

5 May 2003

## TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

AD/RAS/96/C25 Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of  
the Shan State

AD/RAS/02/G25 Community Based Primary Health Care and Demand  
Reduction in Mong Pawk District, Wa Special Region  
No. 2

Thematic Area: Elimination of Illicit Crops

Country: Myanmar

### Report of the Evaluation Team

Ronald D. Renard  
Rita Gebert  
Philippe Redon  
U Tin Aung

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

Chapter

INTRODUCTION .....	1
A. The Project and its History . .....	1
B. The Evaluation .....	3
I. PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN .....	4
A. Overall Assessment .....	4
B. Delivery of Inputs .....	
II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .....	9
A. Overall Assessment .....	9
B. Delivery of Inputs .....	9
III. PROJECT RESULTS .....	
A. Outputs .....	12
B. Immediate Objectives (outcomes) .....	28
C. Drug Control Objective .....	31
D. Other Results .....	32
E. Sustainability .....	32
IV. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS .....	33
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .....	35
A. ISSUES RESOLVED DURING EVALUATION .....	35
B. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS .....	35
VI. LESSONS LEARNED .....	41

Annexes

1. Terms of Reference
2. Organizations and Places Visited and Persons Met
3. Project Activities Map

Tables/Figures

1. Monsoon Rice Crop Cuts

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report evaluates Phase II of the Drug Control and Development in Wa Region of the Shan State of Myanmar (AD/RAS/96/C25) based on the Project Document Revision dated January 2001 and the latest revision dated December 2002. This report also evaluates the AD/RAS/02/G25: Community Based Primary Health Care and Demand Reduction in Mong Pawk District, Wa Special Region No. 2 which was also implemented by the Project staff and which is scheduled to end in September 2003.

The Project staff is also implementing preliminary activities of AD/RAS/02/G45, Programme for Education and Training of Opium Farmers Providing Food Security by Sustainable Production of Rice as an Alternative Crop, Based on Construction of Irrigation Canals...in the Mong Khar Township, Wa Special Region No. 2...". In order to adhere to the overall workplan, and in response to a lengthy project approval process at UN Headquarters in New York, funds from the C25 2003 budget were made available in advance so that G45 could begin work in 2002.

The evaluation took place in March 2003 in Yangon and in the Project Area where the evaluators visited all major Project activities. During the evaluation, the team interviewed key Project staff, Wa Authority members, villagers, and Government officials.

The evaluation team concluded that the Project Document revisions and the two other Projects administered by the staff constitute a heavy workload for the staff. Inconsistencies, overlaps, and nebulous indicators within the three Project Documents make effective implementation as well as the measurement of outputs and the achievement of objectives difficult and sometimes impossible.

More constraining to effective implementation were difficulties inherent in the remote southern Wa region with the top-down Wa Authority that can be unfamiliar if not antagonistic to participatory village work. Delays resulted because some individuals in the Wa Authority disrupted the Project workplan and caused work for a lengthy period of time to be diverted away from community development.

For these two reasons, mostly unavoidable by the Project Staff, the Project became more output oriented at the cost of planning and creating a participatory environment involving

stakeholders. As a result, the sustainability of many activities, especially those in the livelihood and common support components (community development and institution building) are threatened. In comparison, education, infrastructure, and poppy cultivation monitoring activities appear more sustainable.

The health component work, most of which was transferred to the G25 Project, has proceeded satisfactorily. Two international NGOs with sufficient capacity and funding to carry on the work have expressed an interest in assuming much of the Project work. If Government permission is obtained for this, the evaluation team is convinced the health component work can be sustained.

Nonetheless, and in summary, the Project has made significant advances in working under so many constraints. The capacity of the Project staff has increased to where it has begun engaging the Wa Authority productively and do village-level participatory work. As a result, productive activities are expected to be accomplished if the Project is given the time for the community development work to be carried out.

In order that this can happen, the team recommends that the Project life be extended under the current budget until mid-2005.

However, to ensure that this time is used effectively, the team recommends that the Project conduct a comprehensive impact assessment, preferably with an external facilitator and involving Wa stakeholders. Based on this, the Project should redesign the Common Support Facility Component, vitalize monitoring activities, and increase capacity building for both communities and counterparts. An international community development expert should be hired either on a regular backstopping basis or permanently, to assist the Project staff with Common Support Facility work. The team is confident that this will lead to productive implementation of work by the Wa Project for the next two years.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

### Terms

CSF	Common Support Facility
EPI	Expanded Programme for Immunization
GOUM	Government of the Union of Myanmar.
HSF	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
Kyat	Unit of Myanmar currency, unofficial exchange rate \$1.00=900 at time of evaluation.
NaTaLa	Myanmar abbreviation for Progress of Border Areas and National Races Department, the government agency responsible for development work in border areas; government counterpart agency for the Project.
Monsoon Rice	Rice grown during the rainy season from about June to November.
MHT	Mutual Health Team
<i>Mu</i>	A Chinese unit of area, equal to 15 hectares.
<i>Mu</i>	A Shan unit of weight, equal to 2.35 grams
PRC	People's Republic of China.
PSC	Project Steering Committee.
RHC	Rural Health Center
Summer Rice	Rice grown during the dry season from about February to May
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services.
VHV	Village Health Volunteer.
Wa	A diverse ethnic group belonging to the Mon-Khmer linguistic family and located in Eastern Shan State and the western portion of Yunnan Province of China. A political grouping including many Wa cooperated with the Communist Party for about two decades until the late-1980s when a peace treaty was signed with the government recognizing Wa autonomy in what it calls Wa Special Region 2, and the Wa agreeing that this region belonged to the Union of Myanmar.
Wa Authority	The local administration, based in Pangsang, just north of the Project Area, and under the direction of the Central Committee.
<i>Yuan</i>	Unit of Chinese currency, widely used in Project area: \$1.00=8.2 <i>yuan</i> at time of evaluation.
Note on place names:	Place names in the Project site are often spelled differently, according to Myanmar, Wa, Chinese, Shan and other pronunciations. Spellings in this report follow the base map reproduced in an annex.

## INTRODUCTION

### A. The Project and its History

1. Design for a project in the Wa Region of Shan State began in 1996 with pilot activities done later that year. The Project Document, entitled “Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of the Shan State” was approved and signed in 1997 by UNDCP, GOUM, and the PRC. UNDCP executed the Project and UNOPS was an Associated Agency. The Project objective was to “establish a sustainable, community based approach to the reduction and eventual elimination of supply and demand for opium in the Wa Region.” With a budget of \$15,492,075, the Project included 27 outputs and activities in six areas: community development; public health, drugs and AIDS awareness; infrastructure; education; alternative crops and income generation activities; and poppy cultivation monitoring and evaluation. The Project area at the signing of the Project Document constituted three townships in the southern Wa region: Hotao, Mong Phen, and Mong Pawk. The major groups living in this region are Lahu, Shan, Akha, and Palaung, followed by Wa. Some Chinese live in the cities. The Project Office was in Hotao. Work built on UNDCP RAS/94/724 (Preparatory Assistance for Alternative Development in the Southern Wa Region, 1994-1996).

2. Project work has been carried out in exceptional difficulty and considerable isolation—at the start of the Project well over two days travelling time was required to go from Yangon to the Project headquarters and in 2003 one full day is still needed. Obstacles facing this work are greater than that of any other UNODC project since the very first it (as UNFDAC) organized in Thailand starting in 1971.

3. Among the obstacles has been the political situation resulting from the aftermath of the Wa alliance for two decades with the Burma Communist Party (BCP) in waging an insurgency against the Government. After Wa leaders forced the BCP out and concluded a cease-fire with the Government in 1989, agreeing that the Region was a part of Myanmar, the Wa Authority was allowed to retain its army and control much of its internal affairs. Because of this, the Government’s presence in the Region is limited.

4. Working in the Region thus requires cooperating with the top-down Wa Authority whose worldview was largely shaped through working with the BCP. As such, the Authority neither understood community development, recognized the need for many Project strategies, or supported grassroots participatory work. Many in the Authority felt they only needed infrastructure inputs with which they could develop the Region alone. This was complicated

by the fact that the original Project formulators worked directly with central Government officials who believed they had to control policy in such a sensitive and remote border area.

5. Initial Project implementation was constrained thus by physical remoteness, political complications and overlapping jurisdictions, and, according to the Project evaluation completed in March/April 2000, overestimates of the Government's ability to provide project inputs and support. To overcome early resistance by the Wa, Project management acceded to requests for providing infrastructure.

6. As the midterm evaluation report was being formulated, because one Wa Security Brigade head defied the central Authority and brought the Project to a halt by taking Project staff hostage during one of the community level activities that was being undertaken: drug detoxification. Work in remote highland villages, mostly with non-Wa groups, was then prohibited because this man thought such work threatened security and an insurgency.

7. The midterm evaluation was unaware of the above incident when it made its cautiously positive report in June 2000. Yet, because of the report's warnings about fewer community activities, one of the two main donor countries indicated it might halt financial contributions which would have forced the Project to close down. The funding decline also constrained UNODC Yangon's backstopping because it was forced to close the Project Support Unit.

8. Conditions were thus difficult and confused when negotiations with the Wa and the Government began in November 2000 to rework the Project. Nevertheless, a compromise was made by which limited community work in villages close to Mong Pawk and Mong Phen townships could be done while also mandating some infrastructure to restore the confidence of others. The Project revision and workplan for what was now being called the second phase was finalized in January 2001 and the donor community made new financial commitments.

9. At the time when committed funds for the budget had dwindled so low that achieving the Project objectives was threatened, the Project staff had identified new sources of funding. The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security has since funded the following:

- AD/RAS/02/G25: Community Based Primary Health Care and Demand Reduction in Mong Pawk District, Wa Special Region No. 2.
- AD/RAS/02/G45: Programme for Education and Training of Opium Farmers Providing Food Security by Sustainable Production of Rice as an Alternative Crop, Based on Construction of Irrigation Canals and Land Development in the Mong Khar Township, Wa Special Region No. 2, Shan State, the Union of Myanmar.

10. As for community work, UNODC-Government-Wa Authority negotiations led to an agreement by which the Project would no longer operate in the previous target/model villages that were near the Chinese border. Instead, it was agreed that the Project would work in two new catchment areas: Mong Khar (Wan Hwe, Pam Nau, and Wan Lone villages) and Nam Lwi catchment (Son Keh Village, Mong Phen Village).

11. At the time of this evaluation, the total budget available to the Project, including the two subprojects, almost equalled that in the original Project Document. The revised budget for RAS/C25 was US\$11,640,100, for RAS/G25, \$200,000 and for RAS/G45, \$1,168,870, totalling \$13,008,970. These additional funds will allow the implementation of the activities following the new agreement with the Wa Authority.

12. This report constitutes the evaluation for RAS/G25, which is scheduled to be completed by September 2003.

13. The Project activities are intended to support the Wa Authority's ban on poppy cultivation in 2005. Cultivation has already declined by over 30 per cent since 1999.

14. The revised Project Document, and those of the sub-projects, includes 27 outputs and activities in six areas: common support; public health, drugs and AIDS awareness; infrastructure; education; livelihood; and poppy cultivation monitoring. UNDCP (now UNODC) is the executing agency and there is no associated agency. The revision also includes doing an opium poppy survey for all Myanmar for the 2002/2003 growing season.

## **B. The Evaluation**

15. Paragraph 7.7 of the January 2001 revision of the Project Document which calls for a joint in-depth evaluation at the end of Phase II, is the basis for this evaluation report.

16. The evaluation team consisted of three international evaluators Ronald D. Renard, Rita Gebert, Philippe Redon, and one national evaluator, U Tin Aung. They reviewed Project Documentation that the Project staff made available at UNODC Yangon and the Project Office. Following discussions with government officials in Yangon, the team visited all Project area townships. In-depth discussions were held with Project staff, volunteers, and members of Project villages, as well as government officials in the area and representatives of the Wa Authority. This document is based on the findings of the team as refined after



discussions with key participants in Project implementation and Project supervision including those in the Myanmar Field Office in Yangon and UNODC Headquarters, Vienna.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN**

#### **A. Overall Assessment**

17. The Project concept as reflected in its overall objective, “establish a sustainable, community based approach to the reduction and eventual elimination of supply of and demand for opium” in the Wa region is valid. The evaluation team is in agreement with the overarching principle that the ultimate success of alternative development, including the issue of sustainability, lies in the communities of a given region. Contained within this concept, however, is the notion of close cooperation with, and capacity building of, communities and their service providers that would support their ongoing future development. The political factors noted and other reasons led to progress being slow.

18. Project design, despite revisions following recommendations of the midterm evaluation, partly because they were apparently done in haste (out of a desire to “get something done”) remains flawed. Much of the design minimizes the severe limitations imposed by the socio-political and administrative conditions in the Wa region. The conclusion of the midterm evaluation that many “institutional aspects of project implementation and project management...in the Project Document have proven both unrealistic and impossible to put into practice as designed” remains unfortunately valid. Sustainability of Project activities from community to Wa Authority to Government level is still being secured. Because the sustainability of many activities has been inadequately considered in the Project design,<sup>1</sup> serious effort is still needed by various means, such as involving international NGOs, so that Project activities do not collapse after the Project’s termination.<sup>2</sup>

19. The Project design, despite the reduction in Outputs and Activities from the original Project Document, remains complex, and saddles the Project staff with unnecessary difficulties. There is confusion between outputs and activities, i.e., some activities have

---

<sup>1</sup> The table on page 19 provides indication of this in showing that “securing sustainability” is an activity left for the last year of the Project.

<sup>2</sup> The Project’s termination date has been variously given as December 2003 and December 2004. It would seem that budgets should be available to carry the Project through until mid-2005.

greater scope than the output to which they should contribute, does not provide clear guidance for the Project partners as to the means by which it can achieve its aims.

20. With the addition of the Human Security Fund projects, G25 and G45, the number of Outputs went up to almost as high in the original Document, while the total activities has gone from 41 to 100 (71 in the Project Document). The increased activities, combined with the decreased (of an already overtaxed) international and national staff in the second phase, impeded overall Project implementation, particularly community based work.

