HOLD BRIEF CRITIQUE 3:30 to 4:00

Share critique guidelines below before starting:

- The critique is a friendly, no-fault environment.
- All players are welcome to contribute, ***but not observers—they should not be present.***
- There should be a representative "reporter" from each functional area and/or jurisdiction.
- Please keep comments short and to the point.
- Provide supporting comments as well as points for improvement.
- Do a round robin. If a comment you support is already noted, and you have no others, you can ask to pass.
- Critique comments will be used to develop the After Action Report on the exercise.

ATTACHMENT 4

LIST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND *OBSERVERS*

AMADOR COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Culver	Mary	Loss Prevention Officer
Olson	Lynne	Emergency Services

EL DORADO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Hackett	Marty	Emergency Services

PLACER COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Cunha	Rui	Emergency Services
Pierce	Mary Lou	Emergency Services

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

D'Annunzio	Patrick	Emergency Operations
Aiello	Kerri	CMO
Anderson	George	Sheriff
Andis	Chris	CMO
Angeloni	Randy	Energy
Antley	Deb	Public Health
Archer	Jim	Sheriff
Artz	Ryan	EMD Haz Mat
Baltzell	Dave	Metro Fire
Batibrook	Bob	
Biggs	Tommy	Sheriff
Bixler	Harold	Building Inspection
Blaskoski	Keri	Economic Develop.
Booth	George	Water Resources
Braziel	Betsy	OCIT/CMO
Brundage	Peter	LAFCO
Bshara	Roger	DHA
Canty	Ted	DHA
Chambers	Kathleen	County Executive/CMO
Chin	Brian	County General Services

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, continued

Claerbout	Pat	Animal Care
Collins	James	General (Fleet)Services
Colosimo	Terri	DHA
Crain	Carl	County Purchasing
Creson	Cheryl	Municipal Services Agency/County Exec
Crouch	Craig	SCWA -
Culbert	John	OCIT - EOC Network
Cummings	Jennifer	DHA
Davey	Geoff	
Devereux	Paul	American River Flood Control
DeVore	Keith	Water Resources
DeYoung	Katharine	DHA
Downey	John	Airports
Dull	Chip	Sheriff
Durden	Jody	DHHS
Earle	Bob	County GIS
Elkins	John	Haz Mat
Exline	Roger	County GIS
Farrelly	Joe	DHA
Finney	John	County Purchasing
Forrest	Bill	Water Resources
Forrester	Brett	Water Resources
Gant	Nancy	DHA
Gernandt	Mark	Sheriff Special Ops
Green	Carol	Countywide Serv. Agcy
Green	Dennis	Haz Mat
Groff	Patrick	OCIT - Director
Haagenson	Bob	Finance/CMO
Harrold	Eric	DHHS, Public Health
Harry	William	SRFECC - Fire

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, continued

Hartley	Jim	Metro Fire
Heatley	Lester	DHA
Henderson	Fred	Purchasing
Herscowitz	Craig	Galt Fire
Holmes	Rick	Elk Grove Fire
Hopwood	Carole	Emergency Ops Mgr.
Hunt	Jim	Health/Medical
Hunt	Andy	Utilities
Irish	Dave	Finance
Johnson	Dave	PD
Johnstone	Tim	Sheriff-TEWG
Jymn	Scott	Sheriff
Kelly	Bill	Sheriff - Chief Deputy
Kim	Daniel	DHA
Knight	Mel	Environ. Mgmt.
Kropp	Rich	Sheriff
Latta	Wynn	Metro Fire
Lee	Doug	Law
Lamera	Ben	Dept. of Finance
Lewis	James	Sheriff
Livingston	June	CMO
Lloyd	Tim	Water Quality
Lloyd	Tim	Water Quality
Long	Jeanette	Human Resources
Lyons	Robert (Bob)	Coroner
Maccini	Ron	DHA
Malaspino	Troy	Fire
Margetts	Diane	PW/CMO
Matre	Alan	Dept. of Finance

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, continued

McCoy	Kelly	Env. Mgmt. - Health
McGarry	Judy	County Executive
McMahon	Tom	Sheriff
Miller	Sc	Water Quality
Moghissi	Reza	Dept. Transportation
Moyle	Craig	Mun. Svc. Agcy
Mugartegui	Greg	Metro Fire
Murray	Tom	OES - Law
Myers	Kara	Elk Grove City
Nadolna	Debra	OCIT-Telecommunications
Neighbours	Lynn	General (Fleet)Services
Newton	John	Public Works
Nicholas	George	County GIS
Niederberger	Herb	Water Resources
Norton	Kathy	DHA Emrg. Coord.
O'Connor	Kathleen	County Counsel
Pedretti	Steve	Sacramento County Engineering
Pelser	David	Waste Mgmt & Recycle
Penrose	Mike	Transportation
Perez	Katie	General Services
Peterson	Michael	Sacramento County Engineering
Peterson	Michele	Animal Care
Phillips	Ron	City of Folsom
Porter	Cynde	County GIS
Potter	Craig	Sheriff
Price	Vaness	CMO
Pruitt	Dwight	Sheriff
Pullman	Pam	General Govt
Rains	Mark	Water Resources
Randolph	Tami	Emergency Ops

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, continued

Rasmussen	Jane	DHA
Rhodes	Ana	Plng & Comm. Dev.
Rickett	Jerry	General (Fleet)Services
Roberts	Ralph	Haz Mat
Rogers	Doug	Metro Fire
Rothschild	Elise	EMD
Sakaris	Peter	Galt Fire
Sales	Mike	Sheriff
Sanchez	Richard	Environ. Health
Sarandria	Patrick	Revenue Recovery
Sathel	Bryan	Folsom PD
Sawyer	Nancy	SRFECC - Fire
Sawyer	Nancy	SRFECC - Fire
Schutten	Terry	County Executive
Serynek	Lucinda	CMO
Shanks	Robert	Fed SRCSD
Sharar	B	
Smith	Ed	Coroner
Smith	Michael	UASI
Snyder	Mary	Collection Sys Chief
Stangle	Don	EMS
Steele	Dave	Haz Mat
Stoddard	Dave	Metro-TEWG
Swankie	Gina	CMO - Airports
Tait	Karen	Public Health
Tanner	Heather	Haz Mat
Terry	Johnnie	Purchasing
Tharratt	Steve	Emerg. Medical Svc
Trask	Mark	Haz Mat
Trochet	Glennah	DHA - Medical Officer