21. The Project Document “phased” implementation to respond to the policy of extension of opium free zones and to evolving administrative arrangements and political situation in the area. The rest of the Document does not indicate how this should be done. However, this setting of three-year activity phases puts unrealistic expectations on the Project staff because integrated community development cannot be done in such short phases. The practice of extending opium free zones has also changed; one township declared opium-free by 1999 (Hotao), some villagers independently had resumed poppy growing prior to the evaluation team’s visit in 2003. The entire Wa region, however, is to be opium-free by mid-2005.

22. Inconsistencies in the Project Document extend to the Project Area. In one place, the Document defines the Project Area as the entire population living in the southern Wa region (46,000 persons). However, following the 2001 negotiations, the Document did state that the Project would focus Phase II activities on Nam Naw ( Mong Pawk Township) and Nam Lwi (Mong Phen Township), but for political reasons left the number of Project villages unspecified; in any case, village-level work has had to be kept at a minimum in these two catchments,<sup>3</sup> with the Project focusing on infrastructure (weir, extension of electric power line), and summer rice cultivation in the Nam Lwi catchment. An attempt at establishing a tea plantation in the Nam Naw catchment failed. The Project now works more intensively in three villages of Mong Khar Township, not mentioned in the C25 Project Document.<sup>4</sup>

23. Overall, while the Project concept remains valid and relevant, the Project Document is flawed, and inconsistent regarding activities in the two new catchments. The Project remains too large and complex for both the framework conditions, and for the number of staff and counterparts, whether GOUM or Wa, available to implement the activities.

---

<sup>3</sup> At the time of the evaluation, the Project was working only in one village in the two catchments.

24. Nevertheless, and despite the obstacles with which the Project has been encumbered, it has made progress and improved food security. The Wa Authority has been engaged to the point where community development work is possible and can be expected to proceed.

#### B. Problem Analysis, Objectives and Achievement Indicators

25. The drugs and development problem analysis contained in the Project Document, emphasizing the harsh living conditions of area farming families which lead to chronic rice shortages and little means of making them up besides the cultivation and sale of opium poppy is largely correct. The problem analysis falls short, however, in that it only provides a general picture, while local realities vary substantially. It also gives little credit to local people's innovation abilities, leaving the impression that highland people have not made any changes in their farming systems for decades. Overall, the problem analysis should have indicated the need for different alternative development strategies in different parts of the Project area.

26. The Project's overall objective, as mentioned above, is valid and relevant (although challenging). The Project Document has, in addition, six component objectives of varying degrees of clarity and achievability. Further analysis and comments on the individual component objectives will be made below, although it is worth emphasizing here that most component objectives are overly ambitious considering how little change there has been in the overall framework conditions of the Project between the first and second phases.

27. Well-defined achievement indicators are vital to Project design and to monitoring. Unfortunately, the Project Document revision does not provide Project management with clear indicators. Besides complicating the work of the evaluation team, throughout the implementation of the Project, the staff has not had the means to measure its progress.

28. For health, although many indicators in the C25 Document are not quantified, they are in the G25 Document. Some are questionable, namely the five per cent ratio for understanding opium abuse.

#### C. Outputs, Activities and Inputs

##### Common Support Facility (CSF)

---

<sup>4</sup> The G45 project focuses on canal construction and land development in the Mong Khar valley; the village development now being implemented in Mong Khar comes under C25 and was not foreseen for this township.

29. The design of this component is confusing, and places inordinate demands on those trying to implement it. The confusion starts with the name, Common Support Facility, which suggests a logistical unit, while the content relates more to institution and/or capacity building from community to district. The immediate objective along with three of the four outputs are overambitious, while some activities have the scope of components in and of themselves.

30. The fourth component (logistics and input procurement, including quality control of agricultural inputs) should not have been made the responsibility only of this component, but put instead under the livelihood component or an administrative support section. The first three outputs, as they emphasize capacity building of the Wa local authorities in terms of participatory management, basic development line functions, and participatory planning and monitoring systems would have required the assistance of a full time adviser and a much longer timeframe to be even partly achieved. All in all, there is no clear logic in the design of the component, and it should have been rewritten before being approved.

31. An inconsistency also arises in that the rest of the Project Document refers to capacity building for *both* GOUM and Wa local government staff, but under this component there is no reference to such activities for Government staff (training for teachers and health workers is mentioned under the respective components, but not for agricultural extension staff).

32. The explanation on outputs and activities, by focusing on establishing entire capacity building programmes (from village to district) in different fields under the guise of activities, is confusing. Producing Information, Education, Communication (IEC) materials has also been included under the CSF. At the same time, the Common Support Facility is to take the lead in village-level community mobilization. Here, the confusion of the Project Document shows with “community-based organizations” being termed “irrelevant”, (to Wa leaders) while elsewhere they are called “indispensable” (in terms of theoretical benefits). The inputs for the CSF to carry out its tasks as outlined in the Project Document, in terms especially of manpower but also of budgets, are inadequate to achieve the component’s outputs.

#### Public Health Component

33. The health-related outputs are consistent with the immediate objective, their aiming mainly (in addition to demand reduction) at establishing a primary health care system. The activities listed in the C25 Document are generally coherent and consistent with the outputs as they aim to strengthen the entire health system from village to hospital level. However, procedures to link services at the different levels are lacking.

34. For G25, the major outputs and activities were extracted from an earlier C25 Project Document. Their major activities are more compact and better linked. Although this new Document was prepared mainly in response to donor requirements, the shift not only has no major impact on Project implementation but also can be considered a significant achievement for Project management.

#### Education Component

35. The objective of upgrading the educational and vocational training capacity of local communities and integrating it with the Government system at the higher level is modest; so too is the budget, \$75,000 for 2001 and about \$100,000 each in 2002 and 2003. The goals of upgrading education in the different languages in the Project Area and integrating the schools with the Government system were appropriate and feasible. Recognition of the need for adult literacy in local languages (such as Akha, Lahu, and Wa) is far-sighted.

#### Infrastructure Component

36. The Infrastructure component, comprising the establishment of a road maintenance system and installing clean water supply and sanitation to villages is scaled down from Phase I and appropriate. However, the logic of including the village water supply activity under this component while excluding hospital and Rural Health Center construction is unclear.

#### Livelihood Component

37. Many activities are included to provide options for farmers who shift away from opium poppy cultivation. However, the diversity of the proposed work seems beyond what the Project staff operating in the difficult local conditions could have achieved. Major shortcomings in the design include the promotion of non-sustainable hybrid rice, an insufficient number of quantified indicators, and too few provisions for monitoring.

#### Poppy Cultivation Monitoring Component

38. Besides the monitoring of cultivation in the Project Area, the Project Revision includes a nearly nationwide survey (largely reinserted in 2002 from the original 1996 Project Document). Although the logic of the activities is coherent and consistent, and additional staff to conduct the survey was recruited, this put a heavy burden on Project management not considered when the 2001 Project Revision was made.

39. The 2001 Project Document calls for establishing two village cluster committees to bring the Wa leadership and local communities into dialogue to promote sustainable Project work. The political conditions described above, however, prevented these from being formed. The

Project hopes that its work is evoking within Authority officials a feeling of responsibility for sustainable local manage and good governance that will achieve the objectives of these committees although it remains to be seen if this succeeds.

#### D. Executing Modality and Managerial Arrangements

40. The original Project Document was signed by the Government of the Union of Myanmar, the People's Republic of China, and UNDCP. However, the PRC has not participated in the Project or attended meetings of the Joint Executing Committee. This has been resolved by having the Project Steering Committee, on which the Wa Authority is represented, serve as the supervisory and policy shaping body.

## **CHAPTER II**

### PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

#### A. Overall Assessment

41. Based solely on the accomplishment of achievements in the Project Document, the Project has not succeeded. However, placed within the context of conducting work in the Wa Region, the Project has progressed to where productive work is not only possible but is beginning to be done increasingly.

42. Working in the Wa with leaders trained in the top-down culture of Communist China in the 1980s where local officials sometimes do not heed the directives of the Central Authority is difficult. Nevertheless, the Project is contributing to the Region's development and food security, introducing the concept of participatory work at all levels, and laying the groundwork for future and more productive activities.

#### B. Delivery of Inputs

Inputs from the Government

43. The Phase II Project Document specifies that the Government area-based essential positions which should be committed is 31. The GOUM has honored this commitment as specified under the Project Document; the staff includes the National Project Director, agricultural, health and education staff. Of these, 16 receive allowances from the Project which amount to more than the salaries they receive from the Government. It is not sure how many of these staff positions will stay filled once the Project no longer pays allowances.

44. The Government is also to provide and/or contribute to building construction in the Project Area, with the Mong Pawk Hospital and the Mong Phen Middle School being mentioned specifically for Government inputs. As far as is known, hospital construction was funded by a grant from the Government of Japan. The Mong Phen school was built by the Project with no GOUM inputs. An NGO, Karamosia, built an adjacent dormitory.

45. Other Government agencies made provisions in kind such as fuel, human and animal vaccines, medicines. Fuel supplied has been less than the amount stipulated (2,500 gallons over two years instead of the 20,000 specified<sup>5</sup>). Human vaccines and medicines have been provided in part. Adequate vaccines, plus Vitamin A, for EPI have been provided in 2000, 2001 and 2003. Medicines were to be provided to the five RHCs and Mong Pawk Hospital, but the Government could provide medicines only for the hospital, about 25 per cent of the need. Again, the Project Document was too ambitious in estimating the Government inputs.

#### Wa Authority

46. Although not signatories to the Project, the Wa Authority was not required to provide any inputs to the Project, which although an oversight was a product of how the Project Document was formulated. The Wa authorities in fact have benefited from the Project through expensive infrastructure, such as a main road, urban electricity, school and water supply. The Project Document does make reference to inputs from community leaders, but these are confined to what a village could provide, such as land, labor, local people for Project work. The Wa authorities have also received other benefits such as the use of heavy equipment for their construction projects (free except for fuel). Ways to involve the Wa Authority in the Project more closely and to elicit inputs need to be found.

#### UNODC

47. UNODC recruited the Project Coordinator and provided Project funding. When funding shortages arose, UNODC identified new sources and helped prepared Project Documents for approval. Both the G25 and G45 subprojects have been approved. One shortcoming was the lack of additional management support. Although the five expatriates in the first Phase were too many, the one at present is too few for proper Project implementation.

### C. Management and Implementation of Activities

---

<sup>5</sup> The Project found it more convenient and bureaucratically simpler to obtain it at market costs in the Project Area than to go to obtain it at the nearest depot which is in Kyaington (even though Project vehicles go there regularly).

48. As in Phase I, the Project served in practice as the development agency in the Southern Wa region, a duty far beyond its scope as set in the Project Document. Also as in Phase I, the responsibility for this task rest excessively on the Project Coordinator who is responsible for implementing the 100 activities (despite efforts to streamline Phase II) with less money and a smaller staff.

49. Burdened by such tasks and also tight deadlines for output delivery, the Project Coordinator has found it necessary to focus on outputs, particularly food security and highly-visible infrastructure (often related to food security). One result is that community-level work in the CSF and Livelihood Components was emphasized less. Also, the Project Coordinator has had little time for the participatory consultations that facilitates delegating authority to less senior staff and for involving the local community in decision-making.

50. Nevertheless, the Project Coordinator has addressed issues raised in the first evaluation. The Project management structure has been more clearly defined (see chart in annex) with each Component having a local expert designated as team leader. As before, however, partly because of the reduction in staff, there is no deputy team leader within the Project structure.

#### C. Monitoring and Backstopping

51. To solve monitoring and backstopping problems noted in the first evaluation, UNDCP assumed full execution of the Project with no associated agency (with no loss in efficiency). The Project Steering Committee has been more active, meeting annually (not twice a year as called for the Project Document).

52. The Project was conceived of as a pilot effort, aimed also at gaining support from other donors to support development work in this region. Without effective monitoring, no clear lessons learned, including an understanding of the processes which occurred in achieving positive or negative results, can be reached. Although staff shortages constrained monitoring, far too little was done and remains a weakness, as noted in the midterm evaluation.

53. Monitoring is central to Project management. While the Project provides six-monthly progress reports to UNODC, they are mostly a narrative of Project activities of the reporting period, without reflecting on where the Project stands in relation to its aims or if it is on course. As mentioned in Chapter I, the Project has never clearly defined its indicators, so that neither Project management nor any one else can do so.



54. Monitoring by UNODC has been remiss. UNODC should have done more to ensure that the Project design was implementable. From the start of Phase II, Project monitoring has mainly been geared to its financial situation, with numerous Project (budget) revisions based on fluctuating conditions. Besides placing so much emphasis on the budgetary situation, UNODC should devote more effort to assisting Project management solve ongoing problems and also deal with the Project's overall direction. Despite budgetary issues ongoing from Phase I, including overspending on certain infrastructure items, the Project has not had a financial audit.

55. At last, all the needed funds for Project implementation have been secured. With the G25 Project coming to an end in September 2003, Project management will be simplified. Since the Country Office staff is being increased, such as in poppy monitoring work, ways should be found to facilitate better and more supportive monitoring of C25 (and G45).

#### E. Circumstances Affecting the Project (prerequisites)

56. Fulfillment of the prerequisites for Phase II, noted in sections 9.6-9.9 of the Project Document (January 2001) has been satisfactory. The Government has arranged for permission for Project staff to travel freely in the Project Area. The Government has appointed counterpart staff from NaTaLa to work with the Project. The Project provides a sizeable supplementary salary support to these individuals in addition to paying full salary to a number of other government staff beyond this number.

### **CHAPTER III**

#### **PROJECT RESULTS**

##### **A. Outputs**

##### **Common Support Facility**

57. As noted in Chapter I, three of the four outputs for this component were phrased so as to be unachievable during the Project's life and certainly not with the limited resources available. Still, some comment is necessary on whether they could be achieved at least in part. The first was formulated with the idea of integration on several levels: among the different Project components and in terms of the Project, township and district) authorities, and NaTaLa. The mechanism of Planning and Implementation Team was foreseen for this.

58. Planning and Implementation Teams, while a good idea, have not been implemented except for inter-component cooperation at the Project headquarters. This is not to say that there is no, or poor, cooperation between the Project and its local counterparts. This

cooperation, however, has not been systematized, nor has it been used as a tool to assist local counterparts see the importance of integrated development at village and higher levels (by area planning).