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Turner	Rodney	Galt Fire
Turner	Steve	Metro Fire
VanLone	Danni	DHA
Weisenfluh	Greg	Airports
Wells	Mark	Metro Fire
Whisenhunt	John	County Counsel
White	Rob	BERC
Williams	Russ	Building Inspection
Wood	Phil	
Wyatt	Greg	Coroner
Zotow	Alex	

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Baldwin	Ron	Emergency Services

YOLO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

McCanta	Dan	Emergency Services
Noderer	Kyle	Emergency Services

CITY OF SACRAMENTO

Anderson	Steve	IT
Archibald	Rich	City Attorney
Balash	Mike	Fire
Baustian	Leo	Fire Operations
Bello	Richard	Planning
Bertrand	Tony	Utilities
Bowdler	Jay	Fire Operations
Braziel	Rick	Operations
Brenner	Barbara	Safety Officer
Brenner	Liz	PIO
Brent	Dave	Utilities
Brown	Val	Planning

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, continued

Browning	Randy	Fire/Special Ops
Cazeras	Hector	Animal Care
Chan	Howard	Transportation
Cherry	Joe	Management
Childs	Howley	Fire
Chong	Rod	Operations
Contreras	Dee	Labor Relations
Feeney	Ashley	Planning
Ferguson	Steve	City GIS
Ferguson	Steve	IT
Fisher	Laura	Human Resources
Flemming	Bob	Care & Shelter
Hanneman	Marty	Const. & Engineering
Hargrove	Jennifer	Planning
Hood	Steve	Human Resources
Jackson	Sam	Legal Council
Jones	Ray	Fire Operations
Kauffman	Dennis	Finance
King	Niko	PIO
Koht	Matt	IT
Kranc	Cynthia	Facilities Branch Chief
Lichty	Shannon	Human Resources
Louie Fong	Angie	Transportation
Marshall	Glenn	Utilities
Maynard	Beth	Planning
McCoy	Dan	GIS
McKinney	Rich	Fire
Norse	Calvin	Telecom Support
Paxton	Terry	Flood Operations
Ramirez	Richard	EOC Director

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, continued

Reilly	Brian	Energy
Reyes	Jesus	Utilities
Rosander	Karl	IT
Zadora	Patrick	Human Resources
Scrambler	Dave	Utilities
Schwartz	Reyna	Logistics
Scott	Douglas	General Services
Segura	Steve	Operations
Shires	Cathy	Planning
Shook	Angela	Emergency Operations
Sizemore	Rowe	Fleet
Stewart	Christopher	Procurement
Storehouse	Gary	Planning
Summerset	Bob	Fleet/ Energy
Talbot	Sandra	City Attorney
Theocracies	Nicholas	Transportation
Thomas	Robert	EOC Director
Tierce	Bill	Fleet/ Energy
Tomiyama	Alan	Care & Shelter
Tucker	Linda	General Services
Vannett	Bill	Human Resources
Vasquez	Ed	Special Ops
Vina	Gus	Finance
Vo	Laura	Human Resources
Vo	Thanh	IT
Vo	Thanh	Planning/GIS Section Chief
Way	Jerry	Roads and Bridges
Woods	Terrence	Human Resources
Yasui	Ron	Planning
Yee	Kim	Utilities
Yope	Sandra	Planning

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Banker	Denise	CA HSEEP
Brack	Maureen	State Parks @ Folsom
Colivas	Jerry	State OES
Fitzpatrick	Jim	State Parks
Fong	Sonny	CA Dept. Water Resources
Howell	Brenna	State OES
Salata	Bill	State Parks
Sicilia	Michael	State Homeland Security

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Cook	John	US Dept. Inter./Emrg Mgmt.
Rickman	Natalie	USBR Folsom - Folsom Dam
Roza	Edward	USBR Folsom - Folsom Dam

AMERICAN RED CROSS

Pennybaker	Joyce	Red Cross

PRIVATE SECTOR

Briggs	Jeff	SMUD
Heyerman	Chere'	Consultant
Myers	Scott	Elk Grove Water
Ornellas	John	Elk Grove Water

CONSULTANTS

Tobin	Rick	TAO Emergency Management Consulting
Boxer	Kathryn	TAO Emergency Management Consulting
Orlove	Jack I.	TAO Emergency Management Consulting

ATTACHMENT 5

SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE COMMENTS (HOT WASH)

The following is a summary of the comments made, by section or function, during the *Hot Wash* Critique in the EOC:

MANAGEMENT SECTION

High Points

- Size/Scope was worth resources.
- Have committed to do this every 18 months
- Thanked Coordinators and facilitators

OPERATIONS SECTION

High Points

- Were able to speak to people face to face.
- Y2K was less personal than this, whereas this was more of a community threat
- Able to work with PIO's & Communicate w/ Section Chiefs
- Learning Opportunity for all.
- Able to exercise (fire) resources that they can tap into from the State.

Challenges

- Communication – Never able to get a consistent meeting with Branch Manager.
- Didn't know who branch managers were – no vests for them.
- Need to make sure to make contacts with other Sections
- Too much information too soon.
- Huge changes happening too quickly.
- Information not detailed enough to make strong recommendations operationally. Needed more guidance.
- Simulated a shift change.
- Not time enough for adequate transfer of information

ATTACHMENT 5

SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE COMMENTS (HOT WASH)

LOGISTICS SECTION

High Points

- Having City/County personnel in the same location was very helpful.
- Helps to understand processes.
- Now aware of resources they can use, such as personnel.

Challenges

- Communications – technology is available to expand how we communicate.
- Struggling with forms, who to give to, getting copier to work.
- Need real time communication capability.

Other Concerns

1. Valuable to do this type of exercise on more frequent basis. 18mo-2yr.
2. Lots of new players – need to train more

PLANNING & INTELLIGENCE SECTION

High Points

- High value of GIS and mapping – very useful

Challenges

- Communication and information flow
- Misinformation
- Rumor flow
- Quality control
- Things happening so fast – were reacting not planning.