59. While there is cooperation among the components themselves, this cooperation does not always lead to a strong integration of activities at village level, as foreseen in the Project Document. Discussions with villagers show that ownership of some Project activities is more strongly held by the components than by the villagers.<sup>6</sup> In many villages, the Project makes too little attempt to integrate activities in that it has distributed agricultural inputs in an untargeted way or is conducting single sector, or one-off, activities, in health and education.

60. Output Two on strengthening Wa local government units has not been achieved. There have been no systematic capacity building activities for Wa local government, and the *ad hoc* Wa management style with rather arbitrary and top-down decision-making continues. As far as could be determined, the Project has focused more on either lobbying to ensure the compliance of the Wa authorities or on responding to their requests, without sufficiently involving them in the mutual formulation of workplans and activities. Although political conditions constrained the Project from having the Wa accept its stance on community-based work during the second phase, as it is currently only working in four villages (one for humanitarian reasons), this risks leading the Authority to conclude that community level work has a low priority in the Project.

61. Output Two includes activities on community level capacity building. The Project is to establish “Mutual Help Teams.” While the idea of such teams is fine in practice the villagers already have forms of mutual help and exchange. In villages from which the Project has withdrawn its field staff, the Teams no longer exist. In the three newer villages in Mong Khar, the people’s main understanding of the teams is as a means to organize labor when the Project provides inputs or does other work in the village. That is, the Village Heads need only contact team heads to mobilize labor. These teams are rather neighborhood groups (families living near each other) which may or may not be closely knit.

62. Although the Project Document makes numerous mention of the need for working in a “gender-integrated” manner and to benefit women directly, this has not happened. The greatest benefit to women from Project work has been from village water supplies.

---

<sup>6</sup> Village development plans are more the product of the Project components than of the villages; the uniformity of the plans from village to village—some with very different socio-economic conditions—is evidence of this. Apparently also training by an AD expert from UNODC Vienna contributed to this uniformity.

Otherwise, particularly regarding livelihood activities, little effort has been made to reach women, and their skills and potentials have been largely disregarded in the overall picture of Project implementation. An example are the farmer cross-visits and key farmer selection. Women have been largely left out of these activities despite the fact that highland women do more than 50 per cent of agricultural field work.

63. The third output on establishing a participatory planning and monitoring system could be established only slightly in the Project, and not at “all levels of local government units.” As noted above, during Phase II, integrated development work at village level had to be reduced to a minimum, with only three villages in Mong Khar Township, and one in Mong Phen. Therefore, the planned “exposure” of the Wa authorities and NaTaLa “participatory, bottom-up planning” could not take place. Original plans to expand village work from “nucleus villages” to elsewhere have not been followed, and the Project as a whole has clearly shifted, at least for now, from being a “community development initiative.”

64. This stopping of most Project activities in the Mong Phen and Hotao as a result of the incident involving a Wa Security Brigade head during a detox camp at Ha Dah took a major toll on the the Project’s community-based work. Besides this, after being reinstated in July 2001 it was withdrawn again in March 2002 resulting in a start and stop approach that damaged community development work in the villages. Not only did it confuse the villagers, it prevented the Project from gaining a clear understanding of what community-based elements worked in creating sustainable livelihoods. Such an approach also seriously impaired the establishment of village-level progress (including process) monitoring.

65. Output Three was to have included a participatory monitoring system, but the Project’s monitoring system is largely confined to activity monitoring such as input delivery or completion of infrastructure. It has done little on either process- or impact monitoring. Project management may be well aware of the types of activities which have failed, but there is not enough awareness as to the reasons why, thus depriving it of the chance to make adjustments for future implementation.

66. As mentioned above, precisely defined indicators are unavailable. A monitoring officer employed by the Project left in December 2000 due to the financial constraints noted above, and was not replaced. Given the job descriptions of the remaining staff, it could not have been expected that they could take up monitoring tasks in any detail or depth. Since the Project was to have established a *participatory* monitoring system, it should have been the task of all components together with Project management to establish impact indicators.

67. The fourth output relates to logistic support for implementing alternative development plans. This output has been achieved in large part, as logistic support has become a major task of the CSF during Phase II, particularly with the placing of two of the staff in Mong Phen and Mong Kar respectively. As noted above, however, part of the logistics task should have remained with the respective components, especially livelihood. It cannot be expected that a section already responsible for some of the most important tasks of the Project should also facilitate the work of the other components (the emphasis should rather be on close cooperation to facilitate the villagers' plans). The Project needs a larger administrative support section to take care of a bigger share of the logistics support activities.

#### Infrastructure

68. The Infrastructure Component has two outputs: to establish a road maintenance system and to provide water supplies for household and farm use. Road construction was essentially completed in Phase I. Regarding the road maintenance system to be established, the Wa have shown the ability to maintain their roads, which at first glance may not seem durable, have proven to be kept open and serviceable except in certain areas during the monsoons. The Project hopes that roads it has built will be regarded as the Wa Authority as "theirs" and maintain them as they do their other roads.

69. Regarding agricultural water supplies, the Mong Khar canal is being built under the RAS/G45 Project and is not evaluated in this report. Although there are no other specific activities in the C25 Project Document for providing agricultural water, the Project built the Pang Lim weir in Mong Pawk Township that is irrigating up to 50 hectares of flatlands where double cropping of rice will now be possible.

70. The Project supported gravity-fed village water systems and spring development, a most sustainable and effective strategy. Usually this included a spring box, pressure break boxes when needed, water tanks and reservoirs, underground pipeline, and hand operated outlets (taps and showerheads). The average spring yield is high for a small-scale village supply, ranging from 0.2-0.4 liters/second. One major factor is the Project's decision to build one water point for every 30 people. Besides the smaller scale systems, larger systems were either built or older ones rehabilitated for Mong Phen, Hotao, and Mong Pawk.

71. The selection of target villages was based on a general assessment. The main criteria included poppy cultivation, geographical location, number of households, and Wa authority clearance. A participatory development plan was then conducted to meet the demands of the

villagers. The local communities unsurprisingly supported having access to a supply of safe water. Once the community agreed, it was then necessary to identify a suitable nearby spring, calculate whether the spring yield meets the people's needs, and evaluate the entire operation.

72. The Project unfortunately did not conduct a baseline water consumption survey. Instead it based its calculation on a theoretical water consumption of 45 liter/person/day with 15 per cent for more cattle and another 15 per cent for gardening for a total of 53 liters. Experience from other rural areas indicates that this is a gross overestimate for isolated mountainous areas; about ten liters, not counting cattle, would be more accurate. One result of this overestimate was that the Project built reservoirs that required taps that increased the overall cost while reducing durability. That this was a weakness was indicated by the fact that all reported system problems were linked to tap or spigot leakage despite the systems being only about six months old. As a matter of policy, reservoirs and water tanks should be used only when there is insufficient water to ensure an flow of 0.2 liters/second for each 300 users.

73. Despite generating overall satisfaction (villagers reported the children liking them), showers do not seem to respond to the villagers' primary needs. Showers do contribute to improved hygiene but at a high cost in terms of sustainability. Similarly, the ratio of one water tap for 30 users might be evaluated as bringing comfort to the users but not as a cost effective, easy to maintain and appropriate option.

74. This component provided water to 18,000 people, 45 per cent of the Project Area population. This is impressive even though more than half of the population covered is concentrated around Mong Hpen, Mong Pawk, and Hotao. Only 28 per cent of the village-based population was covered. The average length of pipe per user of six meters indicates the low population density in the Project Area (compared to half that in rural Madagascar, for example). The community participation in the construction has been estimated at 6 per cent of the material cost, which is quite low, standards generally at 10-20 per cent). The shallow pipe trenches (0.4 meters) and the absence of villager involvement in breaking stones and mixing cement might explain this.

75. The average cost per water user served came to US\$12 (compared to US\$8 for an urban user). Since this, however, excluded transport, staff salaries and overhead, the overall actual cost came to about US\$20 which is quite efficient.

76. Despite there being no quantified target in the Project Document, the Project met the objective of providing a reliable and safe supply of water to a large section of the population

at reasonable cost. Still, an open flow system with a cattle trough near the fountain would have been more cost-effective and durable. The reason for not doing this primarily was because of the overestimation of per capita consumption.

77. Although the villagers indicated a sense of ownership for their water systems, this must be carried further. Not enough villagers were trained to obtain or repair the systems nor were measures taken to establish a means for the villagers to fund repairs. Although many villagers said they were prepared to make monthly contributions of 1-2 *yuan*, (with exemptions for the poorest), there are few user committees. This has resulted in many villagers seeing their only option as asking Project staff to help solve technical problems. Various measures could have included training, providing a kit of spare parts at a subsidized price, help in setting up a fee collection system, establishing formal agreements with and promoting internal regulations among users.

78. For the township water systems, sustainability is theoretically guaranteed through the installation of water meters. Mong Phen has gone far beyond sustainability with the township bottling and selling purified water from the Project supplied system.

## Public Health, Drugs and AIDS Awareness

### Health Care System Establishment

#### 1. Primary Level Assessment (G25)

79. The Project-established resource building system became operational in early-2002 which has proved to be well-designed and effective, now having provided training to almost 140 Village Health Volunteers (VHV), most of whom are illiterate. To do this, the Project staff devised IEC material including flow charts and posters using an appropriately designed format using only icons, images, and drawings. Constant references within them are made to local traditions and representations.

80. To estimate the ratio of active VHVs, the network's operational status was assessed. Approximately 40 individuals were chosen by the Wa Health Bureau to be trained and then serve as military medics or as Rural Health Center-based staff. The actual number of trained VHVs is 99, mostly from Mong Khar, Mong Phen, and Nam Pai. Of these, 28 have stopped their work for various reasons (including being rejected by the villagers or asked by the Wa Authority to do other work). Of the rest, nine have been rated as poor by their Community Health Trainer. Thus, out of 62 operational trainees, 23 are rated as excellent. Out of 366 Project Area villages, 54 (15 per cent) have VHVs (eight villages have two). The ratio in the three townships noted above is 27 per cent but only 4 per cent in Hotao and Mong Pawk

because of “political” reasons. Discounting this, and considering that 80 per cent of the VHVs of the three townships are illiterate and in the absence of an incentive system, the VHV retention ratio may be appraised as rather good.

81. From the above, a weakness in the Project strategy may be perceived. The Project should have established a limited multi-party incentive scheme that would facilitate additional training inputs. The Project input could have taken the form of monthly refresher training course per diem which, in turn, would have increased VHV participation.

82. Network effectiveness was evaluated using the three basic indicators stated in the Project Document logframe: 1) awareness level of basic health issues (including opium and ATS), with a target set at 50 per cent. 2) level of village health services use (target of 80 per cent), and 3) number of cases referred to the Rural Health Center.

83. In the visited villages, almost everyone knew the VHV and what the person did. In more organized, “progressive” villages, (where the VHV is often more influential), villagers state that the VHV serves as a health educator and counselor, spreading simple messages on major health issues and providing useful information. However, in most villages, most people reported the unsurprising link between VHV and curative work. Villagers say that main benefits of the VHV are access to treatment, information on personal and environmental hygiene, cleanliness, as well as food and water protection. Hand washing is slowly being adopted in villages with a water supply. Knowledge about malaria protection and cure lags behind, with some villages having little understanding of the key factors. Accurate information about malaria overall is still insufficient. The independent adoption of mosquito net use has increased only in villages where they were already present.

84. In all, the Project has achieved higher than expected results in two types of villages, those where existing social dynamics magnified Project inputs and those where the intensity of inputs was sufficient to generate changes. Elsewhere, the Project is far from the expected 50 per cent (considering only the targeted villages). Part of the reason for this deficiency is that most VHVs have been working no more than six months which is too short to see results.

85. As for the utilization of health services (access to essential drugs), access does not provide a complete picture because reporting has not yet been stabilized or standardized. Nevertheless, data do exist which must be mentioned as a success for the Project because setting up a reporting system with illiterate VHVs is far from simple. A six-month study in Mong Phen shows an average of 40 cases handled monthly by a VHV and 80 in Nam Pai.

From this and other sources, we can estimate an overall mean of 50 cases handled monthly per VHV, or 600 yearly. Out of these, 30 per cent are under five and ten per cent are pregnant. With a VHV covering 150-200 villagers, every villager would meet the VHV more than twice a year, a calculation validated by field observation. This shows the potential impact of the system if it is also considered that ideally every case could be the occasion for delivering preventive health messages. One clearly promising Project achievement is the establishing of a network allowing a low cost flow of health information to reach remote villages.

86. One aspect regarding gender balance has to be considered. In Mong Phen Township, only 35 per cent of those seeking help are women. More unexpectedly, the number of girls under the age of 5 comprised only 31 per cent of the total. The fact that all the VHVs are all male does not explain the situation in Mong Phen because they are also all male in Nam Pai where the ratio is balanced. This inexplicable point requires more study.

87. Another indication of the effectiveness of the provision of health services is the number of referrals to the Rural Health Center. Knowing this is of the utmost importance in strengthening the position and legitimacy of VHVs in the village. A precise answer cannot be given because the number of VHVs, the length of their being on the job as well as the reliability of reporting has varied. Given these limitations, the number of referrals for each operational VHV can be estimated at 10 per year, about 2 per cent of the total cases. This low amount may indicate a level of overconsumption of medicine in villages. This can be partly confirmed by the fact that 35 per cent of the cases pertained to the demand for painkillers and may, thus, be a symptom of the search for an opium substitute. This is, however, a common phenomenon in schemes by which medicines are distributed free of charge.

## 2. Secondary and Tertiary Assessment (C25/G25)

88. Two Rural Health Centers were built by the Project, in accordance with the G25 Project Document. But a question must be posed about the Center in Mong Khar. This township already has an operational NaTaLa-run Border Clinic in Pam Nau. Two reservations must be stated. First, at the Quadripartite Meeting in Pangsang, it was agreed that each township would have either a Rural Health Center or a Border Clinic. Second, two health centers in one township duplicates activities and wastes resources (although it may improve the access of the local population to services). An indication of this is the relation of activities between them. As the VHVs workload has increased, the Community Health Trainer's presence in the Rural Health Center has decreased. Meanwhile, the monthly case level dropped from 470 in Q1 to 68 by Q4 at the Rural Health Center while at the Clinic it increased from 147 to 231.



89. The five secondary health stations (Mong Khar, Mong Phen and Nam Pai Rural Health Centers and the Pam Nau and Hotao Border Clinic s) provided care to 11,326 patients in 2002 (20 per cent malaria-related). This is a significant increase over the patient load of about 5,000 (+120 per cent) prior to the Project becoming operational. Mong Pawk treated 4,117 out-patients in 2002 as opposed to 6,813 the previous year. This 35 per cent drop can be partially explained by the opening of alternative health care services in the Project Area.

90. The total number of consultations in 2002 at all centers was 15,743, a rate of 0.4. Although low, this represents a 25 per cent growth from the year before (0.3). Furthermore, it has to be assessed while keeping the whole context in mind. Due to the low population density, many people reside more than one hour's walking distance from any health facility. Also, the VHVs' contribution to the consultation ratio should not be neglected (the whole network allows access to essential drugs for 30,000 people annually).

91. The patient/staff ratio provides useful indicators regarding the staff workload and, further, about system efficiency. The ratio for VHVs is 50 cases per month. In the three Project-run Rural Health Centers (given that a Community Health Trainer works full-time, which is an overestimation) the ratio is 175. For Border Clinics and the Mong Pawk Hospital, the ratio is 60 and 52, respectively. This gives the preliminary indication that Government staff at all levels of the health system is underutilized.

92. This ratio can be used to calculate the per capita cost in terms of wages-related recurrent costs. Materials and equipment are excluded from this calculation (medicines are provided free and capital depreciation is negligible). The cost per patient is about 13-15 *yuan* at a Rural Health Center, 2 *yuan* at village level (allocating half of the CHT salary to VHV support), 0.75 at the Pa Nauk Clinic, 13 at the Hotao Clinic, and five in the Hospital. This shows that in the existing system, the cost for a patient seen by a VHV is not negligible. This is mainly due to the high Project salary (\$500 monthly for a CHT). This could be lowered by increasing the number of VHVs under a CHT's responsibility. The high cost at the Hotao Clinic and the hospital is due to the low workload and to the Project "topping up" policy, as stipulated in the Project Document, to Government staff assigned to Project Area health centers. Although this policy, in principle, is an acceptable incentive for medical staff to stay in remote areas, its practicality here is dubious. First, the amount the Project provides is stupefying: 16 times the base salary. Second, there is no evaluation to assess whether the staff "tops up" its performance or workload. Third, "topping up" was provided to staff at the start of activities but not to those coming later. This looseness leads to incongruities, such as having two Project-supported nurses earning 800 *yuan* a month working alongside a doctor

and an senior nurse receiving their basic salary of 75 and 48 *yuan* helped by a VHV with three-months training earning 80 *yuan*, all with a workload of less than two patients daily.

93. Taking the Pam Nau Border Clinic as a point of reference, Project intervention increases the price but the increased quality was not an adequate compensation for the local people. The major reason for this is the Project's high contribution for health care provider salaries. A more realistic evaluation of the "topping up" policy should have been done at the start of the Project in order not to lose sight of the sustainability of activities undertaken.

94. With institutional issues, the focus of output 4, the situation is at a standstill. Although Government staff increased from 11-14 during the implementation phase (and recently declined to 13), this is no breakthrough. The Government does not recognize Rural Health Centers as official and has no commitment to do so. A possible solution would be to redistribute the existing staff among different facilities. This is not unreasonable considering that NaTaLa policy provides for such a transition. The Project should have taken up this issue earlier to resolve it. As for the Wa Authority Health Bureau, the situation is no better. Its shortage of skilled medical staff is so acute that whatever the Project does, it cannot soon create credible alternative to Government or Project staff. The Northern Wa region is no better; there the option is to use a Chinese curriculum, organizational pattern, and trainers.

### 3. EPI Crash Programme

95. Three Crash Programmes were conducted: in 2000, 2001, and an ongoing one during the evaluation period in 2003. The latter consisted of opening a new cycle and restarting operations in the areas covered in 2001. The targetted age group is children under three for DPT, polio, and BCG and under five for measles. All Project Area villages were covered: 236 in 2000 in Mong Pawk, Hotao, and Mong Phen Townships and 100 in 2001 in Nam Pai, including seven relocated villages.

96. In the 2000 programme, which was subcontracted to the Department of Health, the official results were remarkable in terms of coverage: above 90 per cent of those under three were immunized for polio and DPT which suggests a considerable amount of work considering that three successive administrations are required per immunization. For BCBV and measles, the final figures reported were 96 and 90 per cent, respectively. These figures raise skepticism since 90 per cent coverage for DPT and polio is hardly ever achieved in rural contexts, especially one so thinly populated and inaccessible as the Project Area. Still, the human resources mobilized were intensive; at least 63 staff members were assigned to

conduct the programme on a three-month full-time basis (5,670 person days) to administer 10,135 effective doses, equivalent to 1.8 doses/person/day).

97. The second programme was run by the Project, with 13 staff members working full-time for six months (2,340 person days). Although impressive, the results were less comprehensive: 64 per cent and 55 per cent for polio and DPT, respectively and 96 and 89 per cent respectively for single dose BCG and measles (4,613, effective doses, equivalent to 2 doses/person/day).

98. The cost for the 2000 Crash Programme was US\$51,250, with a unit cost of US\$5.1 per effective dose. For 2001, the total expenditure was about US\$15,000, or US\$3 per effective dose. Due to the vast area to be covered, the operational effectiveness was rather low, with two doses per day delivered. As far as unit cost is concerned, we can estimate a cost, respectively, per fully immunized child of US\$20 and US\$12.

99. In spite of the greater efficiency of the Project efforts, the high level of expenses for this strategy is not worthwhile. Therefore, in assessing the valuable results obtained, three questions should be asked. These are 1) what is the indirect cost of such results (such as disruption of other village activities or the absence of VHVs from the village)?, and 2) how sustainable can a strategy be that costs US\$12 minimum per fully immunized child?, and 3) what will the impact be on child mortality given the fact that adequately treating a malarial child in the village costs far less than 1 *yuan* (US\$0.12)?

#### 4. Relief Operations

100. The Project encountered and then addressed humanitarian problems in the course of implementing activities. The most serious of these arose from the Wa Authority relocation in 1999 of approximately 400 Wa families from the north to Son Keh Village (Nam Lwi catchment) of Mong Phen. However, after settling in Son Keh, many contract malaria and mortality soared, rising 100 per thousand (‰) in 2000 and then 80‰ again in 2001 to a level eight times higher than the average in the area.

101. As an emergency response, the Project organized one mobile health care unit, provided medicines, trained a VHV and distributed mosquito nets. These helped reduce the mortality rate in 2002 to 14 per cent. Child mortality followed the same trend, with a death rate of 270‰ in 2000, 200‰ in 2001, and 120‰ last year.

102. This reduced trend must be mentioned as an unexpected success of the Project. More than providing vital support to the villagers, the Project identified the issue of village relocation and the difficult fate of the people moved. In addition the Project engaged Wa leaders in discussion of the issue, raised their awareness on the pitfalls inherent in such efforts, and advocated alternative solutions. Nevertheless, regarding special considerations and the operational plan for such cases, the Wa Authority clearly counts on external support to soften the bitterness of the medicine.

#### 5. Drug Demand Reduction (C25/G25)

103. After the Wa Brigade chief disrupted the drug detoxification camp in Hadah in 2000, community-based rehabilitation almost came to an end. Nevertheless, a second community-based camp started which resulted in 31 users being detoxified in Pawk Noi Nue and Ayodeh villages in Mong Pawk Noi Township .

104. Only in 2002 did the Wa consent to have drug rehabilitation work resume, in Mong Khar and following a center-based approach as proposed by the Deputy Director of the Wa Agricultural Bureau.

105. In the new phase, the Project treated 210 addicts from 29 villages in nine successive 30-day batches. Detoxification was by Routine Symptomatic Treatment using opium tincture as a substitute. This represented five per cent of Mong Khar Township, correlating closely to initial Project findings that users numbered four per cent of the population. Treatment in Mong Phen is being implemented by the Government.

106. Of these 210 individuals, nine were using ATS, four per cent of the total. Twelve per cent were women and three managed to escape the treatment site which was within the local police compound. Estimates of the town's remaining addict population's age range from 20-40. As for the older addicts, both the Authority and local population tolerate their continued usage and do not try to detoxify them.

107. At present, all demand reduction activities take place at the Mong Pawk Hospital Drug Treatment Center. The fourth batch started during the evaluation, bringing the total number of addicts admitted for treatment to 109. The Mong Pawk township census counted 385 addicts; all are supposed to be treated at the hospital in an anticipated total of 11 batches, each lasting about three weeks. The Project plans to target Nam Pai Township next where 8-10 batches are foreseen. The expected completion date is about 18 months from now.

108. The average basic cost per detoxified addict is about US\$50 (\$30 for food, \$20 for medicine). If the staff salaries were added, the total would come to US\$70. The estimated cost for village-based camps was \$100 per treated addict for food and medicine alone.

Contributing to the expenses was the low expertise of the Project at the beginning. A more carefully prepared strategy could have greatly reduced expenditures. Nevertheless, center-based treatment, which can handle 30-40 users per session, should inevitably cost less than village-based treatment that usually handles no more than six per time. The standardized treatment protocol used in center-based detoxification also promotes efficiency.

109. Comparison of the effectiveness of the two strategies is impeded by the lack of crucial information in Project documentation. No data are available on the relapse rate, which is to detoxification what a cure rate is to tuberculosis control, namely the principal measure of success. A survey to fill this gap will be conducted in April for all the villagers covered by the detoxification programme.

110. Relapse is linked to follow-up. The drug treatment programme in Mong Khar, as has already been observed in the target villages, can relay on a comprehensive network of VHVs who could serve potentially as key actors in the monitoring and counselling of ex-addicts. They would, however, require additional training and supervision in this regard.

111. Regarding drug abuse prevention, the provision of information and education to villagers about drug abuse has not yet started. For opium use, there is no real need since the villagers see the effects of using opium in their daily life. However, the risks of ATS use are clear because of its low cost (0.5 *yuan* for a good quality tablet), the dose dependant effect, the culturally alien nature of the item, and its psychological destructiveness. ATS is being promoted by drug sellers as a tonic medicine that has led to considerable use in the Project Area villages. Another factor is the official prohibition of the sale of ATS which, while slowing its spread, also increases the pressure for the user to deny having taken it.

112. Those aspects explain why reliable information on consumption is so scarce. A preliminary assessment would be that ATS awareness among villagers is either poor or remarkably well-hidden. The Project must gather precise data on this subject. Information and educational materials also need to be designed and prepared regarding ATS.

113. The Project has been slow in implementing the workplan. Although 600 addicts were to be detoxified in 20 sessions, only a bit more than half of this has been achieved. Another

year will be required in order to accomplish this and somewhat more than that to treat all the addicts in Nam Pai.

#### Education

114. Of the two outputs in the Education Component (improve literacy and school educational standards and establish school and backyard gardens), the Project has promoted activities that are essentially sustainable. In Phase II, teachers given supplementary financial assistance by the Project have been locally recruited. Most of them will receive support either from the Government or the Wa Authority, as well sometimes as the local community, following the completion of the Project. School buildings have usually been built in cooperation with villagers—in some cases the villagers built the building while the Project provided the roof (although some Wa leaders find these structures “makeshift” and thus unsuitable). Many villagers have also taken an interest in the adult literacy activities.

115. These activities are taking place amid cultural and linguistic diversity. Almost the entire population, including the Wa Authority, recognizes multi-lingual education as needed for socio-economic development. The Project promotes education by two curricula, Chinese, more favored by the Authority, and Myanmar, more popular with the people in the Project Area, particularly Lahu and Akha. Complications also exist regarding overlapping academic years but this has been overcome in schools in the northern Wa Region. More problematic is the salary differential with the Wa and Chinese schools able to pay significantly more than the Myanmar Government, the amount of the latter perhaps less than a living wage.

116. By supporting education in both curricula (sometimes even in the same village), the Project is facilitating the skills by which the local people can deal with the realities of their life as ethnic minorities in an area of Myanmar with significant Chinese influence. The adult literacy in Lahu and other local languages supported by the Project supports this initiative. Linguists agree that teaching reading in one’s native language is an effective way to teach literacy and after which learning the National and other languages proceeds more effectively.

117. However, as in other areas, the Wa Authority has sometimes acted arbitrarily, with local authorities not inevitably following the policy of the Wa Authority in Pangsang. Apparently because of decisions by local Wa Authority officials, two schools following the Myanmar curriculum had to change to Chinese while another school had to shut down. There is as yet no Myanmar curriculum high school, which constitutes an obstacle for those who want to study further in the country. Although the Project’s activities have been carried out in

a positive and forward looking manner, the overall sometimes random decision-making process makes planning problematic and jeopardizes the gains made.

#### Livelihood

##### Intensified & Diversified Rice-Based Farming Systems (Monsoon Upland and Lowland Rice)

118. The average yield of upland rice was estimated at 1.1 tons/hectare. Local varieties *Kao Mar Phai*, *Kao Mon Kao* and *Kya Law Nat* were tested. Yields were 2.8 tons/ha, 2.5 tons/ha and 1.62 tons/ha respectively. *Kao Mar Phai* was introduced for upland cultivation.

119. Farmer's average yield of lowland rice was less than 2 tons/ha. Introduced varieties of Open Pollinating Varieties (OPV) China 201, China 203, and hybrid F1-63 and F1-64 were tested. OPV China 203 and China 201 yielded an average of 4.75 tons/ha and hybrid yield an average of 3.75 tons/ha. An evaluation in 2001 showed that the maximum yield of F 1-64 was 5.58 tons/ha and for China 203 4.31 tons/ha under demonstration conditions.

120. The Project tested 7.31 hectares of summer rice at Mong Phen in 2000 with an average yield of 3.98 tons/ha. Again 9.7 hectares of summer rice was test planted in Mong Khar in 2002 which yielded of 4.31 tons/ha using improved Chinese varieties. The Project distributed 1,200 kilograms of China 203 and 1,100 kilograms of hybrid rice for the 2002-2003 summer cultivation on 131 hectares of land.