Other Concerns

1. Make changes related to technology. More information sharing ability.

ATTACHMENT 5

SUMMARY OF CRITIQUE COMMENTS (HOT WASH)

FINANCE SECTION

High Points

- All finance players – first time in EOC

Challenges

- Keep track of your costs. Each department needs a set of coding to keep track of costs, staff time, purchases & equipment, etc. Contact Ben La mera in County Finance

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OFFICE

High Points

- Thanks all for participating.
- Good exercise – know we have a lot of new people in City/County who have never participated in an exercise.
- Focus on homeland security.
- Rick Tobin compliments players for working very hard.
- Carole Hopwood thought exercise was more comprehensive/complex than expected.

Challenges

- Flooding scenario is very likely in this area.

ATTACHMENT 6

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION

"Operation Pathfinder" January 12, 2005

Participant: _____ **Agency:** _____
Position during the exercise: _____

The Sacramento County Sheriff's Department thanks you for your participation in this exercise and would appreciate your feedback.

1. Please rate the overall exercise on the scale below.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very Poor Adequate Excellent

Comment: _____

2. Did the exercise effectively simulate the emergency environment and County-City/Operational Area Emergency Management activities? Yes____ No_____

Comment: _____

3. How would you rate the effectiveness of the ICS/SEMS structure in regards to helping you complete your role?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very Poor Adequate Excellent

Comments: _____

4. Did you have access to the information you needed to carry out your responsibilities? Yes ____ No ____

Comment: _____

5. How would you rate the communications quality during the exercise between the EOC positions?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very Poor Adequate Excellent

Comment: _____

6. Was the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) properly equipped for your position? Yes____ No ____

Comments: _____

7. What additional equipment or tools for your position would you like to see in the EOC?

Comments: _____

8. Based on this exercise do you believe you need additional training? Yes____ No ____

What additional training do you require? _____

9. How often would you like to see an exercise of this type conducted? Circle one.

Every year Every 2 years Every 3 years

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

100 EOC participants returned evaluation forms (not counting evaluator/controllers and simulators). The numerical ratings from questions 1-5 and 9 are depicted below. Written answers for questions 1-9 are found on following pages. Similar or repetitive answers were consolidated for brevity.

1. The values below (by percent response) indicate that the overall experience of the participants was positive. It is worth noting that the results were significantly skewed to the negative side by response from one Section, which did not reflect the overall response of the rest of the EOC.

2. 80% of the EOC participants felt that the exercise simulated an actual event environment. That is a very high response and further indicates that the scenario design met the mark as required by the Exercise Director.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS (CONTINUED)

3. Although the majority of the participants rated the ICS/SEMS use as at least average, that mark should be much higher for the Sacramento County Operational Area, especially considering the cooperative structure designed to include Special District, City, County, State and Federal participants. The overall performance in this area needs improvement through training and practice.

4. 73% of the EOC participants felt that they had enough information to perform their duties. This rating, however, contradicts with many of the same participant's written comments about not getting timely, accurate or adequate information. This is an interesting inconsistency in the survey, which bears further discussion with the participating jurisdictions and disciplines.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS (CONTINUED)

5. Communications within and between Sections was truly one of the greatest concerns by all participants. The reasons for these shortfalls have already been discussed in detail under Part II, Section I.

6. Only 60 % of the participants felt the EOC was properly equipped to support them. This is a particularly low score for a modern EOC. This result indicates that some timely modifications need to be completed even before the new EOC is ready at McClellan, in order for the EOC to perform in real events that occur before the new site is ready.

7. No numerical data was generated for this question.

8. 51% of the participants want more training. This result is also high and probably reflected the frustrations noted in written comments about procedures, equipment, communications protocols and other EOC functional details. It supports additional and regular training in order to support their documented needs.

9. 52% want similar exercises every year, 41% every two year, and 7% every three years. This split accurately reflects the common, specific comment that every 18 months would be best. Many respondents also asked for specific drills for skills training and Section tabletops for support prior to large-scale exercises, whether functional or field.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

1. Please rate the overall exercise on the scale below.

SUPPORTING COMMENTS:

- This exercise was very good. It allowed participants to identify areas of need for their respective functions and helped them all better prepare for a real emergency.
- I was very impressed with the organization. Good job!
- There was very good participation by all the players.
- It was well organized and realistic.
- This was an excellent training opportunity.
- It was good practice and I benefited from the rehearsal.
- It was a good exercise that definitely shed light on where we need improvements.
- It was a good exercise to evaluate the networking process needed to gain information and intelligence.
- At last we know what challenges we have to overcome.
- Networking with county counterparts was the most valuable part of the exercise.
- The facility set up was great as was networking and the coordination from the City Manager.
- Thank you for making this happen!
- This was a wonderful learning opportunity.
- The facilitators for the exercise were great!
- Our Section would have failed in a real emergency. This exercise pointed that out and now we can fix the problems.
- It was a very useful experience.
- We have all learned how much more we need to know.
- Good learning experience!
- I have never worked in the EOC before, but it simulated all the Police Operations Centers I have been in before.

CHALLENGES:

- Scenario was too challenging and at times a bit overwhelming.
- A simulation can't realistically replicate the real thing, but this was as good as is possible. A more realistic scenario should have been designed.
- Overall information quality coming through the EOC was poor, displays and updates were poor, and it was too crowded.
- Where were CALTRANS, CHP, RT, Cal Guard, Coast Guard, FBI, etc?
- Where were the other cities and special districts in the County?
- It was disorganized, information flow was poor and forms were poorly designed.
- Adding a terrorist attack was just too much to manage.
- The air crash events were not as realistic as they could have been, but that would have been very hard to do in such a short time frame.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

2. Did the exercise effectively simulate the emergency environment and County-City/Operational Area Emergency Management activities
SUPPORTING COMMENTS: • There was very good variations in the scenario with many different elements. • I felt the scenario was very real. • The exercises stimulated all of the City/County Departments to communicate with each other for resources. • The activities and task were realistic. • The exercise was good for forcing cross communications among a variety of departments and agencies. CHALLENGES: • Media contacts were sometimes unrealistic. • There were too many people in the EOC and too many emergencies. • Too many things were happening without enough information being available.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

3. How would you rate the effectiveness of the ICS/SEMS structure in regards to helping you complete your role?
CHALLENGES: • There needs to be more training to increase understanding of ICS/SEMS. • There was some confusion with reporting roles at lower levels in the organizations. • Initial communications between the sections to the PIOs was limited at the beginning and then improved. • Use of joint systems and policies would have made this structure work better. • GIS needs a better way to manage and prioritize requests. • There should be better flood forecasting information in these exercises. • As a central function, planning was left out of most of the information flow. • The City players had no training in SEMS. • Graphics needed to be identified by incident and by time. • The ICS/SEMS functions were good at denying resources to certain functions, but not in provided alternatives or other sources. That is not helpful. • When people come to the EOC they need to act as an EOC team, not as City or County employees. That remains an impediment to good public service. • There needs to be a stronger chain of command, with fewer people milling about for no reason. • There needs to be more coordination and training between the City and County Logistics Section staff. • When Section Chiefs leave for briefings they need to always assign a Deputy Chief to take over the Section work for continuity of operations.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

4. Did you have access to the information you needed to carry out your responsibilities?

SUPPORTING COMMENTS:

- GIS service was excellent.

CHALLENGES:

- There was too much duplication of services by the City and the County.
- The Section Chiefs were not easily identifiable at all times.
- Laptops with software that shares ongoing information would have made information access much easier.
- There need to be standardized forms for reporting to others and for formal reports.
- Information about Bureau of Reclamation releases was provided too late in the exercise.
- There need to be more EOC briefings to keep all staff more up to date.
- Verification of information was very challenging.
- Notification for setting up the EOC came late and caused a mad scramble.
- Needed access to news releases in a timelier manner.
- County and City GIS couldn't share data easily.
- City could not print or get access to the EOC e-mail system.
- GIS needs more hardcopy base maps.
- Press releases should also be distributed to GIS.
- GIS did not have plotters to print maps fast enough for the needs of the EOC.
- Information was 'siloed' in most Sections with less sharing than was acceptable.
- The information coming into Public Information was too slow and too unreliable.
- Information sharing improved as participants became more comfortable with the EOC environment.
- Reports were inconsistent and not submitted regularly.
- No levee patrol information was made available for the American River.
- There was a lot of confusion on the use of the Supply/Services Request form. The City and County need to meet to develop an understanding of the need for completion of this form for purchases and services.
- Subject matter experts need to remain in the EOC for access.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

5. How would you rate the communications quality during the exercise between the EOC positions?

CHALLENGES:

- This area needs improvement to get consistent results and better cooperation between the County and the City. Training would help accomplish this.
- There was lack of adequate communications between groups.
- There were numerous computer problems that need to be addressed to improve interactions between EOC functions.
- The communications sharing technology in the EOC needs a major overhaul including networks, lack of common e-mail and lack of file sharing, along with training on information sharing software and hardware.
- There should have been situation status boards in place and visible for each section.
- There should be a staff designation for "data takers."
- There was a general lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities.
- It was clear other Sections did not understand the roles and responsibilities of Finance Section.
- It would be better if communications were tied with a qualifier such as "confirmed, suspected, etc."
- There should have been identified liaisons between the sections.
- There were not enough status reports provided and they were often provided to only a few people.
- Communication was mainly face-to-face with the phones hardly being used (which raised the noise level considerably).
- It would help if there were a standard communications format for consistency and accuracy improvement.
- Communications into and out of Planning continued to be a challenge throughout the exercise.
- Agency and inter-departmental cooperation got better as the exercise continued but it was limited by the communications technology available.
- There needs to be a stronger connection between Operations, Planning and the PIO. This disconnect resulted in press releases with incorrect information.
- Many positions were left vacant when there were outside meetings and there was no one left in place to provide critical information.
- There is a serious gap in coordination between City and County functions.
- The LAN was underutilized and did not fully function.
- We could not print out our e-mails.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

6.Was the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) properly equipped for your position?

CHALLENGES:

- Phones did not work well and caused many communications problems.
- There were not enough chairs or storage.
- Needed more marking pens for Post-It Boards
- There were no universal forms for the activities.
- There were not enough PCs.
- It was probably the best that could be done given this location's limitations.
- PIOs need a fax machine and at least one more printer.
- Tables were too small and the work areas were too noisy.
- Need more whiteboards.
- There need to be dedicated printers for each Section.
- There needs to be more wall space and floor space made available.
- The McClellan facility is needed now.
- There needs to be better connectivity through a common FTP server for the City and County.
- There needs to be additional screens for GIS projections.
- A better cache of office equipment is needed from pens to paper, etc.
- There should be a real GIS map plotter in the EOC.
- There needs to be more breakout rooms and nearby the EOC.
- The EOC is far too small and too noisy.
- It was too dark to see easily and there were bad drafts from the doors.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

7. What additional equipment or tools for your position would you like to see in the EOC?

CHALLENGES:

- There should be a list of what the participants should bring, e.g. laptops, cell phones, etc.
- There need to be more PCs/laptops for the participants.
- There needs to be wireless IP equipment.
- Need more easels with additional big tip markers.
- Use of wall space for status boards and posting.
- Better restroom facilities.
- There should be more screens and larger screens for GIS.
- The ability to monitor the media more effectively.
- There should be more phones available and more space to work.
- There should be at least 1 large format printer available (11x17 inches).
- There should be a designated Press Room.
- There should be prepared forms for intake and distribution of information.
- There should be Internet access for all PCs.
- There should be an ability to update organizational websites from the EOC.
- Access to a radio would have been helpful for communications.
- There should be a wall of confirmed information including phone number changes.
- There should be a protocol to use in baskets and out baskets for information on forms, and the forms should be in different colors for their purpose so there is immediate visual understanding of what is arriving.
- A pre-designed set of maps should already be ready ahead of time for general use through the PC for anyone in the EOC.
- There should be several color printers.
- There needs to be one or more televisions for live news reports.
- There should be portable keyboards and mice for the PCs.
- There should be several shredders available in the EOC.
- Each position needs job descriptions and process guidelines (checklists).
- All forms need to be update, renamed, and reorganized.
- Put telephone directories in all of the supply boxes.
- GIS needs pre-designed analysis tools.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

8. Based on this exercise do you believe you need additional training?

CHALLENGES:

- Provide training on the roles of individuals and communication protocols.
- Provide more training on terminology used in an emergency.
- Provide training to improve mapping activities and presentation, especially the sharing of the information in all Sections.
- Provide more small exercises with meetings of those with similar functions in county and City government.
- There needs to be more training/availability of the EOC mail system.
- Provide training on an ongoing, regular basis, not in spurts here and there.
- Provide training that clarifies policies and procedures for the EOC.
- Provide training to GIS about the types of information other Sections typically need so GIS can get ahead of the curve and be better prepared to serve them in a timely manner.
- Provide SEMS training on a regular basis for City and County participants, especially with a focus on the SEMS process and position relationships in an EOC, including NIMS requirements.
- Provide training on the use of flood maps with other departments.
- Provide more training on the software used in the EOC.
- Provide specific Section training to describe and discuss the flow of communications and information in an EOC.
- Provide training on RIMS for everyone who uses it in the EOC.
- Provide training on phone systems so everyone knows how to hold and transfer calls within the EOC.
- Provide more detailed training on evacuation processes and planning.
- Provide some tabletops with smaller groups for addressing community incidents.
- Provide training on how resources are acquired that the County does not have.
- Provide training on EOC Post Office.