121. The evaluators visited the summer rice fields at Wein Son village, Wan Hwe village in Mong Khar Township; Nam Naw and Nam Lwi catchment areas, Son Keh village, Wan Li village and Wan Pha village in Mong Phen Township. The rice fields are in good condition.

##### Winter Crops and Cash Crops (Backyard Gardens)

122. The Project distributed 1.1 tons of winter wheat seeds, 64 tons of winter crop seeds, four tons of vegetable seeds for poppy crop substitution. None of the necessary monitoring was conducted. The evaluation team saw backyard vegetable gardens in Wan Lone Palaung and Pam Nau villages and winter crops on nearby slopes. The farmers had grown most of the vegetable seeds successfully. There is no market for this produce and it is consumed at home. Other crops like sweet pea and fava bean yielded mixed results.

#### Fertilizer Use

123. Despite poor soil, few farmers fertilize their crops. Fertilizer demonstrations in 2000 showed that significant yields could be obtained, even for traditional rice varieties. In 2002-

2003, the Project distributed 11.398 tons of urea, 6.955 tons of rock phosphate and 6.491 tons of compound fertilizer together with recommended rates. This would much help the farmers increase yields and enhance soil fertility and productivity but one that is rarely taken.

#### Livestock and Fishery Production

124. A total of 5,305 livestock animals were distributed to the four townships from 2000-2002 to supplement family income. No follow-up report assessed the benefits of this programme. The evaluation team saw fish ponds in Pa Nauk and Mong Khar, but the fish could not be seen in the muddy water. The ponds are likely to dry out in winter and summer months and obtaining fish feed could also be a problem. Veterinary service is satisfactory with 5,674 vaccinations from 2000 to 2002.

#### Pasture Management

125. Eighteen introduced forage legumes were maintained by the Project to observe for adaptability in Wa areas, with trials for of eight conducted at the Mong Pawk agriculture camp. Two varieties were demonstrated to key farmers at Pa Nauk, Mong Khar in 2002. *Stylo hamata* showed high potential while *Solanda*, *Setaria*, *Glen*, *Wynn Cassia*, *Viscia villosa* while *Paspalum* also were found to establish themselves.

#### Alternative Income Generation

##### Tea Production

126. A total of 8.26 hectares of tea plantations were set up in 2000 at Pan Lim and Pawk Noi Niu as was a 2.75 hectares tea nursery at Pan Lim, hiring two tea specialists from Simao, China. A site visit found that due to ownership problems, maintenance was inadequate, leading to their failure. But two hectares of community tea plantations owned by 15 farmers at Mong Pawk New was in good condition. Some villagers are running a tea nursery which has enough seedlings for transplanting a four hectares plot, that has already been prepared.

##### Fruit Trees and Woodlots

127. Different varieties of mango, orange, peach, litchi, banana, papaya etc., were transplanted with community participation at 22 villages but the reliability of follow-up data is questionable. A 45 *mu* (3 hectares) woodlot plantation was planted with 7,000 *Cassia sesmea* seedlings at Mong Pawk, but was destroyed by fire.

#### Provision of Irrigation Systems and Farm Equipment

128. The Pang Lim Weir which was just completed will irrigate up to 50 hectares for double rice cropping. Three electric water pumps were set up near Son Keh village in Mong



Phen to irrigate 67 hectares of summer rice. A visit showed that one pump can irrigate ten hectares, a second can irrigate 17 hectares, and the last can irrigate 40 hectares. The 67 hectares of summer rice is in good condition. The Project introduced a 7-power tiller and 2 tractors for land preparation, 11 rice inter-cultivators for weeding, seven threshers and one rice mill for quality rice production. Small farm machinery and equipment are needed in Project areas because of the shortage of draught cattle and buffaloes.

#### Capacity Building

129. A total of 815 farmers were trained in community agriculture and livestock, tea nursery and plantations, wood-lot plantations and rice production.

#### B. Immediate Objectives (Outcomes)

##### Common Support

130. The immediate objective, “Institutionalize a system to involve the local community in planning and implementing development to enable new ways of living not involving the cultivation and use of opium cannot be achieved”. This objective forms the core of the Project as a whole, and if interpreted literally would mean that the Project could be judged a failure. However, since the objective is so overly ambitious that even if the entire Project had been devoted to achieving it, it could not have been accomplished, it is unreasonable to use this as a benchmark of Project success. Had it been accorded the importance due to it, a community development and/or local government development adviser would have been needed for the entire second phase, or at the very least on a regular backstopping basis. Instead, the Project has focused more on infrastructure construction and providing free inputs rather than capacity building at the different levels envisioned. Moreover, in some areas, the Project has spent more money on urban development (Mong Pawk and Mong Phen) than rural development, and would also appear to deviate from its original objectives.<sup>7</sup>

#### Livelihood

##### Rice-Based Farming Systems

131. To phase out shifting cultivation rice farming, the Project introduced improved rice varieties with high yield potential, both for lowland and upland rice cultivation. Apart from the rainfed rice cultivation, summer rice cultivation was successfully implemented. However, it is uncertain how much this will actually contribute to poppy replacement.

---

<sup>7</sup> An example comes from Mong Phen Township whereby the Project spent almost \$134,000 on urban Water Supply and School Construction, while the amount spent in villages for water and schools came to \$5600.

132. A total of 1,114.93 hectares of winter crops and 131.98 hectares of summer rice were grown in previous poppy growing areas of Mong Phen, Hotao, Mong Pawk and Mong Khar, thus replacing poppy cultivation in these areas.

### ***Rice-Based Farming System***

The Project had introduced Open Pollinating Variety (OPV) and hybrid variety in the rice cultivation programme. The farmers can retain the OPV seed for their own seed security for future cultivation, but not the hybrid variety, which has only a one season cultivation life span as seed. Thus the Project must supply the hybrid seeds to the farmers every rice growing season which may not be as sustainable as OPV.

### **Cash Crop ( Backyard Garden)**

The Project distributed 4 tons of vegetable seeds to the poppy farmers for poppy substitution in their backyard. This will work only if the Project supplies the seeds. But this may not be sustainable in the long run.

### **Livestock and Fishery Production**

133. To achieve the objective to increase livestock and fishery production to supplement income for the loss of poppy cultivation, livestock such as cattle, hogs, ducklings and fish fingerlings were freely distributed. However, the effectiveness is not known due to lack of follow up monitoring and assessment.

### **Alternative Income Generation, Irrigation Systems and Farm Equipment, and Capacity Building**

134. The target is to increase individual household income by mean of alternative income generation rather than opium cultivation. The Project initiated this poppy substitution programme by distributing winter and cash crop seeds, and the effectiveness of this programme can only be interpreted by assumed cultivation of the distributed seeds in poppy growing areas. The summer cultivated areas in Nam Lwi was in old opium poppy fields.

135. Tea production for poppy substitution failed to materialize due to ownership problems and neglect of the tea nursery and plantations.

136. Training key farmers for implementing rice and winter cultivation was carried out according to the Project Document.

### Education

137. The objective is to “upgrade the educational and vocational training capacity of the local community and integrate it with the mainstream GOUM system at the upper levels” is, as in the case of the Common Support Facility, vague and unachievable. However, Project activities supported the objective by improving educational standards and literacy and the establishment of backyard gardens. There is still a need at some stage for more vocational education; the Project should help at least plan for the establishment of an agricultural training center which was removed as an activity in the latest Project Document revision.

### Health

138. Regarding this component, the objective was to “reduce illicit drug demand...and establish an accessible and culturally sensitive primary health care delivery system, the Project has contributed significantly to drug demand reduction. Significant also was the Wa ban on opium use as of 2005 that encouraged many users to enter treatment.

139. The Project devised the structure and materials for a culturally sensitive primary health care delivery system but had insufficient means, for the political reasons elaborated above, to implement them. If, as expected, that the European NGOs, Malteser Hilfsdienst and Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI) receive Government permission to take over the health work, there will be time for the Project work to be institutionalized and for the Government and Authority to take over at a later date.

### Infrastructure

140. The road maintenance system apparently will be by the Wa Authority. However, the Authority is not mentioned in the Project Document under this activity. As for the provision of irrigation and household water, the Pang Lim Weir has provisions for maintenance while the village supplies are need of more assistance as noted in the sections above.

### Poppy Cultivation and Monitoring

141. The Poppy Cultivation Monitoring Component has two outputs, one to make information on opium poppy cultivation and abuse available and one to improve national capacity to conduct opium poppy surveys. Although the objective for the component includes reduction of opium abuse, no component activities support this and demand reduction will be considered under the Public Health Component, including the G25 Project.

142. By the end of 2002, 328 villages in the Project Area had been surveyed for poppy cultivation in two consecutive seasons. Poppy was cultivated on 956.37 hectares in the second survey, a decline of 29 per cent from the previous year. A further decline in area cultivated is expected in the current survey but because of favorable climatic conditions, the actual yield should increase. Besides the activities in the Project Document, the Project also conducted a market survey and compiled data on the market for opium and other commodities. Activities for the second output were underway during the evaluation. Although no findings were available the evaluation team observed preparations both in Yangon and elsewhere in terms of staffing, training, and implementation.

### C. Drug Control Objective

143. The Project relates to two of the three objectives agreed on by the governments of Myanmar and China, namely to eliminate opium poppy cultivation through socio-economic development programmes and to reduce demand and consumption of drugs. Although, as the Project Document states, the Project “is directly related” to these objectives, it is the Wa Authority which has made the ban and the Government which concurs.

144. For both objectives, there have been reductions in the southern Wa region. However, the reductions need to be seen in context. The Wa Authorities appear very serious about the plan to eliminate opium by the year 2005.<sup>8</sup> This information has been communicated to the villagers, and eradication campaigns have taken place in Mong Phen Township in 2002 and 2003, with 93 and 55 hectares being eradicated respectively. In other Townships, village leaders mentioned that they were being told to phase out their cultivation of poppy until 2005.

145. In the southern Wa region, poppy cultivation has decreased from around 1,200 hectares in 1999 to 960 hectares in 2002, and 775 hectares in 2003 (the latter two figures *before* eradication). It is not possible, however, to attribute most of these reductions to alternative development activities sponsored by the Project, as it has not achieved an overall reduction in the 28 villages in which it has had a higher level of activities than the other 300 some villages in Mong Pawk District. The Project’s own area figures show that these 28 villages had 150 hectares of poppy cultivation in 1999, 155 hectares in 2001-2002 and 150 hectares in 2002-2003.

---

<sup>8</sup> The serious attention paid by villagers to the Authorities’ calling for a poppy ban may be seen in Hotao which had been declared opium-free in 1998-99 as a result of the UNODC project starting its activities there. In 1999 there were only 10 hectares under poppy cultivation, but when the authorities decided to relax the ban, the cultivation went up to 63 hectares in 2002, and further increased to 71 hectares in 2003.

146. In drug demand reduction, the Project has focussed on detoxification. Based on anecdotal accounts, it has had good success with these. As a result of detox camps conducted in two villages, in Mong Kar Township and at the Drug Demand Reduction Centre in Mong Pawk, 372 addicts (almost all opium users) have been detoxified (out of an 1500-1700 living in the entire southern Wa region). Although the Project has not done any systematic follow up of these treatment activities, it would appear that the ex-addicts take seriously the warnings from the Authorities that they will be fined for the first three relapses and then eventually put in jail on a fourth relapse.<sup>9</sup> Given the current framework conditions, the Project is making serious inroads into reducing opium demand in the area although it has not conducted any drug prevention activities, and the treatment is largely confined to detoxification.

#### D. Other Results

##### More Productive Interaction with the Wa

147. Although the first evaluation mentioned that one positive result of the Project was improved relations with the Wa, the misunderstanding between the Wa and the Project noted above, that interrupted activities for months, showed that relations were still problematic. By the time of this evaluation, the Project staff and the Wa Authority had established a forthright dialogue with relations sometimes being cordial. Although the Authority occasionally makes unfeasible requests or inappropriate decisions that affect Project work, overall relations have improved to the point where some joint planning has taken place and the Authority has generally supported Project activities and looks forward to future cooperation.

##### Greater Presence of the Government in the Project Area

148. These better relations have enhanced Government-Wa Authority relations in that GOUM representatives on the Project staff join in discussions with the Wa. In the last four years, the number of government officials in the Project Area has increased from 26 to 33, the Government is more involved in local life, communications between the Project Area and the Wa Area are improving, and there are plans for a TV relay station and increasing the hospital staff to a total of over 40. The affiliation of the Mong Pawk schools and the planned affiliation of those in neighboring townships further enhances the government presence.

#### E. Sustainability

149. Several more years will be required to insure the sustainability of many Project activities. This is because of the conditions prevailing in the Wa Special Region which has

---

<sup>9</sup> At one village, people told the evaluation team that the Authorities had made spot checks, and that a few relapsed addicts were fined on the spot (200 Yuan each for the first relapse) which had caused them considerable hardship.

shaped many of the approaches taken by the Project to date. The Project has been constructing various types of infrastructure (public infrastructure such as major canals, electricity lines, roads, permanent school buildings, health centers, urban water supply systems, and community infrastructure such as village water supply systems), and it can only be *hoped* that this infrastructure will be maintained. There is little evidence, however, that either the Wa Authorities or the GOUM have made budgets available to cover maintenance and/or recurrent costs connected with operating the infrastructure.<sup>10</sup>

150. The sustainability of service delivery in the Project area is also not assured, particularly in the agriculture but also the health sector (if the INGOs do not pick up the work). In education, the situation looks somewhat better as the Wa authorities are willing to pay Chinese curriculum teachers a low, but reasonable salary. For Myanmar curricula teachers, the situation is more difficult since their salary is less than what they need to live on. However, most Project-supported teachers live in the village where they teach and they can make a living independently. Another issue is that subsistence farming families have little cash for books and school stationery.