ATTACHMENT 7

PARTICIPANT EXERCISE EVALUATION RESULTS

Written Feedback from Participants

9. How often would you like to see an exercise of this type conducted?
• Every 18 months would be better. • There should be smaller, topic-focused drills every year, with a major functional like this one at least every 18 months.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
• Section briefing experience and media simulation was a highlight. • Put an EOC organization chart for the EOC up on the wall for reference during an event. • PIOs need to have more access and recognition by all of the Sections in order for better communication flows inside and outside of the EOC. • Much of the EOC does not understand the role of the EOC and it become a dumping ground for issues that others did not know how to manage in their own areas. • The Planning Section did not develop an Incident Action Plan with the other Sections and was disconnected through most of the exercise with the process of resource tracking and needs. • There should be someone assigned to each Section to track costs.

END OF PARTICIPANT EVALUATION COMMENTS

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

OBSERVED TIMELINE IN THE EOC
FROM A PLANNING SECTION CONTROLLER

Sacramento OA Exercise Activity Timeline – 12 January 2005

0830 In a planning meeting before events "kicked off", EOC Director asked for evacuation routes by 0900. Also asked for sandbag / heavy equipment staging areas – two in the north and two in the south.

0919 Planning received a request from State OES Advance Planning asking for potentially needed resources. [The person who answered the phone was unclear on where to go to get this info.]

0920 After the announcement of the "boom!" Planning understood that no phones were working. Section Chiefs immediately returned from their planning meeting and the Plans Chief did a section briefing. In this briefing he discussed liaisons and following the chain of command. He also allowed how electronic forms were available, but since nobody had training on how to use them, it will all be "manual"

0926 EOC Director said that the Sacramento TEWG had reported a hijacked FedEx plane.

0928 Planning Section was informed about the FedEx plane without stating the source of the information.

0930 Emergency Management Coordinator announces possible plane crash while the Plans Chief - Green is physically en route to Ops.

0936 Planning staff is discussing creating an action/event log as well as a phone log.

0940 An aerial photo of area was projected on screen. Impact locations are marked, but not identified.

0945 Ops and EOC Director are at Planning asking about schools in the floodplain. EOC requests again the list of convalescent hospitals, etc. in the area.

0952 Both Plan Chiefs discuss imminent presentation to Plans staff on confirmed info – rather than anecdotal info. Plans Chief talks with PIO staff to get confirmed written info sheet.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

OBSERVED TIMELINE IN THE EOC
FROM A PLANNING SECTION CONTROLLER

0958 Plans Chief heard from GIS that GIS responds to requests only if they come from him or Operations Chief.

1000 EOC Director, announces other info to the EOC, and is requesting again for the hospital information, etc.

1006 In planning meeting, EOC Director announced that a Local Disaster had been declared, that the toxic cloud hazmat evacuation area boundary was the river, 21st street, Richards, and I-5. He needed an assessment of the utilities, but the Utilities Department said they weren't allowed in because of the hazard. However, levee failure was possible. This prompted the EOC Director to request a second evacuation map in case the levee goes. A suggestion was made to put a Utilities engineer in a hazmat suit and send him in to assess the situation, but that was promptly vetoed by Fire. Instead, Fire – who have personnel trained on the suits – will go in with a camera and send pictures back. At this point the EOC Director sent staff to go get the second evacuation area map prepared **immediately!** Other announcements included that 4 shelters were up, but with unknown capacity. The EOC Director asked that spending be done through Finance in order to keep track of expenditures. Staging sites were up and ready. 15 RT buses were available for evac transport and they (EOC staff) are working to get commercial buses. Several fire/hazmat/USAR mutual aid requests have been made including a DMAT team. PIO is putting out news releases, and they need food in the gym (where the releases are taking place). Plans Chief needs requests/info in writing, otherwise it hasn't happened. River height info is presented. President Bush has left the area, and is no longer an issue. The EOC Director asks for three things in the next 15 minutes…. 1) info on levee condition, 2) area of evacuation in case levee fails, and 3) schools etc. in the levee evacuation area.

1021 Plans Chief confirms the written request policy.

1033 The EOC Director says there is a mandatory evacuation because the levee is bubbling… west side: Sac River, east side: Bus 80/Highway 99, south side: Meadowview, north side: American River. He also orders that shelter capacity be doubled, whatever the current capacity is. This takes place in an impromptu Section Chief's meting.

1037 Plans Chiefs go to Care and Shelter and pass the word about the mandatory evacuation.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

OBSERVED TIMELINE IN THE EOC

1043 EOC Director asks Plans Chief about shelters and need for PIO info release.

1122 In planning meeting… [briefing map had thin outlines only, so it was hard to identify what areas were what. Perhaps if there had been light shading, or cross-hatching, or even extra thick differently colored outlines.] There is a shelter at the Meadowview Corp Yard, yet that is on the edge of the evacuation area. The EOC Director says do not move shelter because the boundary edges are worst case. The EOC Director asks for a policy to allow back in those who need to get back in (because they left behind, medicines, kids, dogs, etc.) At 1136 the EOC Director confirmed that West Sac be contacted. Coroner has requested a DMORT team. Per fire, there are about 200 dead. Per law, FBI confirmed it is terrorism, therefore the threat condition is Red. National Guard air ambulance is on standby at Mather. PD is doing only emergency calls for service. The EOC Director needs assessment of contaminated water intake, based on a question raised by a staff member.

1145 Passed message 37A late because it was directed to the Plans Chief, and he was in a meeting, so could not have received the message until the meeting was over.

1153 Plans Chief starting to update Action Plan, with section staff only. [No attempt at gathering information from other sections is seen.]

1200 Planning staff is maintaining a section activity log, an EOC activity log, and updating RIMS – all of which are being done on individual computers, but nothing is posted or visible to anybody other than the typist. However, the PIO function is posting a list of info with times.

1338 In planning meeting Sac PD announces that they are blocking freeway off ramps / onramps to expedite evacuation process toward Folsom. Phase 2 evacuation – all 7 shelters are full – including Amador, El Dorado, and Placer county fairgrounds - so they need to stage shelterees in Folsom. EOC Director (supporting the Deputy EOC Director who had taken over from him) calls a briefing meeting with alternates, rather than the primaries –to get the alternates playing in the exercise. This required the PIO, SO/PD, utilities, and housing to get together and put out the order for immediate evacuation. They didn't know just where they'll be sheltered, but "get out now – head east". Folsom will open all Folsom high schools for staging. The Deputy EOC Director asks that everybody update their portion of the Action Plan. Since this is April 15th, Finance asks if the IRS can grant a filing waiver for the folks in the Presidential declaration area? Total evacuees are 250,000 plus 82,000. [Later, this number was dropped by 100,000.] The EOC Director is very concerned with State OES's decision to house evacuees in Reno. He does not support this option.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

OBSERVED TIMELINE IN THE EOC

1408 The EOC Director, Emergency Management Coordinator, and State OES representative stage shelterees at Placer County fairgrounds, then if there are too many shelterees they will be sent/taken to Reno.

Other comments without times notation:

As part of the discussion of what to do with the shelterees that eventually ended up in Reno, there was discussion about staging them at McClellan.

The PIO put out press releases that were numbered, yet they had no date or time. I started to read one on the posting wall (they were all there), yet I couldn't tell when the information came out.]

It was announced near/at the end of the exercise that the assessed value of the property in the flood area was $1.5 billion.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

MANAGEMENT SECTION

The exercise seemed to adequately test the systems in place. Overall, the Management Section did an admirable job! There was a high degree of realism in simulation of event. Exercise 'script' of messages were appropriate and initiated receivers of messages to act.

The following are specific comments and observations:

1. The group implemented SEMS and wore the appropriate vests. However, checklists were not used and plans and procedures were not referenced.
2. The Management Section did an excellent job of threat assessment. Specific actions were identified by the Management Section Chief and tasks were distributed to the Operations Section.
3. Management Section performed very well overall. In a real emergency their actions would be both timely and appropriate.
4. The Management Section directed the evacuation of several neighborhoods in a very timely and systematic manner.
5. The potential need for National Guard resources were discussed but the Management Section was not observed directing the use of any other mutual aid resources.
6. A declaration was made in a timely manner, including a request for a gubernatorial and presidential declaration.
7. The Public Information Section would have needed additional resources in a real emergency of this magnitude.
8. There was not enough information communicated out of the Section Chief briefings.
9. The PIOs had 4+ press conferences. This was never discussed at a Section Chief Briefing.
10. City of Sacramento City Manager was very on top of events, policy decisions, public information and public safety concerns. City Manager was clearly a seasoned EOC Director.
11. County of Sacramento Administrator played a very low-key role and could have shared the leadership function with the City Manager.
12. Recommend encouraging the County Administrator to receive more training to increase his comfort level with this role.
13. The City of Sacramento City Manager/EOC Director did not communicate with the City Emergency Planner.
14. The Law Enforcement function was not proactively communicative with other sections. Law Enforcement and Fire needed to coordinate with Planning and PIO more frequently.

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CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

MANAGEMENT SECTION (CONTINUED)

15. Recommend that each section send a full time presence to other sections in order to ensure that critical information is communicated.
16. The Public Information Section excelled in its handling and dissemination of incident information.
17. Situation Analysis was not effective. They need extensive training.
18. Recommend that critique portion of exercise would be more effective if it was longer and more people were allowed to comment. Also consider critiques to be conducted by section as well. Individual critique section facilitators would be helpful.
19. Exercise as a learning tool could have been conducted in 4-hour period.
20. A centralized electronic status board for the EOC would be helpful.
21. Consider tabletops as good methods to enhance communications between sections.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

OPERATIONS SECTION

Topic: Information Management

Observation: Information related to the various incident scenes was received within the EOC by a variety of different exercise participants. While a system existed to manage and share information between EOC Sections, the Operations Section did not have a system to share information between Branches and even within Branches.

Discussion: Within the Operations Section there were several different Branches to include Law Enforcement, Fire, HazMat/Env. Health, Public Works, Flood Control etc. All Branches received information from the field (Sim Center). Some information was specific to a Branch, but some of the information required coordination and sharing between Branches and between Sections (Operations and Planning as an example). Some Branch Directors were proactive and conducted coordination and information sharing as required. Many, however, did not. A simple example of this follows: Early in the exercise a message indicated 200 dead within the first hour of the event. This information was widely disseminated in a number of messages within a number of Branches and at Emergency Management. Later that hour, the Coroner received information that the actual number was less than 60. Nearly two hours after this message was delivered to the Coroner, PIO was still tracking 200 dead. As the incident unfolded, this minor discrepancy was overcome as the casualty count climbed well in excess of 200. This example is not intended to single out the Coroner, as the Coroner was particularly proactive in a number of other areas. It is however, illustrative of the many challenges that exist in managing information within an EOC. As an estimate, less than 70% of the information that required coordination and sharing was actually shared with the appropriate Branches / Sections that also needed the information.

Recommendation: There are a number of techniques used to manage information within and Operations Center. Some include scheduling routine update briefings within Branches and Sections, creating message centers with one or more individuals who collect, assess and disseminate information to all applicable participants (message centers are widely used in large military operations centers), establish a routine cycle to support information sharing such as the planning cycle described in the Fire Operation Guide, or a logistics, finance and operations cycle (in this case, as with the planning cycle, a specific product is produced at the conclusion of the cycle). Lastly, it is recommended that Emergency Management designate what is critical information that must be shared with Emergency Management. As a minimum, critical information should support required and timely decision-making. Critical information should be widely posted within the EOC so that everyone knows, that if they receive information that might be assessed as critical, it must be coordinated at Emergency Management level.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

Topic: Information Management and Coordination

Observation: The EOC lacked a single "picture" of the incident.