151. For village-level sustainability of activities, much of what the Project has done, particularly in livelihood and community development, is not sustainable. Agricultural activities have yielded poor results, or have had good results but insufficient markets. Asking villagers to assess the sustainability of Project impacts, they showed the greatest appreciation for higher yielding varieties of upland and lowland seed (OPVs) which they had gone on to exchange with other families. Near Hotao, improved maize varieties continue to be grown. Otherwise, activities continued by the villagers on their own after the Project had stopped to work directly in them were minimal—in two villages visited, the villagers said they had continued some rice bank activities, but other activities such as use of Community Centers (as Community Centers and continuation of various village groups, including Mutual Help Teams and Village Development Groups, established by the Project had been abandoned

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **OVERALL CONCLUSIONS**

152. The socio-political and administrative framework conditions prevailing in the Wa southern region are not more conducive for Project work since it started in 1998-1999. Highly skilled counterpart staff are still hard to come by. Counterpart budgets which would allow the continuation of services are also far too little to meet the actual needs. The Project

---

<sup>10</sup> At the same time the concept of user fees is virtually unknown.

has a complex, at times confusing, and overly ambitious design that is still working to fit well with the prevailing conditions in the area.

153. Therefore, the achievements of the Project for its five years of implementation remain modest, and relate more to infrastructure and input delivery than to capacity building. Project achievements and impacts are also modest at village level in relation to the overall expenditures of the Project to date. Reductions in opium poppy cultivation are more because of the Wa Authority ban than the UN presence in the area.

154. The Project has so far not been able to live up to its name as a *pilot* alternative development Project. With the skewed balance towards infrastructure and free input distribution rather than towards low-cost village development (livelihoods and capacities), it has not yet found a way forward which is replicable. This risks sending the message to the Wa and to the Government that alternative development means infrastructure and free inputs. This means also high costs and de-emphasizes the strong orientation towards different types of capacity building which is required for *sustainable* alternative development.

155. As stressed above, the Project operates in a context where conditions for development are unfavorable. With this in mind, trying to depict an overview of the Project's achievements becomes as difficult as the conditions in the Project Area. One way to assess the Project in light of its context is according to the kind, and level of interaction it has managed to establish with actual, and potential, stakeholders. This is more process-oriented compared with the goal orientation in the paragraphs above, and recognizes the hierarchy of roles the Project has played over time. In this sense, some pilot work has indeed been done.

156. First role: Project as alternative development agency. Interacting with villagers was the primary mandate of the Project. However, as noted above, the results in many fields are insubstantial. Besides the political issues, one reason for this is the lack of community development expertise in the Project. Still, benefits have reached some remoter villages in the fields of health, access to water, education, and to a lesser degree, livelihood.

157. Second role: the Project as instrument for macro-policy execution. External factors, namely the Authority's own development model based on concentrated inputs and labor intensification (large-scale irrigation schemes and plantations) taken from China, influenced the original objectives. At this level, the Project, and UNODC as a whole, has acted as a tool to implement larger schemes by providing budgets and expertise. This served to complement

Wa-driven law enforcement measures. Ironically, the farther the Project has moved from sustainable alternative development, the closer it has come to the drug control objective.

158. Third role: the Project as a political mediator. At this level, the Project appears as the only intermediary able to maintain channels of communication to and between many actors: international donor countries and agencies (including INGOs as new actors), GOUM and the Wa. This role has permitted the Project to generate a multidirectional flow of benefits at a more political level: the Wa's search for recognition and legitimacy; Government policy of national stability and unity, donor quests for drug control and poverty reduction, and the potential to bring in new implementing partners. This, in turn, may influence the future interplay of these stakeholders.

159. The evaluation team concludes that the Project should continue at least until mid-2005, provided adequate budgets can be made available, but that the focus of the Project's work until its end should be on integrated community-based approaches to sustainable alternative development.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **A. Issues Resolved During Evaluation**

160. The size of the *mu* was clarified, Project staff believed that the Shan measure of weight was about twice as large as it actually was resulting in mistakenly high estimates for user opium doses. This will allow for more appropriate rehabilitation treatment.

#### **B. General Recommendations**

161. *Project Continuation* UNODC should try to ensure adequate budgets are available for the Project to continue its operations until mid-2005, in order to arrive at more solid achievements and lessons learned in terms both of genuinely community-based livelihood development approaches and capacity building.

162. *Cost-Effectiveness* The Project should turn attention to more cost-effective means of implementing and managing activities in the villages (especially the livelihood activities), as significant inputs have been wasted during the course of the Project's two phases.



163. *Additional Expertise* If the Project has funds available to continue to mid-2005, it should give highest priority to hiring a community development/institution building expert on a regular backstopping basis.

164. *Monitoring System* The Project urgently requires the establishment of a suitable monitoring system for all aspects of its work, based on precise achievement indicators. The present activity monitoring is far from adequate. This most probably requires the hiring of a national monitoring officer combined with an international consultancy on this topic.

165. *Internal Impact Assessment* The Project should in 2003 conduct a frank, open and honest impact assessment of the work it has done in a selection of villages from 1999–2002. Based on this assessment, it should hold an internal workshop, preferably with an external facilitator, to discuss the results of the assessment, and to see more clearly what has worked, what has not, and *why*. Selected Wa leaders should be involved in the assessment.

166. *Wa Authorities' Contributions* Attempts need to be made to reach formal agreements to increase Wa Authority contributions to the Project; there should be more cost-sharing than in the past.

167. *Involving the Wa Authorities* Based on the improved better cooperation the Project has achieved with some Wa leaders, it should make a stronger attempts to involve them in joint planning at various levels. This would be an indirect form of hands-on training for them, and would hopefully help them see the need for different types of local area planning.

168. *Input Distribution* Untargeted, free distribution of seeds and other inputs should be brought to a stop as soon as possible. It risks creating passivity among the villages, the seeds are anyway not necessarily suitable, and there is no chance to monitor if such input distribution is having the hoped for impact in terms of reduction of opium poppy cultivation.

169. *Maintenance and Recurrent Costs* Much more thought must be devoted to the future maintenance of infrastructure and covering of recurrent costs. This includes establishing various types of user fees, even if unpopular, for both domestic and agricultural water supplies (particularly for the larger systems).

170. *Gender Issues* The Project has never conducted a gendered, livelihood analysis in a selection of villages, and this is long overdue. Based on such a study, Project staff should receive practical, gender awareness training.

171. *UNODC Backstopping* UNODC should increase its backstopping on alternative development strategies and find ways to be able to provide more assistance to solving problems that cannot be effectively dealt with at the Project level.

172. *Archive Relevant Project Documents* To help reverse the loss of institutional memory between successive UNODC alternative development Projects, a set of hard copies of the major Project documents including consultant reports, maps, and other pertinent materials shall be deposited in the UNODC library in Vienna and, as appropriate, in major document collections elsewhere, such as the national libraries of the donor countries.

### Common Support Facility

173. *Redesign CSF Component* The Project document's CSF component should be redesigned to make it coherent, logical and doable. The CSF staff should also be supported to refocus their efforts more on community development including capacity building. The CSF should not be responsible for Project public relations and/or arranging visits of various outsiders. (Here, Project management should reduce the number of external visits it accepts, particularly from journalists, as they interfere seriously with the work of the Project.)

174. *Number of Villages for Integrated Interventions* The Project should increase the number of villages where it works in a more integrated manner, and reconsider the placement of community field staff. The current field staff should be responsible for more than one village each (upto 3 or 4 villages per staff). More field staff, to the extent possible from the local area, should be hired as it is also a form of local area capacity building.

175. *Village Development Planning* Any further village development planning should be based on the motto of participating in the villagers' plans rather than the villagers participating in the Project's plans. This means a stop to the highly standardized approaches taken by the Project in the villages to date, and more time taken to develop tailored, simpler plans which are based on well-conducted situation analyses and planning processes. This means in turn, a longer time frame for the village planning than has been taken in the past. The whole process could start with water supply construction, which should be used as a tool to develop trust, confidence and dialogue with the local people.

### Health

176. *Opt for sustainability* The best option to preserve and develop what has been achieved would be for another organization to come into the picture. The two NGOs

mentioned above seem to have adequate expertise to establish a sustainable health system. So far, the missing link is the official clearance from the Ministry of Health. UNODC Yangon should follow up on this. A less certain option would be to reallocate health staff through NaTaLa, which is possible if we consider the situation as requesting urgent response. There is already sufficient human resources to staff the four clinics and RHC. These staff should operate as services providers and VHV trainers, the latter task being out of their present scope. Developing a kind of peer alternative enabling the RHC-based VHVs to train, monitor and support village based VHVs could be of great interest and seems achievable.

177. *Revolving fund and incentive scheme* A limited allowance (10 yuan) to VHVs during monthly training sessions should have an impact on attendance and motivation. Addressing the issue of villagers' contribution is essential. Revising the Project allowance policy for health staff is urgent. Drug revolving funds where access to medicines is free in health facilities seems impractical, but ongoing initiatives should be further supported.

178. *Strengthening cost effectiveness* EPI crash programmes should be reassessed, because of their high cost and uncertain impacts, except in response to localized measles outbreaks. Regarding Drug Demand Reduction, ex-addict follow up can be attached to the above system, using VHVs as frontline workers. The activity itself will be terminated before the end of the Project. The organization of simultaneous but somewhat staggered, detoxification programmes in Mong Pawk and Nam Pai should be carried out as soon as possible to reduce the unit cost and reach the final stage of comprehensive case management.

179. *Need for documentation* The ex-addict follow up survey should be conducted in a non-coercive way, while a specific methodology should be used to deal with absentees. Further research study on ATS use, prevalence, circulation and awareness seems essential. Exploring the root causes of health related gender issues observed in Mong Phen (70 per cent of under five children treated are boys) is another key area for study and documentation.

#### Community Infrastructure

180. *Low cost technologies and sustainability of village based water supply* This scheme should be continued with emphasis on open flow systems without showers and equipped with cattle troughs. Building water points with a 0.1 litre/second minimum flow for 100-150 users (up to 30 households) could reduce operational costs by 30 per cent. A baseline water consumption survey should be carried out to find average water use per person. More consistent post-construction inputs should be delivered, focussing on financial, technical and organizational mechanisms to increase village control in system maintenance.

### Education

181. *Provide Incentives to Teachers Other Than Salary Supplements* As the Project nears its final stages, it should consider supporting the village teachers in non-cash ways, such as house repairs or construction. Most supported teachers in Project activities were already village people committed to living and teaching in the community meaning that such assistance is not essential. In return, the villagers should also contribute to the school.

182. *Continue Government Affiliation of Local Schools* The Government has now affiliated the schools in Mong Pawk with the government system. This should be continued in all the other Project Area townships, as it gives a more assured status to the school, and increases the chances of government support, such as for teacher salaries.

183. *Promote Partial Construction of School Buildings* Instead of providing full support for school construction, the Project should promote partial construction, such as the roof of a structure for which the villagers have built the frame and walls. In this case, villagers can repair most, if not all, of the buildings which is not possible in the case of permanent cement structures.

184. *Promote Adult Literacy* Policies in the Project Area supporting adult literacy are enlightened and forward-looking. The Project should identify all possible partners including the Government, the Wa, and NGOs or missions in this effort. Community level field staff should also continue their adult literacy lessons.

### Livelihood

185. *Discontinue Use of Hybrid Rice* The use of hybrid rice in the Project Area creates problems. Harvested hybrid seeds cannot be used for future cultivation, meaning farmers have to buy seeds for the next planting season. Furthermore, to obtain high yields, heavy and costly fertilization is required. Hybrid rice is also susceptible to pests and diseases; continuous cropping leads to Bacterial Leaf Blight which can wipe out the entire crop. The farmers cannot be allowed to assume such a risk. Hybrid rice varieties thus must be eliminated from future programmes.

186. *Promote Seed Multiplication* Instead of importing rice seeds, a planned large-scale seed multiplication programme must be developed quickly. Varieties to be included in the programme are OPV China 201, China 203 (*Sin Shwe War*), high yielding IR 13240 (*Thee Htut Yin*) and *Yezin 2*.

187. *Promote Oil Crops for Winter Cultivation* To overcome the inexperience of local farmers with winter crops, demonstration trials for winter rice and other crops should be carried out as stipulated in the Project Document. One direction to be considered is oil crop cultivation (soy bean, groundnut, mustard), which will raise the local people's oil sufficiency and, thus, reduce the need to import cooking oil from China.
188. *Promote the Use of Organic Fertilizer* Using organic fertilizer (manure) should be promoted to lower production cost and reduce dependence on imports. The optimal use of organic waste should be further promoted to help restore and maintain soil fertility.
189. *Encourage Small-Scale Tea Production* Tea can be a useful part of poppy substitution. Once established, three years after sowing, and given the expected continued stability of market price, a farmer with 3 *mu* (0.2 hectares) of tea should be able to feed a family of four. However, before abandoned tea cultivation activities may be resumed, land use issues must be resolved amicably with the Authorities in order to allocate small parcels of established tea plantation areas to interested farmers. In order not to waste old investments, many of the abandoned nurseries and plantations are in sufficiently good condition that only gap filling of missing plants is needed.
190. *Set up a Livestock Vaccination and Breeding Programme* Instead of freely distributing livestock, the Project should concentrate on vaccinating animals to prevent losses from disease. Money saved from livestock distribution can be used for enlarging vaccination programmes. Once this is established, the local breed of cattle should be upgraded by introducing purebred bulls for natural mating with the local cows. To bring this into action, a national livestock expert should be employed.
191. *Establish a Fish Fingerling Nursery* The Project Document calls for the establishment of a fish fingerling nursery in Nong Kham (Shan Lake) for distribution to farmers. This will reduce if not eliminate the costly importing of fingerlings for local distribution. This should be started as soon as possible.
192. *Promote the Use of Low-Cost Farm Machinery and Maintenance* As more summer rice cultivation is planned, the Project should provide portable harvesters and threshers to selected communities for eventual community management. To sustain this, training in all aspects of maintenance, including the establishment of village funds to cover spare parts and fuel costs, and initial management support should be provided by Project staff.

## CHAPTER VI

### LESSONS LEARNED

1. Operating at a planned, careful pace is more productive.

At least since the revision of the Project Document prior to Phase II, the pace of the Project has been rapid if not feverish. This led to a delivery-oriented process that neglected participatory planning and monitoring at all levels of implementation, resulting in many non-sustainable inputs. The Project must slow down to achieve its objectives. A more deliberate, planned and consultative management system will be more effective and efficient.

2. Planning and monitoring with the Wa promotes sustainability

Although Project-Wa Authority relations are improving, they remain problematic, disrupted by mistrust on both sides. The sometimes unchecked style of Project management and the lack of experienced Wa professionals intensify the sometimes mutual incomprehension. However, a consultative management system that includes the Wa (providing training in planning to the Authority that might not be able to be delivered in any other format) will yield results by giving the Wa expertise in monitoring and evaluation at the highest ranks which should then filter down to the townships.