Discussion: Within the Operations Section, individual Branches put up maps appropriate to their function in the EOC. The Operations Section Chief, however, never had a single picture that allowed him to fully understand the full scope of the problem. The lack of a single picture affected staffs' ability to visualize, coordinate and share information. The Incident Command System and both the Standardized Emergency Management System and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) are designed to ensure that incidents are managed based on common objectives and a consistent picture of the problem. Within the Operations Section and in discussions with the other Sections, to include Emergency Management, it was evident that there were different ideas on the full scope of the problem. The single message that included a mapped picture of the various HazMat and airplane crash sites was extremely useful to the majority of the Branch leadership in the Operations Section. That map did not, however, include the levee failures that occurred later. In this case the Flood Control Branch was extremely helpful with all of the mapped products that they were able to produce. Lastly, while a common picture of the incident is extremely valuable, equally valuable is a common picture of the City and County's ability to maintain operations in areas not immediately threatened by the incident. There was no evidence in the Operations Section of any assessment related to resource drawdown and the impact to continuity of operations outside the affected area.

Recommendation: Designate a Section responsible for maintaining a common picture in the EOC. ICS would lead us to conclude that the Planning Section should have this responsibility. The new IS-700 course is less prescriptive, saying that a Multi-Agency Coordination System, such as an EOC, should ensure the Information Management Function is accomplished. Large displays are extremely useful for this function. A system must be in place to ensure that information is available so that displays do not become stagnant and remain relevant through the problem.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

PLANNING AND INTENTELLIGENCE SECTION

Overall:
The Planning/Intelligence Section was not an effective part of the Operations Center. During the exercise, only requests for anecdotal information and maps were received and processed by P/I. With the exception of the development of a Situation Status Report, no other planning functions were accomplished.

P/I Chief:
During the course of the exercise, there were 4 P/I Chiefs, two per shift. The utilization of 2 chiefs per shift is not recognized by any emergency management concept of operations anywhere. The concept of a Joint Emergency Operations Center is widely recognized. But the identity of the separate organizations stops at management (Command). All other EOC functions then work to support that unified command. The maintenance of two separate local governments in 1 EOC is very confusing. Here you not only have two local governments, but also the Operational Area EOC.

After the first shift of P/I Chiefs were relieved, they stayed at the exercise. This added confusion on the part of the players and to overcrowding of the work area.

Situation Status Unit:
A Situation Status Report was developed and maintain by unit staff. The report was produced in RIMS, copies printed and distributed in the EOC.

An intranet system has been developed for use in the Joint EOC, but because of a lack of training for the EOC staff, participants were told not to use this system. Because of the lack of recognition of the functions of P/I, there wasn't a schedule established for the development of the Situation Status Report. This led to a lack of timely updates and support from the other sections of the EOC for the report.

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CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

PLANNING AND INTENTELLIGENCE SECTION (CONTINUED)

Action Planning Unit:
This unit was not staffed during the exercise. When prompted to develop an Action Plan, the P/I Chiefs filled out the Action Planning Form. When filling out the form, the Situation Status Report was not used for Current information for the form. The objectives were developed from a Management briefing, and were from Management only. There was no development of objectives by sections to meet management objectives. No assignments were given as would have been if the Action Plan development process had been followed.

Advance Planning Unit:
Not staffed during the exercise.

Geographic Information System:
Well staffed and functional. However there was little communication between GIS and the rest of the P/I Section. Information made available to GIS was not shared with the rest of the section. Maps were being produced without the knowledge of the P/I Chiefs.

Conclusions:
Because of the lack of integration of the P/I functions in the Joint EOC operations the following key principles of a successful EOC were not present:

1. Management by Objectives
2. Manageable Span of Control

There was little documentation of the events that transpired during the exercise and how the Joint EOC was addressing them. There was good logging of events by individual players, but no way to share that information with the rest of the EOC staff.

There seemed to be a general lack of understanding of the philosophies, principles and processes used to address emergency management in California. Now that these same concepts have been adopted and mandated by the federal government in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), it is even more imperative that they be utilized. Now federal grant money can be withheld if a government is non compliant, as demonstrated during this exercise.

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

LOGISTICS SECTION

1. Control of Logistics Field Facilities and Staff

Logistics Section would obtain resources and send them to a "staging area". However, they did not control those sites or staff. I asked them how they would know the resources arrived or their eventual assignment and they did not know at first. They proceeded to try to find out who was in charge of the "staging areas" and obtain a phone number so they could contact them. In accordance with ICS a "staging area" is a temporary location to temporarily position resources prior to assignment. There was no talk of establishing a logistics base or mobilization center for holding and tracking resources over a longer period and before and after assignment to an agency.

Recommendation:
Logistics Section should obtain and track all resources committed to the operation at least up to the point of assignment of the resource to a responsible agency and than after eventual release by that agency. Logistics personnel should staff a logistics base and/or mobilization center (or the staging areas if that is all they want to use) with staff that works for the OA Logistics Section. ICS has the position of "Request/Distribution Manager" for this field function. In this way, resources can be ordered and confirmed as delivered by Logistics staff themselves. Logistics staff in the field would then "sign out" resources to requesting agencies and would receive them back for demobilization after the agency is finished with them. There is a fundamental disconnect if the people ordering the resources are not the same people confirming their arrival, tracking their assignment to different departments or agencies in the field, and demobilizing them. This will cause problems.

2. Decentralized Ordering within the Logistics Section

Purchasing, Fleet, and Facilities staff of the Logistics Section would all receive requests directly and handle those requests themselves until confirmation of delivery. I asked how they tracked everything that was being requested. The Purchasing staff said they had a paper telephone log to enter everything. I asked how they were sure that the other staff in Logistics was reporting all requests that were coming into them. Purchasing said they had no system or regularly scheduled meetings to double-check other staff. The only form of tracking of incoming requests and implementation was a paper telephone log. If this had been real they would have had to scan pages of telephone log entries to find a request so implementation information could be entered.

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CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

LOGISTICS SECTION (CONTINUED)

Recommendation:
ICS provides for "Ordering Managers" who receive requests from Logistics personnel in the field agencies. There should be Ordering Managers assigned in the Logistics Section to receive all requests for resources and document both the request and implementation information. Ordering Managers would then assign requests out to the appropriate staff in the Logistics Section for action. There needs to be a computerized system for documenting requests and implementation information. I would recommend using the fire service Order/Request system for tracking.

3. Decentralized Purchasing within County departments and City departments

At least with the County (and maybe the City) the Logistics Section only ordered some of the resources being obtained. They said other departments were authorized to obtain resources directly using standing contracts, etc. If a department did request something from Logistics they had to provide a department account code, which would be billed for the expense. Logistics Section had no direct contact with mutual aid coordinators arranging for mutual aid resources. When the Finance Section staff came around I asked how they would obtain a list of everything ordered for the emergency and total costs. He said he would have to contact every department and ask them for details of what they have ordered.

Recommendation:
I do not believe that this system lends itself to rapid accounting for everything ordered and total costs. Purchasing staff, who are the experts in procurement, are out of the loop in watching prices, etc. paid for resources. All requests from departments should go through the Logistics Section, which can centrally document the request and implementation. Logistics said this would overload them but I think with a computerized logistics tracking system and adequate communications they could handle it. Then all purchases could be charged to a single "emergency " account so that total expenditures, etc. could be easily tracked. In our County we tell departments that if they get it on their own they have paid for it. If they want it to come out of the County Contingency Fund then the order needs to go through the OA Logistics Section, which has a special "emergency" account. That fixes the problem. If you do not do this you have the problem of ensuring that only authorized persons in the field order things. It is also a lot harder to consolidate total costs. I also believe the mutual aid systems need to have at least a rep with Logistics Section if not the mutual aid coordinator. This would allow for coordination of logistics facilities in the field, overall resource tracking, and coordination of support needs such as feeding, etc. The Logistics Section had no contact with the Mutual Aid Coordinators that I could see during the exercise.

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CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

LOGISTICS SECTION (CONTINUED)

4. Standardized Meetings and Briefings

I asked Logistics Staff how they obtained information on what was going on. Several said their only source of information was when someone stopped activities in the EOC and updated them. The Logistics Section Chief would gather Section Chiefs together after a management briefing and brief them on the situation but there was never a "business" meeting to discuss what was going on in Logistics Section and to coordinate activities internally.

Recommendation:
There should be regularly scheduled "business" meetings within Logistics Section to coordinate section activities, consolidate information, and ensure that the procurement process is working correctly. ICS has generic "cycle" charts for each function based on the operational period that identifies when key meetings and activities will take place or be completed.

5. E-mail and Posting of Information

Although they said there was a County EOC-net system they never used one or any system for posting information. The County staff was using their own e-mail accounts for information but there was no "Logistics" e-mail account so that field or other agencies could contact Logistics. Information was posted on paper on signs, etc.

Recommendation:
I did not see the EOC net but there needs to be a reliable system for displaying situation and other information and for exchanging information within the EOC and from the EOC to outside agencies. An e-mail system needs to be developed where each function has its own e-mail account.

6. Request Form

There was a "**service request form**" but no regular request form or format for receiving requests for resources and recording implementation information. This should be computerized and preferably on a database so the information could be easily manipulated.

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CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

LOGISTICS SECTION (CONTINUED)

7. City/County Cooperation

The presence of the City and County in the same EOC is a great achievement. Both entities still operated independently for the most part.

Recommendation:
Work to integrate or standardize how the City and County Logistics Section personnel will work. Complete integration would be great (the computerized request tracking system could keep track of City vs. County expenditures) but both staffs need to at least standardize their procedures more including using the same logistics' facilities in the field.

8. Support of other agencies

County purchasing had no pre-established policy regarding obtaining resources for other agencies than County departments. Support of reclamation districts, etc. is a critical aspect of flood emergencies. There should be a policy for support of other agencies. In our County we passed an ordinance authorizing the County purchasing agent to buy on behalf of other agencies within certain guidelines. In some cases it is billed back to the requesting agency and in some others it is put in the County claim.

Overall Logistics Staff worked hard and did a good job. They need more computerization and centralization of the purchasing and resource procurement process.

FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

There were only three people in the Finance/Admin Section. Two were from the County and one was from the City. I only had four messages for them throughout the exercise. All three of them went to the numerous management meetings leaving no one to observe. I spent a lot of the day in support of the Operations Section Evaluator/Controllers. When the Finance Section was present, I did inquire about their role and function in the EOC. The following is a synopsis of our discussions:

The County has a decentralized system for finance and accounting. Each of the County departments has a budget analyst who handles their department's finances. Obviously the other departments did not have their finance reps present. The City has a more centralized system. The role of the Finance Section in the EOC is to approve all requests

ATTACHMENT 8

CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EVALUATION SUMMARIES

FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION (CONTINUED)

over $5000.00. Both the City and County have a Department Operations Center for their finance operations that would closely track response costs from the other departments.

There was an Operational Area Logistics Supply and Services Request Form that was suppose to be used by the Sections when requesting supplies or services. No one was using this form. One request for supplies from the Coroner came into Finance for approval from Logistics in the form of a hand written note on a plain piece of paper. The Finance Section had to go to Logistics to inquire as to why the supply request form was not being used. The Logistics Section forgot about the form. At the end of the exercise, there was only one request that had been sent to Finance for approval that I saw.

The Finance section was asked to compile Initial Damage Estimate figures early on in the exercise. The Finance Section coordinated with the GIS branch in the Plans Section for this information. Info that could not be gathered from the actual building owners was pulled from the GIS branch, which had access to the County Assessor's records. By the end of the exercise, Finance had gathered information suggesting that there was over one-billon dollars in damaged property in downtown Sacramento.

Halfway into the exercise, the Finance Section was asked to compile information relating to response costs to date. It was not possible to get these costs because it was too early into the disaster.

The Finance Section did observe that the date of this flood/terrorist attack was April 15th, tax day. They did take the initiative to contact the IRS and the State Franchise Tax Board (assuming that they were not evacuating) to discuss extensions for residents of the city for filing taxes due to the current emergency.

The three people who comprised the Finance Section appeared to know and understand their roles in the EOC. They were aware of the EOC Web system that was not functioning during this exercise. In addition they knew where to go for information and who to pass information onto.

END OF AFTER ACTION REPORT

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