3. Starting work with simple, inexpensive activities creates a favorable environment for further work

Starting simultaneous activities generates insoluble difficulties. Initiating work with straightforward tasks, such as a village water supply through which expertise in the context can be developed, yields far-reaching results. Doing less here is doing more.

4. Jointly planning a health strategy for the Southern Wa is imperative

Planning a strategy to address the intricate health issues in the Project Area would be a useful exercise in planning and monitoring with the Wa and then starting work through a workplan of simple, progressive activities. This planning could help balance village- and center-based work, GOUM-Authority responsibilities, as well as paid and free services.

10. Freely distributing materials is unproductive

Giving away Project inputs such as seed has created the impression sometimes that the Project provides items unconditionally that require no contribution or effort by the villagers or the Wa Authority. More sustainable are inputs with conditions, such as providing breeding animals temporarily with villagers keeping only the offspring.

6. A Project Coordinator overwhelmed by a variety of tasks from implementation, to staff management, to guiding tours, and revising budgets, cannot function properly

The Project Coordinator has too many responsibilities beyond the responsibility of ensuring Project delivery. Supporting management staff as well as more effective backstopping will give the Project Coordinator more time to devote to planning, monitoring, working with the Wa Authority, that will facilitate a more simple and productive work process.

Annex I**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of the Shan State) (aka Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP)</b>
<b>Project No.</b>	AD/RAS/96/C25
<b>Duty Station:</b>	Mong Pawk Township, Southern Wa Region, Eastern Shan State, Myanmar
<b>Post:</b>	Project Evaluator (team leader)
<b>Duration:</b>	7-27 March 2003 (21 working days)

**Background**

The Project aims at reducing the supply and demand of opium and other drugs in the southern Wa area of Myanmar, using a sustainable, community-based approach. The Project design features 2 phases with a thorough evaluation at the end of each phase. The Project Document was approved by the Chinese and Myanmar Governments and UNDCP (now called UNODC) in 1997 and implementation started at the end of 1998. A midterm evaluation was conducted at the end of Phase One in May 2000 and included some recommendations which led to a redesign of the Project. The new Project Document was endorsed by UNDCP (UNODC) in January 2001. According to the last Project revision the second phase is due to end in December 2003.

**Current Status**

During the second phase of the Project, due to funding limitations, the number of activities has been decreased compared to the first phase. The focus has been on community development and capacity building to ensure sustainability. Funding increased in 2002, permitting an extension in time of the Project depending on the recommendations of the evaluation team.

Expansion to other areas outside the current Project zone will be considered as requested for some time by the Wa and GOUM authorities. The Needs Assessment mission, which follows the evaluation will comprise a mission in Northern Wa and Kokang region.

**Project Strategy**

The overall Project strategy remains unchanged, as summarized in paragraph 2.22 of the Project Document.

**Evaluation Purpose**



As requested by UNODC and including the objectives in paragraph 7.7 entitled “Evaluation” of the Project Document, the Evaluator will conduct an in-depth evaluation of the Project. The Evaluator will provide to UNODC before leaving Yangon a written report that will contain sufficient information to permit a decision concerning whether the Project should continue and in what form (extension in time and/or expansion in geographical area) based on the potential for success as determined from the activities conducted and level of support given to the Project by the various stakeholders during the first phase.

The Evaluator will:

- ◆ familiarize him/herself with the expected and actual Project context, objectives and activities, counterparts and stakeholders of the Project,
- ◆ review Project design and concept in view of the specific context of the Project,
- ◆ carefully review strategic orientations and the planning process that have occurred during the two phases,
- ◆ conduct a review of all aspects of Project implementation: effectiveness of Project management, inputs and backstopping by UNODC,
- ◆ identify and assess the effectiveness and timeliness of expected Project outputs,
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in Project design, management and implementation,

in order to report fully regarding the potential for successful implementation or otherwise of the remainder of the Project activities.

A summary questionnaire will be completed by the consultant as part of the evaluation exercise. The Evaluator will present his conclusions, recommendations and overall assessment of the Project status at a joint Executive Committee, to be held in Yangon before the end of his consultancy.

The Evaluator will prepare for UNODC a comprehensive final evaluation report within two weeks of the end of his assignment, which will include a thorough assessment of two weeks at the end of his assignment, which will include a thorough assessment of:

- ◆ Project Concept and Design in view of the context
- ◆ Implementation of the Project
- ◆ Outputs and Impact of the Project.

In the final report, the Evaluator may recommend abandonment, modifications, or continuation of the Project, as well as recommendations related to the implementation and/or management of the Project.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

It is expected although not required that the evaluation will include discussions with the communities benefiting from the Project activities, Project CTA and staff, UNODC Yangon, relevant Government ministries, Wa local authorities, donor

representatives, and others who have knowledge of Project activities and may assist the Evaluator to carry out his/her responsibilities.

The Evaluator will travel to the Project Site to review and discuss Project activities. Background documentation will be made available to the consultant no less than 2 weeks before the starting date for the consultation. This documentation consists of:

1. WADP Project Document
2. Annual Project Progress Report 99-2000-2001-2002
3. Minutes of the WADP Steering Committee Meetings no: 5,6, & 7
4. Guidelines for the preparation of Project evaluations
5. UNDCP Project Evaluation Summary Questionnaire
6. Standard Format and guidelines for Project Performance Evaluation Report
7. WADP Mid Term Evaluation Report 2000
8. Revised Project Document December 2000
9. Wa Authority 5-year development plan.

The evaluator team leader will work with two other international specialists and one national specialist with expertise in the health, livelihood and drug demand reduction sector. Representatives from each donor country (USA, Japan, Germany, Italy) might also participate in the evaluation process and the follow up mission on need assessment.

Lessons learned which are valid beyond the Project itself should be recorded in the final evaluation report.

### **Qualifications and Experience**

The Evaluator should be familiar with Alternative Development activities associated with reducing opium poppy cultivation in regions of Southeast Asia with at least 10 years experience implementing, monitoring, and evaluating similar Projects. The Evaluator will have appropriate professional qualifications as determined by UNODC. Previous involvement and familiarity with UNODC programmes, ability to communicate in local languages (Chinese, Myanmar) and dialects is an asset.

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of the Shan State) (aka Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP)</b>
<b>Project No.</b>	AD/RAS/96/C25
<b>Duty Station:</b>	Mong Pawk Township, Southern Wa Region, Eastern Shan State, Myanmar
<b>Post:</b>	Project Evaluator (public health)
<b>Duration:</b>	7-27 March 2003 (21 working days)

### **Background**

The Project aims at reducing the supply and demand of opium and other drugs in the southern Wa area of Myanmar, using a sustainable, community-based approach. The Project design features 2 phases with a thorough evaluation at the end of each phase. The Project Document was approved by the Chinese and Myanmar Governments and UNDCP (now called UNODC) in 1997 and implementation started at the end of 1998. A midterm evaluation was conducted at the end of Phase One in May 2000 and included some recommendations which led to a redesign of the Project. The new Project Document was endorsed by UNDCP (UNODC) in January 2001. According to the last Project revision the second phase is due to end in December 2003.

### **Current Status**

During the second phase of the Project, due to funding limitations, the number of activities has been decreased compared to the first phase. The focus has been on community development and capacity building to ensure sustainability. Funding increased in 2002, permitting an extension in time of the Project depending on the recommendations of the evaluation team.

Expansion to other areas outside the current Project zone will be considered as requested for some time by the Wa and GOUM authorities. The Needs Assessment mission, which follows the evaluation will comprise a mission in Northern Wa and Kokang region.

### **Project Strategy**

The overall Project strategy remains unchanged, as summarized in paragraph 2.22 of the Project Document.

### **Evaluation Purpose**

As requested by UNODC and including the objectives in paragraph 7.7 entitled "Evaluation" of the Project Document, the Evaluator will conduct an in-depth

evaluation of the Project. The Evaluator will provide to UNODC before leaving Yangon a written report that will contain sufficient information to permit a decision concerning whether the Project should continue and in what form (extension in time and/or expansion in geographical area) based on the potential for success as determined from the activities conducted and level of support given to the Project by the various stakeholders during the first phase.

The Evaluator will:

- ◆ familiarize him/herself with the expected and actual Project context, objectives and activities, counterparts and stakeholders of the Project,
- ◆ review Project design and concept, with specific reference to the public health, drugs, and AIDS awareness component of the Project, in view of the specific context of the WADP,
- ◆ carefully review strategic orientations and the planning process, with specific reference to the public health, drugs and AIDS awareness component activities, that have occurred during the two phases, references to how GOUM and local authorities have promoted component activities at the village level, such as enhancing the effectiveness of health volunteers, and establishing a follow-up system (so that the evaluator can appropriately evaluate WADP training work),
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in Project design, management and implementation regarding public health and drug demand reduction.
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in Project design, management and implementation, regarding public health and drug demand reduction

in order to report fully regarding the potential for successful implementation or otherwise of the remainder of the Project activities.

A summary questionnaire will be completed by the consultant as part of the evaluation exercise. The Evaluator will draft a final evaluation report (focusing on public health) for the Team Leader within one week of the end of his assignment, which will include a thorough assessment of:

- ◆ Project Concept and design in view of the context
- ◆ Implementation of the Project
- ◆ Outputs and impact of the Project.

In the final report, the Evaluator may recommend abandonment, modifications, or continuation of the Project, as well as recommendations related to the implementation and/or management of the Project. Lessons learned which are valid beyond the Project itself should be recorded in the final evaluation report. These will be incorporated into the final evaluation report submitted by the Team Leader to UNODC.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

It is expected although not required that the evaluation will include discussions with the communities benefiting from the Project activities, Project CTA and staff,

UNODC Yangon, relevant Government ministries, Wa local authorities, donor representatives, and others who have knowledge of Project activities and may assist the Evaluator to carry out his/her responsibilities.

The Evaluator will travel to the Project Site to review and discuss Project activities. Background documentation will be made available to the consultant no less than 2 weeks before the starting date for the consultation. This documentation consists of:

10. WADP Project Document
11. Annual Project Progress Report 99-2000-2001-2002
12. Minutes of the WADP Steering Committee Meetings no: 5,6, & 7
13. Guidelines for the preparation of Project evaluations
14. UNDCP Project Evaluation Summary Questionnaire
15. Standard Format and guidelines for Project Performance Evaluation Report
16. WADP Mid Term Evaluation Report 2000
17. Revised Project Document December 2000
18. Wa Authority 5-year development plan.

The evaluator team leader will work under the supervision of the Evaluation Team Leader and with the other members of the evaluation team.

### **Qualifications and Experience**

The Evaluator should be familiar with public health activities associated with reducing opium poppy cultivation in regions of Southeast Asia with at least 10 years experience implementing, monitoring, and evaluating similar projects. The Evaluator will have appropriate professional qualifications as determined by UNODC. Previous involvement and familiarity with UNODC programmes, as well as ability to communicate in local languages (Chinese, Myanmar) and dialects is an asset.

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Drug Control and Development in the Wa Region of the Shan State) (aka Wa Alternative Development Project (WADP)</b>
<b>Project No.</b>	AD/RAS/96/C25
<b>Duty Station:</b>	Mong Pawk Township, Southern Wa Region, Eastern Shan State, Myanmar
<b>Post:</b>	Project Evaluator (community development)
<b>Duration:</b>	7-27 March 2003 (21 working days)

### **Background**

The Project aims at reducing the supply and demand of opium and other drugs in the southern Wa area of Myanmar, using a sustainable, community-based approach. The Project design features 2 phases with a thorough evaluation at the end of each phase. The Project Document was approved by the Chinese and Myanmar Governments and UNDCP (now called UNODC) in 1997 and implementation started at the end of 1998. A midterm evaluation was conducted at the end of Phase One in May 2000 and included some recommendations which led to a redesign of the Project. The new Project Document was endorsed by UNDCP (UNODC) in January 2001. According to the last Project revision the second phase is due to end in December 2003.

### **Current Status**

During the second phase of the Project, due to funding limitations, the number of activities has been decreased compared to the first phase. The focus has been on community development and capacity building to ensure sustainability. Funding increased in 2002, permitting an extension in time of the Project depending on the recommendations of the evaluation team.

Expansion to other areas outside the current Project zone will be considered as requested for some time by the Wa and GOUM authorities. The Needs Assessment mission, which follows the evaluation will comprise a mission in Northern Wa and Kokang region. The Evaluator will provide to UNODC before leaving Yangon a written report that will contain sufficient information to permit a decision concerning whether the Project should continue and in what form (extension in time and/or expansion in geographical area) based on the potential for success as determined from the activities conducted and level of support given to the Project by the various stakeholders during the first phase.

The Evaluator will:

- ◆ familiarize him/herself with the expected and actual Project context, objectives and activities, counterparts and stakeholders of the Project,

- ◆ review Project design and concept, with specific reference to the common support component of the Project, in view of the specific context of the WADP,
- ◆ carefully review strategic orientations and the planning process, with specific reference to the common support component activities, that have occurred during the two phases, references to how GOUM and local authorities have promoted component activities at the village level,
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in Project design, management and implementation regarding the common support activities.
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in Project design, management and implementation, regarding the common support activities

in order to report fully regarding the potential for successful implementation or otherwise of the remainder of the Project activities.

A summary questionnaire will be completed by the consultant as part of the evaluation exercise. The Evaluator will draft a final evaluation report (focusing on common support/community development) for the Team Leader within one week of the end of his assignment, which will include a thorough assessment of:

- ◆ Project Concept and design in view of the context
- ◆ Implementation of the Project
- ◆ Outputs and impact of the Project.

In the final report, the Evaluator may recommend abandonment, modifications, or continuation of the Project, as well as recommendations related to the implementation and/or management of the Project. Lessons learned which are valid beyond the Project itself should be recorded in the final evaluation report. These will be incorporated into the final evaluation report submitted by the Team Leader to UNODC.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

It is expected although not required that the evaluation will include discussions with the communities benefiting from the Project activities, Project CTA and staff, UNODC Yangon, relevant Government ministries, Wa local authorities, donor representatives, and others who have knowledge of Project activities and may assist the Evaluator to carry out his/her responsibilities.

The Evaluator will travel to the Project Site to review and discuss Project activities. Background documentation will be made available to the consultant no less than 2 weeks before the starting date for the consultation. This documentation consists of:

19. WADP Project Document
20. Annual Project Progress Report 99-2000-2001-2002
21. Minutes of the WADP Steering Committee Meetings no: 5,6, & 7
22. Guidelines for the preparation of project evaluations
23. UNDCP Project Evaluation Summary Questionnaire
24. Standard Format and guidelines for Project Performance Evaluation Report

25. WADP Mid Term Evaluation Report 2000
26. Revised Project Document December 2000
27. Wa Authority 5-year development plan.

The evaluator team leader will work under the supervision of the Evaluation Team Leader and with the other members of the evaluation team.

### **Qualifications and Experience**

The Evaluator should be familiar with public health activities associated with reducing opium poppy cultivation in regions of Southeast Asia with at least 10 years experience implementing, monitoring, and evaluating similar projects. The Evaluator will have appropriate professional qualifications as determined by UNODC. Previous involvement and familiarity with UNODC programmes, as well as ability to communicate in local languages (Chinese, Myanmar) and dialects is an asset.



## TERMS OF REFERENCE

<b>Project title:</b>	<b>Drug control and development in the Wa region of the Shan State) (a.k.a Wa alternative development Project ,WADP)</b>
<b>Project No.:</b>	AD/RAS/96/C25
<b>Duty station:</b>	Yangon and project base in Mong Pawk
<b>Post:</b>	National Project Evaluator (Livelihoods)
<b>Duration:</b>	7 - 27 March 2003 (21 working days)

### **Background**

The project aims at reducing the supply and demand of opium and other drugs in the southern Wa area of Myanmar, using a sustainable, community-based approach. The project design features 2 phases with a thorough evaluation at the end of each phase. The project document was approved by Chinese and Myanmar Governments and UNDCP (now called UNODC) in 1997 and implementation started at the end of 1998. A mid term evaluation was conducted at the end of Phase one in May 2000 and included some recommendations which led to a redesign of the project. The new project document was endorsed by UNDCP (UNODC) in January 2001. According to the last project revision the second phase is due to end in December 2003.

### **Current status**

During the second phase of the project due to funding limitation the number of activities have been decreased compared to the first prodoc. The focus was on community development and capacity building to ensure sustainability. Funding increased in 2002 permitting an extension in time of the project depending on the recommendations of the evaluation team. Eventual expansion to other areas outside the current project zone might equally be considered as requested for some time now by the Wa and GOUM authorities. A need assessment mission will follow the evaluation mission in Northern Wa and Kokang region for which separate TOR will be written.

### **Strategy**

The overall project strategy remains unchanged, as summarized in paragraph 2.22 of the project document.

### **Evaluation purpose**

As required by UNODC and including the objectives described in paragraph 7.8 entitled "Evaluation" of the Project Document (attached), the Evaluator will conduct an in-depth evaluation of the project. The Evaluator will provide to UNODC before leaving Yangon a written report that will contain sufficient information to permit a decision concerning whether the project should continue and in what form (extension in time and / or expansion in geographical area) based on the potential for success as

determined from the activities conducted and level of support given to the project by the various stakeholders during the first phase.

The evaluator will:

- ◆ familiarize him/herself with the expected and actual project context, objectives and activities, counterparts and stakeholders of the project,
- ◆ assist in reviewing project design and concept in view of the specific context of the project,
- ◆ Take part in review of strategic orientations and planning process that have occurred during the two phases,
- ◆ Consider all aspects of project implementation : effectiveness of project management, inputs and backstopping by UNODC,
- ◆ Participate in the identification and assessment of the effectiveness and timeliness of expected project outputs,
- ◆ identify possible shortcomings and recommend possible adjustments in project design, management and implementation,

in order to report fully regarding the potential for successful implementation or otherwise of the remainder of the project activities.

A summary assessment questionnaire will be completed by the consultant as part of the evaluation exercise. The Evaluator will present his conclusions, recommendations and overall assessment of the project status to the evaluation team leader before the end of his consultancy.

The Evaluator will prepare for UNODC a comprehensive final evaluation report within two weeks of the end of his assignment, which will include a thorough assessment of:

- ◆ Project Concept and Design in view of the context
- ◆ Implementation of the project
- ◆ Outputs and Impact of the project

In his final report, the Evaluator may recommend abandonment, modifications, or continuation of the project, as well as recommendations related to the implementation and/or management of the project.

Lessons learned which are valid beyond the project itself should be recorded in the final evaluation report.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

It is expected although not required that the evaluation will include discussions with the communities benefiting from the project activities, project CTA and staff, UNODC Yangon, relevant Government ministries, Wa local authorities, donor representatives, and others who have knowledge of project activities and may assist the Evaluator to carry out his/her responsibilities.

The Evaluator will travel to the Project Site to review and discuss project activities. Background documentation will be made available to the consultant no less than 2 weeks before the starting date for the consultation. Background documentation consists of:

1. WADP Project Document

2. Annual Project Progress Report 99-2000-2001-2002
3. Minutes of the WADP Steering Committee Meeting no. 5,6 & 7
4. Guidelines for the preparation of project evaluations
5. UNDCP Project Evaluation Summary Assessment Questionnaire
6. Standard Format and guidelines for Project Performance Evaluation Report
7. WADP Mid Term Evaluation Report 2000.
8. revised prodoc December 2000

The evaluator will work with under the authority of the evaluator team leader and with the other member of evaluation the team . Representatives from each donors countries (USA, Japan, Germany, Italy) might also participate in the evaluation process and the follow up mission on need assessment.

## Annex 2

### ORGANIZATIONS AND PLACES VISITED AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED

#### YANGON

8 March 2003

UNODC Myanmar Country Office:	Pierre Bouan, WAPD Project Coord.
Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control	Pol. Col. Hkam Awng, Joint Secretary
	Pol. Col. Sit Aye, Director, International Department

Progress of Border Areas and National Races Department (NaTaLa)	Col. Than Swe, Director-General
	U Nyi Nyi, Director, Planning & Inspection Division

9 March 2003

Review background literature and documents  
Meeting of Evaluation Team at Sedona Hotel

10 March 2003

Briefing at UNODC by Mr. Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Country Representative  
Depart Yangon by Yangon Airways for Kyaington  
Visit Kyaington Liaison Office  
Travel by car to Project Office, Mong Pawk

11 March 2003

Staff Meeting<sup>11</sup> Chaired by Mr. Xavier Bouan, Project Office, Mong Pawk  
Overview in discussion and by PowerPoint presentation of Project  
Meetings with Component chairmen  
Meeting with Lahu and Shan Health Volunteers trained by Project  
Dinner with U Ya Khu, District Officer, Mong Pawk

12 March 2003

---

<sup>11</sup> See page following schedule for staff organizational chart and persons met

Meet doctors and treated Wa and Lahu drug users at Mong Pawk Hospital Drug Treatment Center

Travel to Wan Lone Palaung Village, meet  
Traditional village leader  
Health, com. dev. volunteers

Ai Yi Nuan  
Ai Toey, Ai Eng, Ai Sam  
Ai Ou, Khamthong

Travel to Mong Khar Township

Pam Nau Lahu village  
Wan Lone Palaung village

Village Farmer, Health Volunteer  
Nang Kham Noom, Nurse at Clinic

13 March 2003

In Mong Khar Township

Rural Health Center

Nang Phen Com. Health Trainer

Meet U Nyi Maung

Mong Khar Township authorities  
Committee Member

Mong Khar Irrigation Canal  
Wan Hwe Shan village  
Wan Lone Palaung Village

Inkham, Headman  
Pai Shan, Cluster Head  
Mr. Say

Return to Mong Pawk

14 March 2003

Project Headquarters  
Visit Mong Pawk Market

Captain Hla Shwe, Project Manager

Nam Maung Tai Village

Nam Maung Tai Village Tract  
Headman's Wife, Namand  
Na Ha, Local Teacher  
Kyaw Di, Headman  
Ay Ta, Village Cluster Head

Nam Pai Township Office, Health Station  
Nam Pai Wa Baptist School  
Hwe Tang Village  
Nam Maung Tai

Pe Trux, Schoolteacher

Health Volunteer, 30-40 villagers in  
discussion on health, water.

15 March 2003

Travel to Mong Phen Township  
 Township Agricultural Station  
 Son Khe Wa Village  
 Lunch with Township Authorities

Rural Health Center

Kyein Kham Village

Nam Pa Kha Akha Village

Thant Zin, Agr. Township Manager  
 Thant Zin, Township Ag. Manager  
 Ai To, Village Headman  
 San Kho, Township Chairman  
 & four associates  
 U Chit Nyunt, Community Health  
 Trainer  
 Kya Eu, Village Cluster Head  
 Mrs. Na Meui, Wife of above  
 Township Assistant Secretary  
 Zeng Pao, Li Wei Shing, Teachers  
 Bu Kuh, Schoolteacher

16 March 2003

Begin report writing.

17 March 2003

Continue report writing

U Solomon (Community Health worker, Nam Pai), in Mong Pawk

Pawk Noi Niu Lahu Village

U Ya Myo, Schoolteacher  
 Daw Na Sen, Schoolteacher  
 U Kya Hpu, Deputy Village Tract  
 Headman  
 Kya Ti, Traditional Leader

Pang Lim Village and Schoolbuilding  
 Rural Health Volunteer Training

18 March 2003

Nong Kham (Shan Lake)  
 Continue report writing

Travel to Pang Sang

Wa Central Authority

Zhao Aik Nup, External Relations Chief  
 Yuan Sheng Ping, Political (& Central  
 Education Committee)

Health Unlimited Office (UK NGO)

19 March 2003

In Pangsang

Wa Central Authority

Bao You Chan, Chair  
& staff

Return to Mong Pawk

20 March 2003

Mong Pawk District Education  
Begin Compiling Evaluation Report  
Meet Captain Hla Shwe  
Meet Project Coordinator on budget issues.

Li Tar, Director

21 March 2003

Compile Evaluation Report Draft

22 March 2003

Complete Evaluation Report Draft  
Review Draft Findings with Project Coordinator  
Review Draft Findings with UNODC Myanmar Country Director, Jean-Luc  
Lemahieu & UNODC Rene

23 March 2003

Present Lessons Learned to UNODC-led Needs Assessment Mission to Northern Wa  
& Kokang


24 March 2003

Ronald D. Renard departs Mong Pawk for Pang Sang

25 March 2003


U Aung Tin, Rita Gebert, Philippe Redon depart for Kyaington & Yangon the  
following day.

# UNODC/Wa Project Organization Chart (March, 2003)









**WA ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  
LIVELIHOOD COMPONENT**      **Date. 17/10/2001**

**Table 1. Monsoon rice crop-cuts**

No .	Village/farmer	Variety	Project yield	Last year yield	Remark
1	Pan Lim, U Mar Lone	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	5.6 t/hectare	3 t/hectare	Local = Eh
2	Kekala, U Le Shi	China 203, LLR	4.95t/hectare	2.5 t/hectare	Local = Kao Mon Kao
3	MPawk New, U Ca Mu	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	3.4 t/hectare	2.5 t/hectare	Local = Kya Ye Eh
4	Kekala, U Ca Va	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	5.58 t/hectare	2.5 t/hectare	Local = Kao Mon Kao
5	Nam Yart, U Kya Yaw	F1/64 (Hybrid) ULR	2.13 t/hectare	1.77 t/hectare	Local = Lan Saw
6	Nam Yart, U Law Ta	F1/64 (Hybrid) ULR	2.28 t/hectare	1.77 t/hectare	Local = Lan Saw
7	Nam Yart, U Kya Ei	F1/64 (Hybrid)	2.43 t/hectare	1.77 t/hectare	Local = Lan Saw

		ULR			
8	PNN, U Kya Ka	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	4.31 t/hectare	2.59 t/hectare	Local = Eh
9	Tong Pha, U Kya La	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	5.58 t/hectare	2.28 t/hectare	Local = Kao Mar Phai
10	Mong Pawk New, U Y Chi Cha	F1/747 (Hybrid) LLR	5.7 t/hectare	3.04 t/hectare	Local = Kya Yi Eh
11	Mong Pawk Old, U Kya Law	China 203 LLR	5.38 t/hectare	2.7 t/hectare	Local = Eh
12	Mong Pawk Old, U Kya Mu	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	4.36 t/hectare	2.59 t/hectare	Local = Eh
13	Mong Pawk Old, U Kya Shi	China 203 LLR	4.35 t/hectare	2.54 t/hectare	Local = Kao Mon Kao
14	Keh Ka La, U Kya Maw	F1/64 (Hybrid) LLR	3.2 t/hectare	2.38 t/hectare	Local = Eh
15	Nam Yart, U Kya Phi	F1/64 (Hybrid) ULR	2.84 t/hectare	1.93 t/hectare	Local = Kya Tu Nyi
16	PNN, U Mut Tha	Kao Mar Phai ULR	2.9 t/hectare	1.52 t/hectare	Local = Kya Law
17	PNN, U Kya Sit	Kao Mar Phai ULR	2.5 t/hectare	1.52 t/hectare	Local = Kya Law

18	PNN, U Kya Wah	Kao Mar Phai ULR	2.8 t/hectare	1.62 t/hectare	Local = Kya Law Nat
19	PNN, U Kya Soe	F1/747 (Hybrid) LLR	4.31 t/hectare	2.43 t/hectare	Local = Eh
20	Keh Ke La, U Kya Yaw	China 203 LLR	5.12 t/hectare	2.5 t/hectare	Local = Eh
21	Keh Ke La, U Kya Yaw	F1/64 (Hybrid) ULR	3.8 t/hectare	2.4 t/hectare	Local = Kao Mon Kao
22	Keh Ke La, U Maw She	F1/747 (Hybrid) LLR	5.6 t/hectare	2.43 t/hectare	Local = Eh
23	Tong Pha, U Nyi Mon	Kao Mar Phai ULR	2.28 t/hectare	1.79 t/hectare	Local = Kya Tu Nyi
24	Tong Pha, U Kya Nu	Kao Mar Phai ULR	2.43 t/hectare	1.78 t/hectare	Local = Kya Law